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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON FIRM-LEVEL DISTORTIONS
AND AGGREGATE PRODUCTIVITY
Gorkem Bostanci
Guillermo Ordoñez
Harold Cole

This thesis focuses on how the frictions at the firm-level production decisions
impact aggregate productivity.
The first chapter quantifies the impact of trade secret protection on labor outsourcing, and consequently, on aggregate productivity. First, using event studies and
differences-in-differences around the staggered adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, I show that better trade secret protection leads to increased outsourcing. Second, to quantify the resulting gains in productivity, I build a structural model of
outsourcing and multi-industry dynamics and estimate it with data from the U.S.
manufacturing sector. I decompose the cross-state differences in labor outsourcing
into differences in firing cost, industry composition, demand volatility, and trade secret protection. Strengthening trade secret protection for all states to match the state
with the strictest protection would increase the outsourcing employment by 29% and
aggregate output by 0.8%.
iv

The second chapter studies the role of information frictions by measuring how the
informativeness of the stock prices changes with business cycles. We first build a stock
market model in which both the information content and the noise in prices respond to
changes in economic activity, affecting how well those prices reflect firm’s performance.
Then we incorporate this module in a dynamic model with heterogeneous firms to
characterize how stock price informativeness and capital misallocation interact with
one another. We find that an increase in liquidity concerns can simultaneously boost
information production, decrease stock price informativeness, and increase capital
misallocation.
The third chapter examines the strong positive correlation between job-to-job
transition rates and nominal wage growth in the U.S. First, using time series regressions, structural monetary policy shocks, and survey data on search effort we provide
evidence that inflationary shocks cause higher job-to-job transitions in the subsequent
years. Second, we build a model with aggregate shocks and competitive on-the-job
search in which wages react sluggishly to inflation. Third, we calibrate the model
to the U.S. economy and find that the output response to inflation shock is nonmonotonic. The monetary authority can stimulate productivity with an inflationary
shock through job-to-job transitions.
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3.10 The Discrepancy Between the MCS Forecast and Realized Inflation . 205
3.11 Predictive Regressions for Inflation Mistake and Acceptance Rate . . 206

xiii

Chapter 1
Productivity Gains from Labor
Outsourcing: The Role of Trade
Secrets
by Gorkem Bostanci†

1.1

Introduction

Producers’ demand for workers changes over time due to fluctuating demand for goods
and the presence of tasks that are not performed frequently. Labor outsourcing allows
producers to make quick adjustments to their workforce, bypassing hiring and firing
costs. However, many jobs, which could be outsourced, also provide access to sensitive
information. For example, accountants might see financial documents, machine operators might see product designs, and security guards might see visitor lists. Sharing
such information with outsiders can be problematic if the legal environment does not
†University of Pennsylvania.

1

provide adequate protection for intellectual property. In such cases, producers will
be reluctant to use outsourced workers, leading to an inefficiently small outsourcing
sector, slower reallocation of workers, and reduced aggregate productivity.1
In this paper, I quantify the impact that trade secret protection has on aggregate
productivity by affecting the extent of outsourcing in the economy. To show that
the legal environment impacts labor outsourcing, I first use the staggered adoption
of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) among states of the U.S. Next, I develop
and estimate a structural model of industry dynamics in which firms choose whether
to use outsourced workers in each task. I use the estimated model to measure the
impact of distorted outsourcing decisions on aggregate productivity. I find that if all
states of the U.S. could protect trade secrets as well as the state with the strictest
protection, the fraction of outsourced workers would increase by 29%, and aggregate
output would increase by 0.8%.
The U.S. provides a good laboratory to study this question because it features
considerable variation in both trade secret protection and the extent of outsourcing.
First, for reasons that were exogenous to outsourcing, the switch to statutory law via
the UTSA happened in different years for different states, creating the heterogeneity in
protection. Second, the extent of outsourcing varies substantially, both over time and
across states. The firms that provide labor-intensive services, which were historically
done in-house, employed 11% of the U.S. labor force in 2018, yet this share was just
over 3% in 1971. In 2018, these firms had an employment share of 14.3% in California
(90th percentile) but only 7.6% in Wisconsin (10th percentile).
I start by documenting three main stylized facts on the patterns of labor outsourcing in the U.S. First, I show that the growth in outsourcing was not an artifact of
1

See Decker et al., 2020 for an exercise and an overview of the literature on the relation between
input reallocation and aggregate productivity.

2

growth in industries that demand outsourcing more than others. Second, the growth
in labor outsourcing is not accompanied by a similar growth in the outsourcing of
physical goods. Third, the cross-state heterogeneity in demand for outsourced workers does not diminish once I compare the demand from more disaggregated industry
groups. These facts motivate a state- and time-specific factor that determines the
extent of labor outsourcing for all industries.
To understand the role of trade secret protection, I use the staggered adoption of
the UTSA across U.S. states. First, using historical anecdotes and event studies, I
argue that timing of the adoptions was exogenous to outsourcing patterns. Second,
using difference-in-differences, I show that stronger trade secret protection has a positive and significant impact on the size of the labor outsourcing sector. Quantitatively,
improvements in trade secret law explain 14% of the outsourcing share growth from
1971 to 1997, translating to 0.7 million new jobs in the outsourcing sector. Third,
I supplement the relevance of shared information by showing that the impact was
not significant for tasks that are (1) unlikely to involve sensitive information or (2)
already subject to auxiliary enforcement through professional organizations.
To quantify the aggregate productivity gains, I develop and estimate a structural
model of industry dynamics that is based on Hopenhayn, 1992. I augment the model
in two dimensions. First, I incorporate a task-based production framework in which
firms decide whether to use their employees or outsourced workers for each task.
Unlike employees, the number of outsourced workers can be adjusted freely, but their
productivity is limited by how much sensitive information is shared. The extent of
trade secret protection determines which information can be shared without risking
leaks and, thus, the tasks that can be feasibly outsourced. Second, I extend the model
to accommodate multiple industries that use different technologies, including different
tastes for outsourced labor. In total, the extent of outsourcing can differ across states
3

due to differences in four components: (1) strength of employment protection; (2)
within-industry firm characteristics; (3) industry compositions; and (4) strength of
trade secret protection.
I estimate the model using state-industry-level data from the U.S. manufacturing
sector in 2007. I use establishment size distributions and job flows among others to
identify the magnitude of firing costs and the parameters of the production technologies (components (1) and (2)). The fundamental identifying assumption for distinguishing (3) and (4) is that the comparative advantage of outsourced workers (e.g.,
specialized knowledge) depends on the industry but not on the state. In contrast, the
extent of trade secret protection depends on the state, but not on the industry. My
identification relies on parameters that are constant across states; hence, it requires
estimating all state-industry pairs simultaneously. To make the estimation feasible, I
continue in two stages. In the first stage, I use the method of moments to estimate
the full model separately for each state under assumptions where the task-based production function simplifies to a CES aggregate of employees and outsourced workers.
In the second stage, I treat the estimated CES factor shares as data and estimate
the trade secret protection and outsourcing efficiency parameters separately using
non-linear least squares. The estimated trade secret protection parameters are highly
correlated with the UTSA adoption dates. I find the impact of differences in trade
secret protection to be considerable. If all states had the same (average) level of trade
secret protection, the cross-state dispersion of outsourcing would decline by 19%.
Using the model estimates, I ask how the extent of outsourcing and aggregate
productivity would change if all states enforced trade secret protection as well as the
state with the strictest protection. I find that the ratio of purchased outsourcing to
payroll expenses would increase by 4.5 pp (from 13.6% to 18.1%), while the aggregate
output would go up by 0.8% ($165B in 2018). A large portion of the output growth
4

would come through the entry of new firms, while the size-productivity correlation
in the economy would also improve. Since the only productive input in the economy,
labor, is fixed, all productivity gains essentially stem from the improved allocation of
workers between producers. The wage levels would increase more than the increase
in output, implying an increase in the labor share. There would also be modest
gains in business dynamism through increased job reallocation and entry rates in the
steady-state.
My paper is closely related to others that use estimated distortions in firm decisions to analyze the importance of contract enforcement and trust for aggregate
productivity. Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2012 find that the regions that have
lower trust measures have firms with more centralized structures, slower worker reallocation, and lower productivity. Akcigit, Alp, and Peters, 2021, who quantify the
impact of lack of enforcement and the resulting lack of delegation, find that the differences in enforcement can explain 11% of the productivity difference between India
and the U.S. Grobovšek, 2020 finds similar quantitative effects from lack of enforcement using data from France. The closest paper to mine is Boehm and Oberfield,
2020. They study the impact of weak contract enforcement on aggregate productivity
through distortions in the choice of intermediate inputs. In particular, in Indian states
where courts are more congested, firms substitute away from specialized intermediate inputs towards generic ones to avoid hold-up problems. My empirical strategy is
similar to theirs in that I use cross-state variation in wedges to structurally identify
distortions. However, there are methodological differences beyond the differences in
our questions. Boehm and Oberfield, 2020 use firm-level data on intermediate input
use, which allows them to control for a larger set of differences across states than
mine. At the same time, their model is static, which does not permit analysis of
the dynamic flexibility gains from labor outsourcing. While their measure of court
5

congestion is constant over time, I can use state-level changes in laws to control for
many state-specific covariates through state fixed effects.
My paper also contributes to the literature on the cost of employment protection.
The patterns and implications of labor flows have been studied extensively,2 but especially more recently after Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008 and Hsieh and Klenow, 2009
who showed that input misallocation can explain a large part of cross-country differences in aggregate TFP. Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993, using a general equilibrium
setting, found that a firing cost equal to 1 year of wages can decrease employment
by as much as 2.5%.3 Focusing largely on the fixed-term contracts commonly used
in Europe, a branch of the literature asked whether alternative forms of employment
can help (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992, Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002, Caggese and
Cuñat, 2008, Katz and Krueger, 2019). My contribution here is two-fold. First, I
study the importance of a wide range of labor outsourcing practices instead of the
fixed-term workers that tend to work in lower-skilled occupations. Second, I allow
outsourced workers to be imperfect substitutes to permanent workers and evaluate
distortions that limit their utilization.
My paper is also related to the literature that examines the determinants and
consequences of labor outsourcing. The large growth in labor outsourcing practices
brought nationwide surveys, as in Harrison and Kelley, 1993, K. Abraham and Taylor,
1996 and Houseman, 2001. The three biggest reasons managers list for outsourcing
are higher flexibility, access to specialized labor, and cost savings. Autor, 2001,
Houseman, Kalleberg, and Erickcek, 2003 and Autor and Houseman, 2010 analyze
2

See Davis and J. Haltiwanger, 1992, Caballero and Hammour, 1994, Bartelsman and Doms,
2000, Foster, J. C. Haltiwanger, and Krizan, 2001, Autor, Kerr, and Kugler, 2007.
3
Bento and Restuccia, 2017 and Da-Rocha, Restuccia, and Tavares, 2019 have found the impact
of firing costs on employment and productivity becomes even larger once the life-cycle productivity
growth of firms is endogenized. The impact of employment protection laws on labor allocation had
been an active area, following the early contributions by Lazear, 1990 and Bentolila and Bertola,
1990.
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how outsourcing allows employers to screen potential hires. Bidwell, 2012, using
data on outsourcing projects within a single firm, suggests that personal interests
of managers play a role in outsourcing decisions. More recently, Goldschmidt and
Schmieder, 2017 and Drenik et al., 2020 use microdata on both the employer and client
of outsourced workers to confirm the cost saved by outsourcing instead of hiring.4
Adding to the literature, I propose and quantify the trade secret protection as a
concern in labor outsourcing decisions. My model incorporates an examination of
how outsourcing impacts flexibility, access to specialized talent, and cost savings in
a simplified way. However, it does not incorporate the potential benefits through
screening or an organizational conflict within the firm. Lastly, Bloom, Eifert, et al.,
2013 and Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar, 2018, using RCTs, document large sustained
gains from receiving free management consulting services. I confirm their findings in
a macroeconomic setting.
Last, my paper is related to studies of firm boundaries. Following Coase, 1937,
Williamson, 1975, and Grossman and Hart, 1986, the literature analyzes how imperfect contract enforcement impacts the organization of production. The empirical
literature has broadly focused on either the make-or-buy decisions for physical inputs
by multinationals or the competitive effects of vertical integration.5 I contribute by
showing that intellectual property protection is specifically important for the makeor-buy decision for services.6
4
For papers that analyze the macroeconomic implications of growing labor outsourcing, see
Berlingieri, 2013 for the structural transformation in the U.S., Giannoni and Mertens, 2019 for the
trends in labor share, and Bilal and Lhuillier, 2020 and Bergeaud et al., 2020 for wage inequality.
5
See Antras, 2003, Nunn, 2007, Corcos et al., 2013, Antras, Fort, and Tintelnot, 2017, and Boehm,
Forthcoming for discussion on multinational organizations. See Alfaro et al., 2016, Crawford et al.,
2018, Hansman et al., 2020 for research on competitive effects and Lafontaine and Slade, 2007 for a
broad review of this literature.
6
The idea that firms provide a structure that protects secrets has been proposed as early as
Alchian and Demsetz, 1972 and Liebeskind, 1996. See Rajan and Zingales, 2001 and Henry and RuizAliseda, 2016b for theoretical analyses and Ethier and Markusen, 1996, Fosfuri, Motta, and Rønde,
2001, Bolatto et al., 2020, and Kukharskyy, 2020 for the make or buy decision of multinationals in
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 summarizes trade secret
protection in the U.S. and how it matters for labor outsourcing in particular. Section
1.3 documents new facts on outsourcing as well as a causal link from trade secret
protection that motivates the structural model. Section 1.4 presents the structural
model, while Section 1.5 presents the estimation strategy and results. Section 1.6
presents the counterfactual exercise and Section 1.7 concludes.

1.2

Background

I start this section by defining trade secrets and discussing their significance for businesses. Second, I discuss the historical development of the trade secret law in the U.S.,
emphasizing the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA). Third, I discuss how trade secret
law impacts employees and outsourced workers differently.

1.2.1

Trade Secrets

The USPTO defines trade secrets as “information that has either actual or potential
independent economic value by virtue of not being generally known, has value to
others who cannot legitimately obtain the information, and is subject to reasonable
efforts to maintain its secrecy”. Business information such as customer lists and
pricing strategy as well as R&D related information such as manufacturing techniques
and designs can be trade secrets.
Trade secrets are arguably the most important form of IP for most businesses.
Protecting information on clients and suppliers, pricing strategies, and long-term
growth plans have historically been essential for firms. On the other hand, only a
fraction of firms engage in formal R&D, and among those that do, a small fraction
countries with weak IP protection.
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holds patents. Moreover, trade secrets are still a fundamental part of R&D, even
when the ultimate goal is to get a patent.
Trade secrets are understudied compared to other forms of IP, as assigning a dollar
value to secrets is hard with the absence of an explicit market.7 The lack of legal
uniformity has also limited statistical research on trade secret protection, even though
they are the most litigated form of intellectual property (Lerner, 2006).

1.2.2

Trade Secret Protection in the U.S.

Before 1979, trade secrets were protected exclusively under common law.8 This created two main problems. First, as no two cases are the same, there was uncertainty
regarding the law’s extent.9 Second, three standard requirements -to declare the act
as a trade secret violation- were unfit for outsourcing practices: (1) information had
to be illegally appropriated, (2) the accused party had to be in direct competition
with the plaintiff, and (3) those who have paid an amount in good faith to purchase
the information from the accused were not prevented from further use (Lao, 1998).
Because the outsourced worker would usually receive the information legally and act
only as an intermediary between the client and its competitor, the law did not provide
adequate protection for outsourcing relationships.
The Uniform Law Commission has drafted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA)
in 1979. The UTSA statutes defined which information constitutes a trade secret,
which acts constitute misappropriation, and which are the associated remedies. It
7

The 2017 report by the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property estimates
the total cost of trade secret theft to the U.S. economy to be between 1% to 3% of GDP, which is
somewhere between the yearly outlays to the Dept. of Education and Dept. of Defense.
8
Common law, as opposed to statutory law, does not rely on a codified set of rules. Instead, it
uses previous court decisions to reach new ones.
9
”... even in states in which there has been significant litigation, there is undue uncertainty
concerning the parameters of trade secret protection, and the appropriate remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.”, UTSA Prefatory Note (1985). See Appendix 1.E for details on the legal
environment under common law.
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also broadened the law’s scope, e.g., by making misappropriation itself a crime, without the information being used or disclosed. Most importantly, it made third parties
liable if they receive this information with a reasonable expectation that it is misappropriated. Each state had to opt-in for the UTSA to be effective in its courts.
Minnesota, Idaho, Arkansas, Kansas, and Louisiana were the first states to adopt it
in 1980. By 1988, 26 states had already adopted it, and by 2019, all states did.10

1.2.3

Trade Secret Protection and Labor Outsourcing

There are two main reasons why trade secret law is crucial for labor outsourcing.
First, although its extent varies, all outsourced workers are exposed to some trade
secrets. Second, it is harder to prevent outsourced workers from disclosing secrets to
third parties compared to employees.
High-skill outsourcing generally provides a personalized solution to the client’s
problem; hence it is straightforward how an outsourced R&D expert or an accountant would be exposed to secret information. Albeit to a lesser degree, trade secrets
are also relevant for the low-skilled. An outsourced machine operator would be exposed to product designs and daily production volumes. An outsourced personal
assistant would have access to manager’s daily activities, including meetings with
other branches and business partners. Furthermore, having access to facilities may
enable overhearing the managers’ discussions and the rumors circulating among other
workers11 . In short, outsourced workers’ regular activities inherently create exposure
10

There have been two other main developments in trade secrets protection. Economic Espionage
Act of 1996 made trade secrets misappropriation that is either interstate or benefits a ’foreign
power’ a federal crime. The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA) allowed any trade secret
misappropriation case to be seen in federal courts. Although both are significant developments,
they happened at the national level, making it harder to measure their impact.
11
In SEC v. Steffes, No. 01 Civ. 06266 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2010), the SEC alleged railroad
workers “traded and tipped on observations made on the job, including seeing people in suits tour
the rail yards, hearing coworkers discuss the possible sale of their company, and being asked to
prepare asset valuations.”Cohen and Dunning, 2010
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to firm secrets unless the firm explicitly limits their access, which would reasonably
reduce their value.
The data from trade secret litigation confirm the intuition. First, limiting access
to certain ‘labs’ does not protect the business from trade secret misappropriation.
Almeling, Snyder, and Sapoznikow, 2009 shows, in their sample of U.S. federal district court cases in 2008, only 35% involved any technical information or know-how.
31% involved customer lists, and 35% involved non-technical business information.
Second, the misappropriator is almost always someone who has physical access to the
secret: an employee or a business partner in 90% and 93% of the cases for the cases in
federal and state appellate courts, respectively (Almeling, Snyder, Sapoznikow, and
McCollum, 2010). Similarly, the defendant was either a former, current, or an outsourced worker in 76% of the cases tried under the Economic Espionage Act (Searle,
2012).
Employees are less susceptible to these concerns than outsourced workers for two
main reasons. First, voluntary disclosure of secrets is less likely for employees. Because the employment relationship is generally of longer-term12 , it allows the design
of better incentives for the employee to work in the best interest of the employer
(Liebeskind, 1996, Gibbons, Roberts, et al., 2013). Second, inevitable disclosure is
less likely for employees. While covenant not to compete (CNC) agreements13 are
ubiquitous among employees that work with sensitive data (Jeffers, 2018, Shi, 2020),
they are not common in outsourcing agreements, being directly at odds with the
business model of most outsourcing firms.14 Lastly, signing a non-disclosure agree12

There is no legal constraint on how long an outsourcing relationship lasts. However, longer relationships make it more likely that the courts will interpret it as a de facto employment relationship
in case of a dispute, especially upon termination. See Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith Inc., (611 F. Supp. 344 S.D.N.Y. 1984).
13
CNC agreements designate a period for which the employee cannot work in the same industry
with the previous employer upon termination of the employment contract.
14
“Firms regularly hire consultants to advise on sensitive business problems, and one of the im-
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ment helps, but how it is enforced is largely determined by the trade secret law (See
Appendix 1.E.2).
In short, firms have reason to avoid labor outsourcing to limit the risks of losing
trade secrets. The next section tests and confirms this hypothesis using the crossstate legal variation across the U.S. The modeling choices in Section 1.4 are based on
the frictions discussed here.

1.3

Empirical Analysis

In the first half of this section, I document two broad facts on domestic15 labor
outsourcing in the U.S, focusing on its growth and cross-state heterogeneity. In the
second half, I argue the trade secret laws in the U.S. help explain the two facts.
I define labor outsourcing as the purchase of labor-intensive services that can
otherwise be done in-house. My definition is far from being arbitrary. The businesses
that provide outsourcing as I define it are conveniently classified into two 2-digit
NAICS sectors.16 NAICS 54 (The Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services)
principally employs high-skill occupations such as consultants, accountants, and data
analysts. NAICS 56 (The Administrative and Support and Waste Management and
Remediation Services) principally employs lower-skilled occupations such as machine
operators, security guards, and janitors. The output of both sectors is mainly used
as an intermediate input by other sectors. The set of industries in this definition
is similar to Berlingieri, 2013, but more extensive than Autor, 2003 and Katz and
portant qualifications of the consultants seems to be that they know the industry well-they have
offered similar consulting services to the competitors.” Kitch, 1980
15
I abstract from foreign outsourcing (e.g., call centers abroad) because it constitutes a relatively
small fraction (3.5% in 2004) of total labor outsourcing practices (Amiti et al., 2005). See Appendix 1.C for the cross-country evidence on the relationship between outsourcing and trade secret
protection. The cross-country evidence broadly supports the analysis within the U.S.
16
See Appendix 1.B for the few exceptions, the details of the selection of industries, and how I
map different classifications to one another.
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Krueger, 2019 who prioritize temp agencies.
Throughout the paper, I refer to the firms and the industries that supply labor
outsourcing services as the outsourcing firms and the outsourcing sector for brevity.

1.3.1

Facts on Domestic Labor Outsourcing

Here, I present two sets of facts that shows a large heterogeneity in labor outsourcing
across states and over time in the U.S. Furthermore, the heterogeneity is not explained
by differences in skill levels, industries, and occupations.
Fact 1: The outsourcing sector’s employment share has tripled since the
70s.
The outsourcing sector’s employment share increased from 3% in 1971 to 11% in 2019.
The left-hand side panel in Figure 1.1 depicts the normalized non-farm employment,
service employment, and employment in the outsourcing sector. The average growth
in the outsourcing sector far exceeds the US non-farm and services employment. The
right-hand side panel shows the large growth was evident for both skill groups. So,
the underlying reasons cannot be exclusively based on the skill level.
The growth in outsourcing was also not an artifact of (1) the growth in industries
that historically had above-average demand for outsourcing or (2) the growth in demand for occupations that historically had been outsourced more than others. I use
the BEA Integrated Production Account and find the aggregate ratio of purchased
services to value-added has increased from 0.25 in 1963 to 0.44 in 2018. Using the
time series for 63 industries, I compute the counterfactual growth if each industry’s
purchased services ratio remained constant while the output shares changed as they
did (between-industry), and if the output shares remained constant while the purchased services ratios changed as did (within-industry). I find that 84% of the growth
13

Figure 1.1: Employment Trends in Multiple Industry Groups (1971-2019) Notes: See
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is within-industry, i.e., would still happen with no structural change.
I further check whether the growth in services outsourcing is part of a broader
trend of shrinking firm boundaries. On the contrary, the ratio of all intermediate
inputs to value-added has decreased from 0.83 to 0.76 during the same period. Although each industry uses more intermediate inputs on average, the structural shift
from manufacturing to services more than canceled the growth.17
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Figure 1.2: The Cross-state Supply of and Demand for Labor Outsourcing Notes: The
details on the data sources and the state abbreviations are available in Appendix 1.B.
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industries are included.

Expenditure Ratio

NAICS 31−33
Temp Staff and Leased Employee
Data Processing
Advertising
Professional and Technical

0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05

VT

NE

ID

SD

AR

MS

ME

WV

IN

WI

MD

MO

IA

OK

MI

OR

RI

VA

KY

PA

UT

OH

AL

AZ

CO

NY

NC

NH

MA

NM

MN

IL

KS

SC

FL

NV

GA

NJ

TX

TN

DE

CT

LA

CA

MT

ND

0.00

State

NAICS 326

NAICS 333

Expenditure Ratio

Expenditure Ratio

0.15
0.15

0.10

0.05

0.05

NH
TX
CO
UT
OR
GA
VA
CA
PA
MN
MS
AZ
FL
IL
MA
OH
SC
NC
AR
SD
CT
IA
IN
OK
NY
NJ
KS
TN
WI
MD
AL
MI
KY
MO

0.00
UT
TX
IL
CA
LA
GA
MS
NC
AZ
FL
OH
RI
MA
MN
WV
NV
OK
VA
MI
TN
OR
AL
SC
NY
MD
KS
WI
NJ
PA
NE
KY
IN
NH
AR
IA

0.00

0.10

State

State

(b) Ratio of Outsourcing Expenses to Annual Payroll in Manufacturing Sectors (2017) Notes: The top panel provides estimates for all NAICS

manufacturing sectors (31-33), the bottom left panel for Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing (326), and the bottom right panel for Machinery
Manufacturing (333). In each panel, only the states with complete data on
each of the four outsourcing expenses are included. All panels use data from
the 2017 Census of Manufactures.
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Fact 2: The supply of and demand for outsourcing is heterogeneous across
states.
I define a state’s ‘supply’ of outsourcing as how much outsourcing services it provides,
and its ‘demand’ as how much outsourcing services is used there.18 To measure
the supply of outsourcing, I use the American Community Survey from the IPUMS
USA database to get employment shares for outsourcing providing sectors. Figure
1.2a presents the shares across the states of the U.S. First, there is considerable
heterogeneity: the state at the 90th percentile has a share of 14.3% while the 10th
has 7.6%. Second, a large part of the heterogeneity comes from high-skill outsourcing:
the outsourcing employment share and high skill ratio have a correlation of 0.6.
To measure the demand for outsourcing, I use the 2017 Census of Manufactures
in Figure 1.2b, which provides estimates of expense items for employer establishments. Specifically, it gives expense estimates for Temporary Staff and Employee,
Data Processing Services, Advertising and Promotional Services, and Professional
and Technical Services among others. For each state, I plot the ratio of their sum
to the Annual Payroll. First, the state-level heterogeneity is comparable to the heterogeneity in supply. The state in the 90th percentile has a ratio of 0.18, while the
10th has 0.1. Second, heterogeneity does not concentrate on one of the four types of
outsourcing expenses. Third, it does not disappear at more disaggregated levels. For
example, both the Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing and the Machinery
Manufacturing exhibit similar degrees of heterogeneity in outsourcing expenses, although their composition is very different.19 Fourth, states with higher outsourcing
17

Berlingieri, 2013 does a similar test for occupations. He picks occupations that are predominantly
employed in outsourcing sectors and tracks their employment share over time. He finds that this
share shows no trend after 1970, where most of the outsourcing growth happens.
18
The two need not equal as outsourcing services provided by a firm in one state can be used by
a firm in another state.
19
The degree of heterogeneity also persists at the 6-digit industry level; however, the data is
censored for most state-industry pairs to ensure the confidentiality of firm data. For example, the
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ratios are also the ones that have a larger share of their outsourcing in high-skill tasks,
with a correlation of 0.32.

1.3.2

Evidence on the Effect of Trade Secret Laws

The previous facts presented a considerable heterogeneity in labor outsourcing both
across states and over time that was not explained by differences in skill levels, industries, and occupations. Here, I test whether the differences in trade secret protection
over time and across states play a role.
Data and the Estimation Method
Testing the impact of trade secret protection is not straightforward for a few reasons.
First, the legal frameworks differ across states in clarity and scope, which are hard to
quantify. I use two measures in this section, namely, adoption of the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (UTSA) and the trade secret protection index (TSP index henceforth)
constructed by Png, 2017a and Png, 2017b. The adoption of the UTSA was essential
both for reducing the uncertainty about the trade secret protection and extending its
coverage, particularly for labor outsourcing relationships. The TSP index evaluates
whether states had certain types of protections in a given year and assigns a score
ranging from 0 to 1 (See Appendix 1.B for details).
Second, I need a measure of the extent of outsourcing. Unfortunately, comprehensive data on demand for labor outsourcing does not exist before 2007. Thus, I use
the supply of labor outsourcing as my measure.20 I use the state-year level employ10th and the 90th percentiles are 9% and 18% in the Plastics Pipe and Pipe Fitting Manufacturing
(NAICS 326122).
20
Although there was no definitive procedure, the governing law was of the state where the misappropriation happened in a large majority of cases (See Appendix 1.E.3). This state would generally
be the one where the client operates, especially in the 80s and 90s. As long as outsourcing firms are
more likely to serve clients in their states, my mechanism predicts a positive relationship between
the strength of trade secret protection and the employment share of the outsourcing sector in that
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ment shares of the outsourcing sector from the ASEC samples. In total, I have an
unbalanced panel of 50 states and the District of Columbia from 1970 to 1997.
Last, to measure the causal link, I need exogenous variation in protection. The
UTSA provides precisely that. After being drafted, each state had to opt-in to start
using it. The adoption times differed significantly (See Figure 1.16), creating crosssectional variation in trade secret protection on top of the time-series variation. After
arguing its exogeneity, I use the staggered adoption of the UTSA as my exogenous
variation for trade secret protection.
The staggered adoption of the UTSA allows aggregating the information from
difference-in-differences (DiD) comparisons across multiple pairs of states over many
periods. The Two-Way Fixed Effects (TWFE) estimator provides an intuitive tool
and is widely used in studies with staggered adoptions. However, the recent work
following Goodman-Bacon, 2018 has shown TWFE may fail to give (1) consistent
test statistics for pre-trends and (2) intuitive measures of treatment effects without
strong assumptions (Appendix 1.F for details). In my analysis, I primarily yield to
the historical setting to argue for the exogeneity of the UTSA adoptions, together
with statistical tests for pre-trends. I then provide estimates from both the TWFE
estimator and the estimator proposed by Callaway and P. Sant’Anna, 2020, which
remains consistent under multiple dimensions of treatment heterogeneity and selection
into treatment based on covariates.
Exogeneity of the UTSA Adoption
I start by confirming that the adoption of the UTSA did not coincide with the adoption of other major state-level laws. The adoption time of the UTSA has a weak
correlation with the adoption of other commercial uniform laws (<0.13) and employstate.
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ment protection laws (<0.04) across states.
The adoptions’ history suggests the timing choices of states were less about economic concerns and more about differences in legal structures and opinions. First,
Ribstein and Kobayashi, 1996 show the basic economic characteristics like size, population density, and state expenditures were irrelevant in explaining the adoption of
any uniform law. The structure of the state legislatures (e.g., size of chambers), on
the other hand, had predictive power on the adoption dates. Second, Sandeen, 2010
documents, many states postponed their adoption of UTSA to after 1985 due to the
opposition organized by a single attorney who argued certain clauses could be misinterpreted. Last, Png, 2017a discusses how UTSA was adopted in California only
when proposed a second time and rejected in New York for reasons unrelated to the
intended coverage of the UTSA. The opposition came from farmworkers in California
and trial lawyers in New York. They were concerned that the law can be used to hide
information about pesticides and trial evidence, respectively.21 The convergence also
supports the argument for differences in legal opinions: all states adopted a version
of the UTSA eventually.
The quantitative tests do not suggest the presence of pre-trends either.22 First, I
run the classical event study regression with the leads and lags of the treatment in a
TWFE setting

yit =

X

δl Aitl + δ4 Ait,l≥4 + δ−5 Ait,l≤−5 + βxit + αi + γt + it

(1.1)

l∈{−4,−3,−2,0,1,2,3}

where yit is the log employment share of outsourcing sectors, Aitl is equal to 1 if for
21

Similarly, during the United Kingdom’s implementation of the Trade Secrets Directive in 2018,
the opposition centered around whether the law would be used against journalists and whistle-blowers
(IPO, 2018).
22
Png, 2017a and Klasa et al., 2018 provide several tests and conclude variables used in their
analysis including R&D expenditures and capital structures of firms do not predict the adoption of
the UTSA.

19

Figure 1.3: Event Study Estimates for the UTSA Adoption Notes: The X-axis refers to

l in (1.1) for the left panel and t − g in (1.3) for the right panel. Y-axis provides the corresponding
estimates with 95% confidence intervals constructed from standard errors clustered at the state
level. I use the doubly-robust balancing procedure in the right panel. The outsourcing shares
and employment series are from the IPUMS-CPS database. The controls are population, GDP,
manufacturing GDP, manufacturing employment, unionization rate, high school and college shares,
and adoption of exceptions to at-will employment. Since the CS estimator relies on propensity score
matching, the control group must be sufficiently large for estimation. Hence, the estimation only
runs for adoptions until 1987. See Figure 1.1 for details on included industries.
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state i, year t is l years after the adoption of the UTSA. The coefficient estimates
are in Figure 1.3a. There are no signs of a pre-trend, i.e., the states that are closer
to adoption have comparable outsourcing shares to others. However, the plot also
hints at dynamic treatment effects: it takes a few years for the treatment to have full
effect. Thus, the pre-trend test likely suffers from the bias suggested by Sun and S.
Abraham, 2020. Thus, I supplement the analysis by using the estimator by Callaway
and P. Sant’Anna, 2020 (CS henceforth).
CS starts with the concept of group-time average treatment effects on the treated:

AT T (g, t) = E[Yt (g) − Yt (0)|G = g]

(1.2)

where g denotes group index (the adoption time), Gi denotes the group of unit i, Yt (g)
(Yt (0)) denotes the outcome variable at time t conditional on being treated at time
g (never being treated). Thus, AT T (g, t) denotes the effect of being treated at time
20

g that is measured in time t, thus allows heterogeneity across groups and dynamic
treatment effects. Furthermore, by conditioning on being treated, it controls for
selection into treatment.23 After identifying AT T (g, t), CS aggregates them over t to
get average dynamic effects:

θD (e) :=

T
X

1{g + e ≤ T }AT T (g, g + e)P (G = g|G + e ≤ T )

(1.3)

g=2

where e denotes the exposure time and θD (e) are the counterparts of the event study
estimates of the classical DiD under homogenous treatment. Lastly, AT T (g, t) can
be aggregated over both g and t to get an overall treatment effect:

θSO :=

T
X

θS (g)P (G = g)

(1.4)

g=2

Figure 1.3b plots the event study estimates from (1.3), which confirm the findings
with the TWFE: there are no apparent pre-trends, and the full effect is realized only
a few years after the adoption.
The Impact of Trade Secrets Laws
Having established a case for the exogeneity of the UTSA adoption, I use the variation
it created to estimate the impact on outsourcing employment.
I have so far ignored that trade secret protection may have differed both preand post-adoption across states. I use the TSP index as the regressor in the main
specification below, instrumented by the adoption dummy in a TWFE model. There23

CS identifies ATT(g,t) under the assumptions of parallel trends (conditional on observables)
and absorbing treatment. In particular, to avoid the bias generated by dynamic treatment effects,
CS only uses units that are not yet treated in the control group and uses propensity score matching
to balance the two groups on relevant observables to take potential selection into treatment into
account.
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fore, I measure the impact through an index that quantifies this heterogeneity while
restricting attention to changes through the UTSA. To test the results’ robustness,
I also use the CS estimator to take selection into treatment, dynamic treatment effects, and treatment heterogeneity over time of adoption into account. In the main
specification, I estimate a TWFE-IV model of the form:

yit = βtspit + β̃xit + αi + γt + it

(1.5)

where yit is the log employment share of outsourcing sectors, tspit is the TSP index,
xit is the vector of controls, αi and γt are the state and year fixed-effects. αi helps
control for state-specific factors that remain constant over time, such as persistent
differences in state subsidies and the availability of natural resources. γt provides a
non-parametric time trend, controlling for broad trends in the economy, such as the
growth in information technology and changes in the federal subsidies. I instrument
the TSP index with the adoption dummy for the UTSA and use White standard
errors clustered at the state level.
Table 1.1 presents the regression results. Trade secret protection has a positive
and statistically significant effect at 5% level, in line with my hypothesis. Moreover,
the quantitative estimates are similar across specifications without controls or instrumentation. Using the estimates, I find the outsourcing sector would be 14% smaller
in 1997 had all the controls changed as they did, but the TSP indices remained the
same as the 1971 levels, translating to 0.7M jobs.
I also use the CS estimator’s overall treatment effect in Equation (1.4), which gives
comparable results.24 The CS estimates are qualitatively in line with the TWFE
24

Since CS takes potential selection into treatment based on observable covariates into account,
it requires a large enough control group for balancing the treatment and the control groups. A
larger estimation period allows using more pairwise DiD estimates to incorporate in the estimation.
However, as the estimation horizon grows, the control group’s size gets smaller, and the balancing
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Table 1.1: Two-way Fixed Effects Estimation
Adoption

Index

IV

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.06
(0.03)

0.13
(0.05)

0.13∗∗
(0.06)

Demographics

Yes

Yes

Yes

Ind Composition

Yes

Yes

Yes

Union

Yes

Yes

Yes

WDL

Yes

Yes

Yes

TS Protection

State & Year FE
Range
Observations

Adoption

Index

IV

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.05
(0.03)
∗

0.12
(0.06)

0.12
(0.06)

∗

∗

∗∗

∗∗

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

’70-’97
1,180

’70-’97
1,180

’70-’97
1,180

’70-’97
1,180

’70-’97
1,180

’70-’97
1,180

Notes: The dep. variable is the log outsourcing sector share of employment. The employment series are from IPUMS-CPS. See Figure 1.1 for details on included industries.
The main variable of interest is the UTSA adoption dummy in columns (1) and (4),
and the TSP index in others. Columns (2) and (4) present OLS estimates while (3) and
(6) present IV estimates. Columns (4)-(6) controls for unionization rate, the share of
college and high school graduates, the exceptions (good faith, implied contract, public
policy) to the at-will employment as well as logged population, GDP, manufacturing
GDP, and manufacturing employment. See Appendix 1.B for details on how each variable is constructed. I cluster the standard errors at the state level. ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05;
∗∗∗
p<0.01

estimates, although their magnitude is larger. The difference in magnitudes may
indicate large dynamic treatment effects, as suggested by the event study estimates
in Figure 1.3.
Two additional concerns bias the estimates towards 0 and cannot be resolved
without additional data. First, the treatment also impacts the control group. Once
a state adopts the UTSA, its subsequent decisions may affect others that are yet
to adopt. As the extent of cross-state citations increases, my estimates’ bias would
be greater. Second, the data available for this period is on the supply side, while
becomes less precise and eventually infeasible. Lastly, the CS estimator requires a balanced panel;
hence the longest estimation period I can use is from 1977 to 1987. I also present results from smaller
horizons where the balancing is more precise.
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Table 1.2: Overall Treatment Effect via Group-Time ATT Estimates
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

UTSA Adoption

0.20
(0.077)

0.13
(0.076)

0.16
(0.065)

0.16
(0.057)

0.11
(0.047)

0.16
(0.051)

Range
Number of Adopted States

’77-’82
6

’77-’83
9

’77-’84
11

’77-’85
11

’77-’86
13

’77-’87
19

Notes: The estimates correspond to Callaway and P. Sant’Anna, 2020 group-time att estimates
integrated over time of adoption and the length of exposure to treatment using (1.4). The
dependent variable is the log outsourcing sector share of employment, and the treatment is
the adoption of the UTSA. The control group consists of states that are not-yet-treated, and
the balancing is done via the doubly-robust estimation method by P. H. Sant’Anna and Zhao,
2020. See the notes for Table 1.1 for a list of control variables included and details on the
variables.

the adoption reasonably impacts the demand. As the extent of cross-state trade of
outsourcing services increases, my estimates’ bias would be greater. The structural
model in Section 1.4 uses demand-side data to circumvent the second problem, while
the first problem requires measuring the extent of cross-state legal influence.
Placebo Regressions
If trade secret protection is indeed important, the effect of laws should be greater
for high-skill outsourcing, where the exposure to trade secrets is arguably higher. In
columns 2 and 3 of Table 1.1, I estimate Equation (1.5) for high-skill and low-skill
outsourcing sectors separately. In line with the theory, the impact on high skill outsourcing is greater. In column 4, I address 3-digit sectors 841 and 890, which mainly
employ lawyers and accountants subject to client privilege codes: her association
would disbar an accountant or lawyer that discloses her client’s information to 3rd
parties.25 Hence, these two sectors should be affected to a lesser extent. The estimate
confirms this, where the estimate is both quantitatively smaller and not different from
25

See the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ Trust Services Criteria and the
American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
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0 at a 10% significance level. Lastly, in column (5), I re-run column (1) excluding subsector 732 (Computer and data processing services) and confirm that the concurrent
growth of the role of computers in businesses does not drive the results.
Table 1.3: Placebo Regressions
Outsourcing Share

High-Skill

Low-Skill

Leg-Acct

Except Comp

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

TSP Index

∗∗

0.13
(0.06)

∗∗

0.18
(0.09)

0.12
(0.08)

0.13
(0.11)

0.13∗
(0.07)

Range
Observations

’70-’97
1,180

’70-’97
1,174

’70-’97
1,175

’70-’97
1,177

’ 70-’97
1,180

Notes: The outsourcing shares and employment series are from the IPUMS-CPS database. See
Figure 1.1 for details on included industries and their assignment into skill bins. The fourth
column is the total employment in 3-digit 1990 U.S. Census sectors 841 (Legal services) and
890 (Accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping services). The fifth column is all 3-digit high skill
outsourcing sectors except for 732 (Computer and data processing services). Standard errors
are clustered at the state level. See Table 1.1 for details on the controls. ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05;
∗∗∗
p<0.01

1.4

A Model of Outsourcing and Trade Secret Protection

In this section, I construct a multi-industry firm dynamics model based on Hopenhayn, 1992, where firms decide whether to use in-house or outsourced workers for
various tasks. Outsourced workers are more productive in certain tasks and are easier to adjust, but need firm-specific information to perform. The effective trade secret
protection determines what amount is safe to share, i.e., the size of the enforcement
friction.
The model provides three main inputs that allow quantifying the output cost of
enforcement frictions using the observed cross-state heterogeneity in outsourcing use.
25

First, it provides a mapping between observables such as firm size distribution and
job destruction rates and structural parameters such as demand persistence and labor
adjustment costs. Second, it incorporates an intuitive restriction: the productivity
advantage of outsourced workers depends on the industry but not on the state. In
contrast, the strength of trade secret protection depends on the state but not on the
industry. Third, it maps estimated firm-level distortions to aggregate productivity by
taking general equilibrium effects through product and labor markets into account,
providing the final piece.

1.4.1

Environment

Agents and Preferences
The economy consists of (1) a decreasing returns-to-scale (DRS) intermediate goods
sector with K industries, (2) a constant returns-to-scale (CRS) final good sector, (3)
a CRS outsourcing sector, and (4) a unit measure of workers. Each K industries
in the intermediate sector have a continuum of firms and a large pool of potential
entrants. All firms maximize expected discounted profits. Each worker inelastically
supplies one unit of labor and is indifferent between being a permanent or outsourced
worker.
Technology
The Final Good and Outsourcing Sectors
All the action in the model is in the intermediate goods sector, so I quickly discuss the other two sectors here. The final goods sector produces the final good by
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aggregating the intermediate goods, solving:

max P

X
K

{Yk }K
k=1

Ykω

 ω1
−

k=1

K
X

pk Yk

(1.6)

k=1

where 1/(1 − ω) is the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods.26 The
outsourcing sector transforms each worker into an outsourced worker. Since both
sectors make 0 profits, firms’ ownership and size are irrelevant.
The Intermediate Goods Sector
The intermediate goods sector consists of K industries. To simplify the notation,
I avoid the industry subscript whenever possible. The structure of the environment
is the same across all industries; only the parameter values potentially differ.
I use a task-based production technology similar to Zeira, 1998 and Acemoglu
and Restrepo, 2018. The production of each firm is a CES aggregate of production
in individual tasks that are indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]:
Z
y=

! γθ

1

y(i)γ di

(1.7)

0

where θ < 1 controls returns to scale and 1/1 − γ is the elasticity of substitution
across tasks. Each task i can be done with permanent or outsourced workers:

y(i) = g(i)n(i) + 1{z≥ζ(i)} δr(i)

(1.8)

where n(i) and r(i) denote the number of permanent and outsourced workers assigned
to task i, g(i) denotes the marginal product of permanent workers in task i, δ denotes
the marginal product of rented workers, and z denotes the amount of firm-specific
26

I do not model demand shares for intermediate goods explicitly, since it is not possible to
distinguish them from intermediate goods prices without data on quantities.
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Figure 1.4: The Task Allocation Problem of a Software Design Firm Notes: The dashed
line pieces denote the upper-envelope of the two lines.

Marginal Product

δ

δ
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|
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i

0

Outsourced |

Permanent
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knowledge shared with each outsourced worker. ζ(i) denotes the minimum amount of
information that must be shared to outsource task i. The relative sizes of g(i) and δ
determine gains from outsourcing a task, while ζ(i) puts a hard constraint on which
tasks are feasible to be outsourced.27
I assume g(i) is strictly increasing, i.e. (1) the tasks are ordered by how suitable
they are to outsourcing, and (2) there is a strict ordering of their suitability. The
next assumption is less innocuous.
Assumption 1. ζ(i) is strictly increasing.
Assumption 1 implies that the gains from outsourcing (g(i)) strictly decreases with
the required amount of information for the task to be outsourced. This assumption
can be micro-founded with a model with communication costs. Relaxing it requires a
two-dimensional task space, which is mathematically straightforward but also harder
to interpret and complicates the notation. Nevertheless, this assumption is rather
conservative for the impact of strengthening trade secret laws. The tasks that would
provide the highest marginal gain once outsourced are assumed to be the ones that
are already outsourced.
27

I abstract from capital as an additional input in the production process. Veracierto, 2001 has
previously shown that explicitly modeling capital does not impact the quantitative inference on
steady-state labor flows in industry dynamics models.
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To make the structure more concrete, imagine SD, a software design firm whose
tasks can be grouped into office security, testing, and design. The left-hand side panel
in Figure 1.4 places the tasks in the x axis, where the increasing and flat lines represent
the marginal product of permanent and outsourced agents respectively in each task
i. Design tasks are the firm’s core functions and require knowing the specifications of
clients, how the data is organized, etc. The extent of information required would make
it more efficient to use a permanent worker. On the other hand, office security requires
little firm-specific knowledge; it could be even more productive once outsourced from
a security company with better training material. Testing would be in the middle,
requiring some firm-specific knowledge, such as the designed software’s potential flaws,
but not as much as required by the designers. First, suppose the information-sharing
constraint (z > ζ(i)) was not present. Assuming the marginal costs are constant
and equal, SD would choose to use permanent workers for design and some testing
functions and outsource the rest as in the middle panel of 1.4. However, when the
information-sharing constraint is binding, as in the right-hand side panel, effective
marginal product becomes zero for the outsourced in tasks that do not satisfy the
constraint. Hence, SD would be forced to outsource a smaller set of tasks.
Why does SD not share as much information as possible then, i.e., maximize
z? If SD shares too much, the outsourced would find it more profitable to steal
the knowledge, risking a potential lawsuit. Instead of explicitly modeling the ‘trade
secret theft’ and its aftermath, which is not the focus of the current paper (See Section
1.4.4), I simplify it into a hard constraint: the firm only shares an amount that does
not induce the outsourced worker to steal. How much information is ‘too much’ is
determined by π, which I introduce next, which represents the trade secret protection
provided by the courts.
The Intermediate Firm’s Static Allocation Problem
29

Before completing the description of the environment, I first characterize the firm’s
static task allocation problem with a given number of workers. I then use the solution
to this problem later, which simplifies describing the rest of the environment. The
firm with n permanent and r outsourced workers chooses how many to allocate each
task (n(i), r(i)), and how much information to share with the outsourced (z) to solve:

Z
F (n, r) = max
n(i),r(i),z

! γθ

1

y(i)γ di

0

(Task production) y(i) = g(i)n(i) + 1{z≥ζ(i)} δr(i)
(Resource Constraints)

1

Z

Z
r(i)di = r,

0

(Information-Sharing)

(1.9)

1

n(i)di = n
0

z≤π

The last constraint represents the legal friction: with perfect enforcement, π would
equal one and the information-sharing constraint would be redundant. Given the
assumptions on g(i) and ζ(i), the problem simplifies substantially:
Lemma 1. Let n, r, π > 0, γ < 1. For g(i), ζ(i) strictly increasing, ∃ a unique
0 ≤ z̄ ≤ ζ −1 (z) s.t. tasks i ≤ z̄ only use outsourced and tasks i > z̄ only use
permanent workers.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A for all proofs.



Thus, the problem of choosing n(i), r(i) boils down to choosing the threshold z̄.
The model does not allow identifying the level of g(i) from δ. Although the shape
of the g(i) is still important, it matters mainly for counterfactuals that extrapolate
from the range of data. Since I do not have task-level data that helps me identify
its shape, I go ahead and assume g(i) = i and stick to counterfactuals within the
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range of my data. Lastly, it is neither possible nor necessary to identify ζ(.) and π
separately. Thus, I normalize ζ −1 (π) = π. These provide a simple characterization of
F (n, r), the maximum production that can be achieved with n and r:
Proposition 1. The solution to (1.9) can be written as

F (n, r) =


|

(1 − γ)(1 − z̄
{z

1
1−γ

αn (n,r)

θ
1−γ γ
1−γ γ γ γ
)
n + z̄| {zδ } r
}

(1.10)

αr (n,r)

where z̄ is a known function of π, n, and r.
Although (1.10) looks like a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function in
permanent and outsourced workers, z̄ being a function of n and r complicates things.
The next assumption is not required for solving the model but makes the estimation
procedure feasible.28
Assumption 2. The information-sharing constraint is binding.
Corollary 1. Under Assumption 2, z̄ = π. Thus, the solution to (1.9) can be written
as
F (n, r) = A(π, δ) α(π, δ)nγ + (1 − α(π, δ))rγ

 γθ

(1.11)

where A(π, δ) is strictly increasing and α(π, δ) is strictly decreasing in π.
To sum up, under certain assumptions, the solution to the task allocation problem
boils down to a CES function, where the factor shares are determined both by the
marginal product of outsourced workers (δ) and the strength of trade secret protection
28

Specifically, it allows estimating the model for each state of the U.S. separately. Assumption 2
is not on parameters, but on equilibrium outcomes. After estimation, I confirm that this assumption
is satisfied for the vast majority of the firms under the estimated parameters. I discuss its benefits
and caveats in detail in Section 1.5.
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(π). Stronger protection has two effects on F : (1) the factor share of permanent
workers α(π, δ) go down, and (2) the productivity multiplier A(π, δ) goes up. The
first effect derives since a smaller share of tasks use permanent workers while the
second effect follows from a larger choice set. Lastly, the parameter that determines
the substitution elasticity across tasks (γ) is inherited in the CES form to determine
the elasticity of substitution between permanent and outsourced workers.
Intermediate Goods Sector - Dynamic Elements
The firms are ex-ante identical, but they are subject to idiosyncratic productivity
shocks s that follow an AR(1) process s0 = ρs +  where  ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) and shocks are
independent across firms.29 Adjusting the stock of permanent workers has a cost of
τ max{0, n− − n}, where n− is the stock of workers that were under contract, n is the
new stock of workers, and τ is a per-worker firing cost. The incumbent firms have to
pay a fixed cost of operating c every period or exit and pay a one-time cost of firing
all workers (τ n− ).30 The entrants have to pay a cost of entry cE before drawing a
shock from the distribution φ(.). Both the fixed cost of operating and the entry cost
are paid in the units of final goods.
Timing
The timing of events in a given period is as follows:
1. Entry decisions are made
2. Intermediate firms learn their productivity shocks and decide whether to stay
or exit.
29

I use revenues to discipline the production function; hence s may represent fluctuations in both
prices and quantities. I will call s demand shocks for brevity.
30
I use the specification here following the empirical evidence in Bottasso, Conti, and Sulis, 2017
that countries with higher firing costs also have lower firm exit rates. If I modeled the exit cost as
a fixed number, my model would generate the opposite pattern. I do not model a separate hiring
cost, since its implications are indistinguishable from those of firing costs in this model.
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3. Intermediate firms make hiring/firing and outsourcing decisions and produce
4. Final good sector produces

1.4.2

Intermediate Firm’s Dynamic Problem

I restrict attention to the steady-state, where firms’ distribution across state variables
stays constant for all industries. I denote the steady-state value function of the
intermediate firm with V :

V (s, n− ) = max{max pk sF (n, r) − n − r − τ max{0, n− − n}−
n,r

(1.12)

0

P c + βEV (s , n), −τ n− }
where F (n, r) is given in (1.11). pk and P refer to the intermediate and final
good prices, and the wage is normalized to 1. There is a single market wage for the
hired and outsourced since outsourcing is provided competitively, and workers are
indifferent.31 The firm compares the exit cost to the expected discounted value of
profits to decide whether to stay in business. The decision to use permanent versus
outsourced workers depends both on the structure of F (n, r), and the firing cost τ (See
Section 1.4.5). Lastly, potential entrants compare the cost of entry to the expected
future discounted profits to decide whether to enter or not. Since the product prices
are determined in equilibrium, increased entry moves prices down, depressing the
profits firms make, thus feeding back to slow entry.
31

I only have data on outsourcing expenditures, instead of the number of outsourced workers.
Hence, the differences in input prices and factor shares are not separately identified. The model
captures any cost savings or markups attached to outsourced workers with the factor share (α).
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1.4.3

Equilibrium

A steady-state equilibrium consists of the final good producer’s demand for intermediK
ate goods {Yk }K
k=1 , value and policy functions of the intermediate firms {Vk , nk , rk }k=1 ,

the intermediate good prices {pk }K
k=1 , the final good price P , the measure of entrants
in each industry {µk }K
k=1 , and the steady-state distribution of intermediate firms
{ψk }K
k=1 that solve
1. Vk (s, n− ) solves (1.12) ∀k ∈ K
2. EVk (s, 0) = P cE
k ∀k ∈ K
3.

P R
k

(Intermediate Problem)

(Free Entry)

[nk (s, n− ) + rk (s, n− )]dψk (s, n− ) = Ls

4. ψk (s, n− ) = T (ψk (s, n− ), µk ) ∀k ∈ K
5.

Yk
Yj


=

6. P =

1.4.4

Pk
Pj

P

1
 ω−1

∀k, j ∈ K
ω

ω−1
k pk

 ω−1
ω

(Labor Market Clearing)

(Stationary Dist)

(Intermediate Good Demand)

(Final Good Price)

Discussion of the Model Elements

The equilibrium defined in 1.4.3 describes the economy of a single state. The model
allows four possible channels to explain the state-level differences in outsourcing use:
differences in (1) cost of firing, (2) within-industry firm dynamics, (3) industry compositions, and (4) trade secret protection. In this subsection, I discuss how the model
generates and quantitatively disciplines each channel.
Since each state recognizes different exceptions to at-will employment, effective
firing costs potentially differ across states. The firing costs only apply to the permanent workers in the model, thus, incentivize outsourcing. The model allows industries
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to differ in almost all dimensions, including the relative average productivity of outsourcing δk . Since industry compositions are available in the data, the model allows
controlling for ‘industry fixed-effects’ that would lead to different outsourcing choices
across industries.
When the same industry has different outsourcing levels across states, the model
does not automatically assign the differences to state policies. Instead, it takes into
account that firms that belong to the same industry may be fundamentally different
across states and face different operating costs or productivity fluctuations. Only
when firms in the same industry have different outsourcing behavior across states
that cannot be explained by differences in firm characteristics or the firing costs, the
model will assign this to differences in the extent of enforcement friction. Thus, there
is a natural link from the enforcement frictions to labor allocation and aggregate
output.
Lastly, I conceptualize trade secret theft only as a threat, which never happens in
equilibrium. Thus, the model assumes a lack of trade secret protection is unequivocally inefficient, which does not have to be true. The unregulated transmission of
secrets in the economy can theoretically be welfare improving. On top of reduced
incentives to innovate (Samaniego, 2013), there are two additional barriers against
this free flow of ideas. First, when the legal protection is lacking, companies invest in
costly physical barriers to prevent theft32 Second, in business partnerships, the sides
become more hesitant to share information, which is the main idea of this paper.33 I
32

Risch, 2007 documents how a client boasted about introducing to the workplace “fingerprint
scanners, almost no Internet access, expensive network filtering appliances to scan outgoing email,
special locks on the computers, disabled CD-ROM drives, and portable drives, extensive physical
security, and so forth.” to avoid trade secret theft. See Henry and Ruiz-Aliseda, 2016a for a theoretical
analysis of deterring access to secrets.
33
Increasing collaboration in innovative activities was one of the main aims behind the EU legislation that introduced a uniform trade secret law across the EU in 2016 (Directive on the Protection of
Trade Secrets). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2013:0471:
FIN:EN:PDF
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assume these effects dominate the gains from the chaotic flow of ideas through theft;
i.e., the current level of trade secret protection is below the socially optimal level.
The strong correlation between trade secret protection and GDP per capita across
countries is consistent with this idea.34

1.4.5

Outsourcing Choice

Characterizing firms’ policy functions is difficult in the full model due to discrete
exit choice and non-convex adjustment cost. Ignoring entry and exit, assuming a
differentiable adjustment cost function Φ(n− , n), and a binding information-sharing
constraint gives a formula that carries the full model’s intuition and allows a simple
characterization of the forces at work. The problem of the firm in industry k would
simplify to
θk

Vk (s, n− ) = max pk sA(π, δk ) (α(π, δk )nγk + (1 − α(π, δk ))rγk ) γk
n,r

(1.13)

0

− n − r − Φ(n− , n) + βEVk (s , n)
where the ratio of outsourcing expenditures over payroll expenses would become
1

 1−γ
k
r
1 − α(π, δk ) 
0
0
0
=
1 + Φ2 (n− , n) + βEΦ1 (n, n )
n
α(π, δk )

(1.14)

where Φ0 j is the first derivative of Φ() according to its jth element. The expenditure
share on outsourced workers would increase if adjusting permanent workers is more
costly, i.e., Φ has a larger slope. The importance of adjustment costs is further
amplified if the expected future adjustments are larger: σk2 is higher or ρk is lower.
The outsourced share also goes down as it becomes easier to substitute permanent
34

See Figure 1.13 in Appendix 1.C. See Ottoz and Cugno, 2011 and Acemoglu and Akcigit, 2012
for theoretical analyses of the optimal scope of trade secret protection.
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workers for rented workers, that is, when γk is higher. Lastly, firms outsource more
when the factor share of outsourcing is larger, i.e., α(π, δk ) is lower. α(π, δk ) is low
when either the relative marginal product of outsourcing (δ) or the strength of trade
secret protection (π) is high.
Although this simplified analysis helps tease out some of the model’s central mechanisms, I estimate the full model in the next section. The estimation confirms that
the general equilibrium effects have a significant impact on aggregate outsourcing.

1.4.6

Model Extensions

I solve the model numerically, using grid-search on the value functions and forward
iterations to compute firms’ stationary distributions. I make a couple of adjustments
before estimating the model. These do not affect the primary mechanism but simplify
the computation and the estimation of the model.
First, I discretize the idiosyncratic productivity process to 10 grid points using
Rouwenhorst, 1995’s method. Second, I add Type 1 Extreme Value (T1EV) shocks
to the exit decision, ensuring the equilibrium moments change smoothly with parameter values which simplifies the estimation procedure. Each period, to continue
operating, firms need to pay cF + ν1 , or they exit and pay τ n+ ν2 where ν1 , ν2 are
identically distributed T1EV shocks with shape parameter η. I assume the ν1 , ν2 are
independent over time, across firms, from productivity shocks, and one another. The
difference of two T1EV shocks has a logistic distribution, which allows the analytical
characterization of the probability that a firm with state (s, n− ) chooses to exit. Last,
as in Boedo and Mukoyama, 2012, incumbents receive an ‘offer they cannot refuse’
after production ends with probability κj and have to exit. This shock helps generate
realistic exit patterns in the model for large establishments.
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1.5

Estimation

In this section, I estimate the model to make quantitative statements. Section 1.5.1
describes the data, the estimation procedure and the identification strategy. The
estimation results are in 1.5.2. Section 1.5.3 evaluates the ability of the model to
match untargeted moments. Section 1.5.4 provides the quantitative decomposition
of state-level outsourcing heterogeneity while productivity gains from better trade
secret protection are discussed in Section 1.6.

1.5.1

Data and Estimation Method

I use establishment-level moments for each state-industry pair in the manufacturing sector (NAICS 31-33) from 2007 to estimate the model. I use three primary data
sources to compute the moments. The Census of Manufactures (CMF) provides stateindustry level revenue shares, revenue to payroll ratios, and outsourcing expenditures.
The Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) provides state-industry level moments on
establishment size distribution. Lastly, the Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) provides state-level moments on job flows, which are only available at the manufacturing
sector level.
The model has parameters that are global, industry-specific, state-specific, and
state-industry specific. I use subscript j to denote that the parameter varies across
states and k to denote it varies across industries. The full set of parameters necessary
to compute the extended model is the vector35 :
Ω = {β, ω, γk , σk2 , κj , τj , cFjk , cE
jk , ρjk , θjk , πj , δk }

(1.15)

35
I fix the productivity distribution of entrants (φ) and the shape parameter for the T1EV shocks
for now.
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I set β and ω to standard values, and γk and σk2 to previous estimates in the literature. I estimate the rest of the parameters (κj , τj , cFjk , cE
jk , ρjk , θjk , πj , δk ) in two
stages. The first stage assumes the information sharing constraint binds and treats
α(πj , δk ) in (1.11) as a state-industry level parameter αjk . This assumption allows the
first stage to be estimated separately for each state. This substantially relieves the
computational burden since the stationary distribution of the firms has to be solved
numerically. The second stage treats αjk as data generated by α(πj , δk ) + α where
α are zero-mean iid shocks and uses non-linear least squares to estimate {πj }Jj=1 and
{δk }K
k=1 .
Externally Set Parameters
I set the discount factor β = 0.94 and the parameter governing the demand substitution between intermediate goods to ω = −0.5. Two sets of parameters are hard
to identify with the available data. The first is the elasticity of substitution parameter between permanent and outsourced workers. Identifying it either requires wage
data with an exogenous wage shifter or an establishment-level panel with information on dynamic inputs. Neither data is available, so I take the estimates of Chan,
2017 directly, who uses an establishment panel from Denmark to do the latter36 for
four manufacturing industry groups. The second is the variance of the productivity
process. It is not possible to nonparametrically identify both the persistence and
the variance of an AR(1) process from cross-sectional data. I take the industry-level
estimates from Bloom, Floetotto, et al., 2018, who use the Annual Survey of Manufacturers to estimate an AR(1) process for the log TFP estimates for each manufacturing
industry.37
36

Both the relative size of the outsourcing sector, and its skill composition are remarkably similar
between Denmark and the U.S.
37
Unlike this paper, Bloom, Floetotto, et al., 2018 estimate value-added production functions and
include capital and materials. However, for a Cobb-Douglas production function between materials,
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Method of Moments Estimation and Identification Idea
I estimate ΩE = {κj , τj , cFjk , cE
jk , ρjk , θjk , αjk } via method of moments, minimizing the
weighted distance between the model M (ΩE ) and data M D moments:

0 

Ω̂E = arg min M D − M (ΩE ) W M D − M (ΩE )

(1.16)

ΩE

where W is a weighting matrix. The estimator is consistent for any choice of W ,
but the efficient estimator has W = V −1 , i.e., the inverse covariance matrix of the
data moments. Estimating the covariance matrix requires micro-data. I instead use a
diagonal matrix where Wnn = (MnD )−2 , which transforms the objective function into
one that minimizes total squared percent deviations.
The model admits a general equilibrium where common labor and product markets
connect all establishments in a state. The steady-state distribution of firms does not
have a closed-form solution either; thus, I can only provide intuitive arguments on why
the selected moments inform the structural parameters. I suppress the state subscript
j as all the parameters here are state-specific. The only parameter that maps one-toone to a moment is the exogenous exit probability κ. The model generates essentially
no endogenous exit for the largest firms; thus, κ becomes equal to the exit probability
of large establishments (more than 250 employees).
The aggregate entry rate, average establishment size, and the revenue shares of
industries jointly inform ck , the fixed cost of operating, and cE
k , the entry cost. Both
a small ck and a small cE
k incentivize entry and are associated with a large industry.
Thus, a decrease in either cost would increase the revenue share of an industry. On
the other hand, the average establishment size moves in opposite directions when ck
capital, labor services (CES of permanent and outsourced workers), and competitive input markets,
their variance estimates can be applied to my setting up to a constant multiplier. The multiplier is
not identified in my model; hence, its value is irrelevant for the estimation. See Table 1.10 for the
calibrated values of γk and σk .
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and cE
k increases. A large average establishment size is associated with a large ck
because establishments would not find it profitable to pay a high operating cost at
a small scale and exit instead. On the other hand, a small cost of entry cE
k would
result in a large average establishment size, as the competitive pressure through new
entrants would lead small unproductive firms to exit. Thus the two moments provide
a single crossing condition for the two parameters. Lastly, the economy’s overall scale
is not pinned down; therefore, there are only K − 1 linearly independent revenue
shares. The aggregate entry rate helps pin down the average level of entry costs
across industries.
While an increase in the returns to scale parameter θk increases both the average
establishment size and the revenue share of an industry, the ratio of revenues to
payroll expenses allows distinguishing it from ck and cE
k . The two costs have no
direct influence on this ratio, except through the firms’ steady-state distributions.
On the other hand, θk directly impacts the labor share of revenues by determining
the elasticity of revenues to the labor inputs.
It is relatively easier to distinguish the persistence of the idiosyncratic shocks ρk
and the firing cost τ from the parameters I discussed so far (ck , cE
k , and θk ): while
the latter parameters have first-order effects only on the first moments of the firm
distribution, ρk and τ are crucial for the second moments and the flows.38 On the
other hand, it is notoriously difficult to separately identify adjustment costs and the
parameters of the idiosyncratic shock process (Bloom, 2009, Decker et al., 2020). I
use the share of small establishments (less than 20 employees) and the aggregate
job destruction rate. Both a high persistence and a high firing cost reduce the rate
of job destruction. If shocks’ persistence is high, establishments face the need to
38

The only exception to this is the impact on the entry rate, which directly affects the job destruction rate. In model validation, I specifically check whether the estimated model does a good
job matching the fraction of job flows through exits.
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change their workforce less frequently while under high firing costs, establishments
choose to operate at a sub-optimal scale instead of having to fire workers later. The
two parameters also impact the share of small establishments in the same direction.
If persistence is high, entrants stay small for a long time until their productivity
increases. High firing costs also discourage establishments from increasing the number
of workers anticipating the possibility of having to fire them later. On the other hand,
for a wide range of reasonable firing costs (0 to 4 years of wages), the impact on the
share of small establishments is modest (less than 1%). Thus, a local single crossing
condition is satisfied. The intuition for the modest impact of firing costs relies on the
firm size distribution’s long right tail. Given the high fixed costs of operating and
low returns to scale parameters, the return from hiring workers is very high for small
productive firms.39
Last but not least, the ratio of outsourcing expenses to payroll expenses helps
identify α, the factor share of permanent workers. As discussed in Section 1.4.5, the
parameters that have a direct effect on the ratio of outsourcing expenses are γ, σ 2 , ρ,
τ and α. I externally calibrate γ and σ 2 with structural estimates from the literature.
The share of small establishments again helps distinguish ρ from α, as the impact of α
is negligible once the average size of establishments is held constant. Finally, although
both a low α and a high τ increase the ratio, the large response of job destruction
rate and the small response of the outsourcing ratio to τ allows distinguishing the
two.
39

One moment that would allow a global identification would be the ‘job destruction’ rate for
outsourced workers, i.e., the average decline in outsourcing expenses for firms that decrease their
outsourcing. Because outsourcing is not subject to firing costs, its flow helps discipline the fluctuations in the idiosyncratic shock process. Unfortunately, there are no public estimates for this
moment.
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Nonlinear Least Squares
In the second stage, I minimize the sum of squared residuals between the model
implied α(πj , δk ) as derived in (1.11) and α̂jk estimates from the first stage (1.16):

{π̂j , δ̂k } = arg min
{πj ,δk }

X

(α̂jk − α(πj , δk ))2

(1.17)

j,k

This procedure is similar in spirit to a fixed effects regression; once the factor shares
are estimated, the ‘state fixed effects’ give the πj and the ‘industry fixed effects’ give
the δk . Similar to a two-way fixed-effects regression, it is impossible to separately
identify the level of πj from the level of δk . Therefore, in the counterfactuals, I do a
normalization a la Hsieh and Klenow, 2009 and consider the state with the largest
πj as unconstrained and use it as the baseline for comparisons based on enforcement
frictions. Table 1.4 summarizes the full calibration/estimation strategy, together with
data sources. The first four rows of parameters are externally calibrated. The ones in
the middle are jointly estimated to match the moments in the first stage. The ones
in the last two rows are jointly estimated to match the αjk estimates from the first
stage.

1.5.2

Estimation Results

I have estimated the model for 28 states so far, where I divide the manufacturing
sector into K = 4 industry groups: Food Products (k = 1), Wood and Paper Products
(k = 2), Heavy Industry and Extraction (k = 3), and Tools, Machinery and Consumer
Goods (k = 4). Figure 1.5a presents the estimated factor shares for all industry-state
groups.40
40

I follow the same grouping as in Chan, 2017 to have a one-to-one match with his γk estimates.
The details of how I match the U.S. NAICS 3-digit sectors with the Danish NACE 2-digit sectors
are in Appendix 1.B. The first-stage in-sample results are in Table 1.11, where I provide the results
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Table 1.4: The Main Parameters and the Moments Used in the Estimation Notes: The
details of the data sources and how the moments are calculated can be found in Appendix 1.B.

Par
β
ω
γk
σk2
κj
τj
cjk
cE
jk
ρjk
θjk
αjk

Role
Discount Factor
Int. Good Subst.
Permanent/Outsourced Subst.
Idio. Shock Variance
Exog Exit Prob
Firing Cost
Fixed Cost of Operating
Entry Cost
Idio. Shock Persistence
Returns to Scale
Permanent Factor Share

πj
δk

Trade Secret Enforcement
Outsourcing Suitability

Moment
External
External
External
External
Exit Rate>250
Job Destruc. Rate
Avg. Estb Size
Ind. Output Shares
Share of Estb Size<20
Receipts/Payroll
Outsourcing/Payroll
Agg. Entry Rate
α̂jk

Source
0.94
-0.5
Chan 2017
Bloom et al. 2018
BDS
BDS
SUSB
CMF
SUSB
CMF
CMF
BDS
1st Stage

Figure 1.5b summarizes how the estimated factor share parameters relate to the
observed outsourcing ratios. In a model with no adjustment costs, the outsourcing ratios would only depend on γk and αjk because there would be no flexibility gains from
outsourcing. The cross-state patterns are as expected within each industry. However,
the estimates suggest the factor share of outsourcing is considerably lower in food
manufacturing, even though it outsources as much as the other industry groups.
Also, the estimates for heavy manufacturing are broadly similar to wood manufacturing, even though heavy manufacturing has a considerably higher outsourcing to
payroll ratio.
Two channels mainly drive these results. First, permanent and outsourced workers
are easier to substitute in food and heavy manufacturing, according to the externally
calibrated γk values (Table 1.10). This implies a larger outsourcing ratio for a fixed
αjk > 0.5 (see (1.14)). Second, in the data, food and heavy manufacturing establishments have a larger revenue to payroll ratio, even though their average size is not
for Michigan for brevity.
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Figure 1.5: The Estimation Results from the 1st Stage Notes: Each shape refers to a

state-industry pair. See Table 1.11 for details on the first and second stage estimation results and
Appendix 1.B for details on the outsourcing to payroll ratios.
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significantly different than the other two groups. Hence, they are estimated to have
low θjk and cE
jk and high cjk (See Figure 1.15). The low returns to scale together
with high fixed costs create a fat-tailed size distribution, and the low cE ensures the
total size of these industries is as large as in the data. In the model, larger firms
outsource a bigger fraction of their workforce, fearing mass layoffs in the future. The
very large firms in the food and heavy manufacturing hence outsource a large fraction
of their workforce, generating the pattern in Figure 1.5a. Lastly, these two effects
are large enough to offset the lower-variance productivity shocks for food and heavy
manufacturing, given the externally calibrated σk values.
Table 1.12 presents the results from the second stage; hence the main estimation results. I find, without enforcement frictions, the industry that would benefit
the most from outsourcing is heavy manufacturing, and the one that would benefit
the least is food manufacturing. The average productivity of an outsourced worker
(δk ) is estimated to be twice as large in the former than the latter (0.36 vs 0.16).
Louisiana is the state with the strongest secret protection, and Missouri is the one
with the weakest. Most importantly, as Figure 1.6a shows, the results from the struc45

Figure 1.6: The Estimation Results from the 2nd Stage Notes: Figures only presents states
who adopted the UTSA by 2007.
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tural estimation align with the adoption date of the UTSA. The states that adopted
the UTSA earlier are the ones that have better trade secret protection on average.
Figure 1.6b further shows that states with better protection spend a larger fraction
of their labor outsourcing budget on high-skilled tasks. The two figures provide an
important first step for validating the model: the estimation results are consistent
with (1) the actual legal environment of the states and (2) laws being more important for information-sensitive tasks, even though neither pattern was targeted in the
estimation.

1.5.3

Model Validation

I validate the model through its ability to match the share of job destruction that
happens through establishment exits, establishment shares of industry groups, and
the share of employment in small establishments.
Although the estimation targets the rates of exit and job destruction, the share
of job destruction through exits can be anywhere between 0 and 1 depending on the
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exiting establishments’ average size. The model does an excellent job of predicting the
share (Figure 1.7a), hence the average size of exiting establishments. The estimation
targets the revenue share, the revenue payroll ratio, and the average establishment
size for each industry group. If workers’ average wages across industries differed
significantly, the model would do a bad job predicting the fraction of establishments
that belong to each industry. Figure 1.7b suggests the model still does a good job.
The only exceptions are the wages at California’s Light and Heavy industries, where
the model undervalues the former and overvalues the latter. Lastly, the model targets
the share of establishments with less than 20 employees but does not target the size
distribution below 20. If the model did a bad job at matching that distribution,
it would make a bad prediction of the expected size of establishment conditional
on less than 20. Figure 1.7c suggests the model does an okay job, except for food
manufacturing, which is a relatively smaller part of the manufacturing sector. In
particular, the model cannot account for the states with small food manufacturing
establishments.
The model does a poor job predicting the size distribution’s right-tail, generating
too few very-large establishments (larger than 250, 500). The model’s inability to
match both tails is partly due to the assumption of normal shocks to the productivity
process. A shock distribution that has fatter tails would help the model generate
more large establishments.

1.5.4

Decomposition of the Outsourcing Heterogeneity

In this section, I ask how the cross-state heterogeneity in labor outsourcing would
change if all states had the same (1) firing cost, (2) industry composition, (3) withinindustry firm characteristics, and (4) trade secret protection. According to the model,
these four objects constitute a mutually exclusive and exhaustive list of the differences
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Figure 1.7: The Untargeted Moments
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between states. However, they might interact with one another and amplify/dampen
each other’s effects. Notably, the industry composition and the within-industry firm
characteristics are equilibrium objects, making the decomposition non-trivial.
To equate the labor protection and the trade secret protection across states, I
replace the values of τ and π with the average estimates. To ‘equate’ the industry
compositions, I take simple weighted averages of industry-level outsourcing shares for
each state, weights being average industry share of employment across states. To
find the impact of equating within-industry firm characteristics, I take the average
values of the other three (τ , π, and industry shares) for each state and compute the
remaining dispersion (See Figure 1.14). Now I can answer one of the main questions
I have started with: what generates the cross-state dispersion in outsourcing use?
I use the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the average) as my
measure of dispersion. The cross-state dispersion would be
• 19% less with average trade secret protection
• 14% less with average industry composition
• 14% more with average firing cost
• 90% less with average within-industry firm characteristics
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The differences in within-industry firm characteristics create the lion’s share of
the observed dispersion across states. While equating industry shares would reduce
the heterogeneity, equating firing costs would amplify it. The counter-intuitive implication is that the states with the higher estimated firing costs outsource less than
others on average due to the other three channels’ counteracting force.
Equating the strength of trade secret protection decreases the cross-state dispersion by 19%. This result, however, is built on considerable heterogeneity across states.
In particular, there are states with weak trade secret protection that still outsource
a significant amount of their workforce. Bringing the strength of trade secret protection up to the average level increases outsourcing shares for these states, pushing
for increased dispersion. For example, Tennessee is a state with an above-average
outsourcing ratio of 0.2, and improving its trade secret protection up to the average
level would bring the ratio up to 0.22.

1.6

Productivity Gains from Better Trade Secret
Protection

In this section, I answer the question I started with: how large are the productivity
gains from better trade secret protection? Specifically, I calculate the counterfactual
outcomes when every state has the same trade secret protection (π) as the ‘best state,’
which is Louisiana, according to my estimates.
Table 1.5 presents the main results. The median state increases its outsourcing
to payroll ratio from 0.12 to 0.17. While both the gross and the net output (net
of all costs) of the median state grows by 0.9%, the state that benefits the most
has a net output growth as large as 2%. The growth is mostly through the entry
channel: the number of firms increases by 0.8% in the median state. Lastly, wages
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also reflect productivity growth, increasing by as much as 1.4% for the median state.
I compute the aggregate gains as the weighted average of the net output gains in
each state, where the weights are equal to each state’s manufacturing output in 2007.
The aggregate output grows by 0.7%. In the remainder of the section, I quantify
individual channels that lead to output gains.
Table 1.5: The Counterfactual Results After an Improvement in Trade Secret Protection Notes: The first and second rows give the result for the median and maximum value across

states. The third row gives the aggregate response, which is an output-weighted average of the
responses of states. The values for columns 4 to 7 are relative to a baseline value of 1. Base and
Best TSP refer to the outsourcing to payroll ratio in the baseline estimation and the counterfactual
where each state’s π is equal to the state with the highest π. Gross Output is the aggregate amount
of final goods produced, and the net output is gross output net of all entry, operating, and firing
costs. The number of firms is aggregated over industries. See Table 1.14 for state-by-state details.

Base Best TSP Gross Out Net Out # of Firms Wage
Median
0.12
0.17
1.009
1.009
1.008 1.014
Max
0.20
0.26
1.019
1.020
1.020 1.029
Aggregate 0.14
0.18
1.007
1.008
1.006 1.014

The Role of Labor Adjustment Costs
Improved trade secret protection decreases the job destruction rate, i.e., increased
outsourcing leads to more job stability for permanent manufacturing employees. Yet,
the aggregate decline is relatively small, from 10.80% to 10.77%. Although the job
destruction rate remains relatively constant, the total amount of job destruction declines substantially because the fraction of workers under employment goes down.
These lead to savings through avoided firing costs: even though the number of firms
increases by 0.6%, the aggregate firing cost paid declines by 2.7%. The magnitude of
the savings is small on the macroeconomic scale (4 basis points of GDP).
On the other hand, the gains from better allocation of workers are significant. The
dispersion of the marginal product of labor across firms (0 at a frictionless equilibrium)
declines by 1.4%. The correlation between size and productivity, a commonly used
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measure of labor (mis)allocation between firms (1 at a frictionless equilibrium), would
also have a modest increase for both in-house employees and outsourced workers from
0.822 to 0.824 and from 0.854 to 0.856 respectively. In other words, the reduction in
the firms that have excess and too little employed workers leads to a better allocation
of outsourced workers across firms as well.
Entry and Exit
The entry/exit channel impacts the aggregate gains both through the number of
firms that operate in the steady-state and through the rate of entry/exit as a force
that generates steady creative destruction. Although the aggregate rate of entry/exit
goes up, it is quantitatively small: the change is 4 basis points relative to a baseline
level of 7.54%. On the other hand, the number of firms in the steady-state increases
substantially by 0.6%. This increase is reflected by the economically significant growth
in aggregate entry costs and operating costs paid by 0.7% and 0.6% (0.1% and 0.2%
of GDP).
The increase in the number of firms is accompanied by a 0.4 p.p. increase in small
firms’ share (less than 20 employees). This increase is not surprising since the total
number of employees employed by the manufacturing firms decreases while the total
number of firms increases, i.e., the average firm size must be decreasing. A decrease
in the fraction of very large firms accompanies the increase in small firms’ fraction.
While small firms find it easier to grow in size with the added flexibility provided by
outsourcing, they also face more intense competition for workers due to the increased
number of firms. For the large firms, flexibility and competition work in the same
direction: they find it easier to decrease their size after bad shocks. Hence, firms
hoard labor to a lesser extent when the outsourcing sector is larger.
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Figure 1.8: The State-Industry Level Gains
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The Role of Industries
The industries differ in δk ; therefore, the importance of trade secret protection is
potentially different across industries, which helps explain why some states enjoy
more significant gains from improved protection than the others.
Figure 1.8 shows the industry that changes its workforce composition the most is
heavy manufacturing, followed by light manufacturing. Both industries heavily rely
on secrecy for comparative advantage. The secret formulas and processes are integral
parts of light and chemical manufacturing. The negative information on R&D, which
cannot be patented, is critical for pharmaceuticals. Similarly, the information on the
location of raw materials and manufacturing processes is essential for oil and metals
industries.
On the other hand, the industry-level output growth rates are much more similar to one another than the outsourcing growth. This similarity is largely driven by
the value of the parameter that controls the demand elasticity of the final good producer (ω = −0.5).41 Since intermediate goods are gross complements, an increase in
41
I choose an elasticity that implies gross complementarity between intermediate goods because
I estimate the model using a revenue (instead of value-added) production function. Since I do not
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one intermediate industry’s productivity increases the demand for other intermediate
industries. This complementarity aligns the output of different industries together;
hence all industries benefit from a productivity gain in one industry.

1.7

Conclusion

I study the impact of trade secret protection on producers’ willingness to use outsourced workers, and consequently, aggregate output. Through an analysis of this
channel in the U.S. I make two main points. First, better legal protection for trade
secrets can induce managers to use outsourced workers for a larger number of tasks.
Second, the consequent expansion in outsourcing use generates a better allocation of
workers across firms and a quantitatively significant increase in aggregate output.
To make the first point, I rely on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and utilize the
variation in adoption times across states. My analysis shows that adopters enjoyed a
higher pace of subsequent growth in outsourcing employment relative to non-adopters.
Also, the effect was more pronounced for tasks that provide greater access to sensitive
information. Quantitatively, the improvements in trade secret law explain 13% of the
growth in outsourcing employment in the U.S. from 1977 to 1997.
I build and estimate a structural model of industry dynamics to make the second
point. The model teases out the part of cross-state heterogeneity in outsourcing
that is attributable to variation in trade secret protection and maps it to aggregate
productivity measures. Estimating it with data from the U.S. manufacturing sector
shows that the gains from better trade secret protection are sizeable. If all states
could protect trade secrets as adequately as the ’best state,’ the aggregate output
would increase by 0.8%.
model an explicit production network between manufacturing industries, I introduce a reduced-form
supply chain through complementarity in final good production.
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These findings suggest large gains for the U.S., a country that is at the forefront
of trade secret protection (See Figure 1.13). The gains might be even larger for
countries where the statutory law is still missing, common law is underdeveloped,
or the enforcement of existing laws is lacking. Improving legal protection requires
trained judges, lawyers, expert witnesses, and functioning audit and appeals systems
that supervise the legal system. None of these come easy or cheap, but neither do
tax breaks or R&D subsidies.
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1.A

Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1. I will first show that if a unique z̄ exists, it has to satisfy
0 ≤ z̄ < ζ −1 (z). Second, I show the task-level production y(i) is increasing in i. Last,
I will show that a unique z̄ exists s.t. tasks i ≤ z̄ only use outsourced and tasks i > z̄
only use hired labor in the optimal solution.
First, the manager would not assign any outsourced workers to tasks i ≥ ζ −1 (z)
because (1) outsourced workers assigned to tasks above ζ −1 (z) do not generate any
output while their output would be strictly positive in tasks i < ζ −1 (z) and (2)
the marginal contribution of each task’s output approaches infinity as the output in
that task approaches 0.42 Hence, the manager would assign a positive measure of
permanent workers and no outsourced workers to all tasks i ≥ ζ −1 (z).
42

Because ζ(i) is strictly increasing, ζ −1 (z) exists, and is strictly increasing.
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Second, y(i) should be weakly be increasing in i. Assume towards a contradiction
that y(i1 ) > y(i2 ) for i2 > i1 . Let the total number of permanent and outsourced
workers assigned to these tasks be n(i1 ), r(i1 ) and n(i2 ), r(i2 ). Then, the marginal
product of an outsourced worker in these tasks would be

M Pr (i) = θY

θ−γ
γ

y(i)γ−1 δ

For y(i1 ) > y(i2 ), the manager could increase Y by reassigning an infinitesimal
measure of outsourced workers from task i1 to i2 . Similarly, the marginal product of
a permanent worker in these tasks would be

M Pn (i) = θY

θ−γ
γ

y(i1 )γ−1 g(i)

For y(i1 ) ≥ y(i2 ), the manager could increase Y by reassigning an infinitesimal
measure of permanent workers from task i1 to i2 because g(i) is strictly increasing.
Hence y(i) has to be weakly increasing in i.
Last, for tasks i ≤ ζ −1 (z), assume towards a contradiction that a permanent
worker is assigned to task i1 and an outsourced worker is assigned to task i2 > i1
in the optimal solution. Let the total number of permanent and outsourced workers
assigned to these tasks be n(i1 ), r(i1 ) and n(i2 ), r(i2 ). Then, the manager could
increase its output by switching the permanent and the outsourced worker in these
tasks because, the strictly increasing g(i) and weakly increasing y(i) imply the last
inequality
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θY

θ−γ
γ

M Pn (i1 ) + M Pr (i2 ) >M Pn (i2 ) + M Pr (i1 ) ⇔


θ−γ
y(i1 )γ−1 g(i1 ) + y(i2 )γ−1 δ >θY γ y(i2 )γ−1 g(i2 ) + y(i1 )γ−1 δ ⇔
y(i1 )γ−1 (g(i1 ) − δ) >y(i2 )γ−1 (g(i2 ) − δ)

Hence, if a permanent worker is assigned to task i1 , no outsourced worker would
be assigned to a task i2 > i1 in the optimal solution. This guarantees that a unique
z̄ exists s.t. tasks i ≤ z̄ only use outsourced and tasks i > z̄ only use hired labor in
the optimal solution.



Proof of Proposition 1. I will first characterize the assignment of workers across
tasks for a given z̄ and then characterize the optimal choice of z̄. The idea is that,
hired (rented) workers should be allocated across tasks i > z̄ (i ≤ z̄) in a way
to equalize marginal products across those tasks. Second, if the threshold task is
interior, i.e. ∃z̄ < z, then the firm should be indifferent between using hired or rented
labor for that task. If not, then the firm should strictly prefer renting to hiring at
the threshold task ∃z̄ = z. First, since the productivity of outsourced workers in
tasks does not depend on the identity of the task i, the CES aggregation of the tasks
together with the budget constraint for rented workers imply

r(i) =

r
z̄

(1.18)

For permanent workers, the equalization of the marginal product across tasks
requires:
γg(i)γ n(i)γ−1 = n̄
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Using g(i) = i gives

n(i) =

γ
g(i)γ
n̄

1
 1−γ

(1.19)

where n̄ is a constant. The budget constraint for the permanent workers gives
1 Z
 γ  1−γ

n̄

1

γ

g(i) 1−γ di = n

z̄

which pins down the constant term:
1



(1 − γ)(1 − z̄ 1−γ )
n̄ = γ
n

1−γ

(1.20)

(1.19) and (1.20) allow writing n(i) as a function of n and z̄:
γ

n(i) =

ni 1−γ
1

(1 − γ)(1 − z̄ 1−γ )
Denote with z̃ the threshold task in an unconstrained (by z) allocation of workers
across tasks. At task z̃, manager should be indifferent between using permanent or
outsourced workers:
2−γ

rδ =

z̃ 1−γ n
1

(1 − γ)(1 − z̃ 1−γ )
This condition does not give an analytical solution for z̃. The right-hand side is a
continuous and strictly increasing function of z̃ that is equal to 0 when z̃ = 0 and is
unbounded above as z̃ approaches 1. The left hand side is a positive constant. Hence,
there exists a unique z̃ that satisfies the condition. If z̃ > z, then z̄ = z. Otherwise,
z̄ = z̃.
Using the derived formulas for r(i) and n(i), I can write down the total firm output
as a function of n, r, and z̄(n, r):
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Z

1

1



γ

ni 1−γ

F (n, r) =

Z

z̄

 rδ γ

! γθ
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Proof of Corollary 1. Once the IC constraint binds, i.e., z̄ = π:
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Defining A = αn + αr and α = αn /A allows rewriting this in the classical CES
form:

Y (n, r) = sA(π, δ) α(π, δ)nγ + (1 − α(π, δ))rγ

 γθ


1.B

Data Sources

In this section, I describe the data sources and sample construction procedures.

1.B.1

Measures of Labor Outsourcing

I conduct analyses with data from different time periods and geographical levels, hence
the best available data changes according to the question at hand. Throughout the
paper, I use employment data that uses NAICS, SIC, and 1990 Census classifications
and outsourcing expenditures data from Census of Manufactures (CMF). I carefully
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designate which industries in NAICS classification provide labor outsourcing services.
Then, for other classifications, I choose the industries that correspond the best to the
designated NAICS industries.
Definition of Labor Outsourcing
I define labor outsourcing as the purchase of business services that are labor intensive
and can potentially be done in-house. First, I restrict attention to business services,
because the main decision (hire vs outsource) I analyze in this paper is not relevant for households. I operationalize this criterion by restricting attention to 4-digit
NAICS services industries who earn more than 70% of their revenues from serving
businesses and government according to the 2017 Services Annual Survey (SAS). Second, I restrict attention to labor intensive services because the decision to outsource
capital-intensive services may rely on financial concerns that I abstract from in this
paper. I operationalize this criterion by restricting attention to services industries
who have less than 5% of their expenditures as depreciation in the 2017 Services Annual Survey (SAS) conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. Last, I restrict attention to
purchase of services where there is a meaningful make or buy decision. I use this criterion intuitively, and rule out the information technology (IT) industry (NAICS 51)43 ,
finance providing industries (NAICS 52, 53) and central offices of holding companies
(NAICS 55).
This definition roughly translates to two 2-digit industries: NAICS 54 (The Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services) and NAICS 56 (The Administrative and
Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services) with the following exceptions. I exclude 4-digit subsectors 5419 (Other Professional, Scientific, and Technical
Services, roughly employs 8% of the total employment in NAICS54, consists mainly of
43

The portion of the IT sector that provides personalized services to each client firm will still be
in my sample as NAICS 5415 Computer Systems Design and Related Services.
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veterinary and photographic services) and 5615 (Travel Arrangement and Reservation
Services, roughly employs 3% of the total employment in NAICS56) because 46% and
68% of their revenues come from households respectively. I also exclude the 3-digit
subsector 562 (Waste Management and Remediation Services, roughly employs 5%
of the total employment in NAICS56) because depreciation roughly corresponds to
10% of its expenses.
Table 1.6: Labor Outsourcing Sector in NAICS Classification Notes: Employment (1000s)

figures are from the 2018 Current Employment Statistics. Total revenues ($B) and the ratio of
depreciation expenditures to total expenditures is from are from the 2017 Services Annual Survey
(SAS). The share of revenues from households are from the 2019 Q3 Quarterly Services Survey
(QSS). The fraction of employment with Bachelor’s degree (or more) is from 2019 IPUMS CPS. The
SAS and QSS do not have full breakdowns by 4-digit sectors of NAICS 561, the last row provides
the aggregate values.
Industry
Scientific R&D
Comput. Sys. Design and Rel.
Manag., Sci., and Tech. Consult.
Advertising and Related
Legal
Architect., Eng., and Rel.
Specialized Design
Account., Tax, Book., Payroll
Office Admin.
Facilities Support
Other Support
Employment
Business Support
Investigation and Security
Serv. to Buildings
Admin. and Support

NAICS
5417
5415
5416
5418
5411
5413
5414
5412
5611
5612
5619
5613
5614
5616
5617
561

Emp.
710
2,154
1,501
493
1,142
1,493
142
1,009
517
160
331
3,669
890
951
2,158

Rev.
166
304
210
72
203
253
15
136

HH Share
0.05
0.00
0.06
0.07
0.29
0.03
0.30
0.15

Deprec.
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.02

632

0.15

0.03

College
0.79
0.73
0.72
0.70
0.69
0.67
0.64
0.61
0.38
0.38
0.38
0.31
0.26
0.19
0.09

Table 1.6 presents the list of 4-digit NAICS industries that fall into my definition
of labor outsourcing sectors, ordered according to the share of employment with a
Bachelor’s degree. The total employment in these industries is around 17 million
workers, where the employment shares of NAICS 54 and 56 are almost equal with 8.5
million workers each.
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Overview of Data Availability on Labor Outsourcing
I use data on both the demand for outsourcing and the supply of outsourcing. Unfortunately, historical data on demand for outsourcing has may problems. The U.S.
Census first started collecting establishment-level data on outsourcing use in 1977
with Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) and Census of Manufactures (CMF), but
restricted attention to purchase of capital-intensive services: repair and communication services.44 Furthermore, the treatment of transactions with the establishments’
Central Administrative Offices (CAO) or other auxiliary establishments of the same
firm has changed in 1997. Within SIC classification, these auxiliary establishments
were classified according to the primary activity of the establishment they are serving. On the other hand, NAICS classifies these establishments according to their own
activity, thus these transactions show up as purchased services for the main establishment after 1997. See the discussions in Siegel and Griliches, 1992, Berlingieri,
2013, and Fort, Klimek, et al., 2016 for more details. The U.S. Census only started to
collect relevant information on purchase of labor outsourcing services 1992 through
ASM and CMF, while the measurement of expenditures on temporary workers only
started in 2007.
The historical data on the supply of labor outsourcing (employment and valueadded) is available through multiple sources, each with their own issues. The Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) publishes historical employment and output figures for
sone state-industry pairs based on 1987 SIC classification (SA25, SA25N, SAEMP25),
but does not provide a clear separation of labor outsourcing sector from other sectors.
In particular, it uses two-digit SIC industry 73 Business Services which combines
labor outsourcing with many other capital intensive services such as equipment rental.
44

Siegel and Griliches, 1992 documents that even for the manufacturing sector, these services
constituted only 28% of total service purchases once compared with Input-Output (I-O) tables for
1977.
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County Business Patterns (CBP) collects very detailed industry level employment and
number of establishment figures at the county level from the universe of employer
establishments. However, (1) industry classifications change several times from its
start with no clear bridge, and (2) it uses extensive censoring and imputation on
employment values.45 The decennial Census provides a large sample size together
with a consistent industry definition provided by IPUMS USA, but the data frequency
does not allow observing the impact of changes in laws. For historical data analysis,
I rely on the March Current Population Survey (CPS) together with the historically
consistent industry definition (1990 Census industry classification) provided by the
IPUMS CPS. The CPS has a smaller sample size than the other data sources and
suffers from small sample size in some state-industry bins, which does not necessarily
create bias in diff-and-diff estimates.
Table 1.7: Labor Outsourcing Sector in Census 1990 Classification Notes: Employment
figures are from the 2018 American Community Survey through IPUMS USA. The fraction of employment with Bachelor’s degree (or more) is from 2019 IPUMS CPS and the skill classification is
based on how the industry compares to the U.S. average of 0.34.
Code
20
721
722
731
732
740
841
882
890
891
892

Subsector
Landscape and horticultural
Advertising
Services to dwellings and other buildings
Personnel supply
Computer and data processing
Detective and protective
Legal
Engineering, architectural, and surveying
Accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping
Research, development, and testing
Management and public relations

Emp (1000s)
1,731
672
1,944
1,464
3,541
1,051
1,903
1,855
1,397
791
2,103

College
0.10
0.70
0.09
0.31
0.72
0.19
0.69
0.67
0.61
0.79
0.72

Skill Classification
Low-Skill
High-Skill
Low-Skill
High-Skill
Low-Skill
High-Skill
High-Skill
High-Skill
High-Skill
High-Skill

Data Sources for the Panel Data Analysis
The Current Population Survey: I use the CPS mainly for state-industry level
employment figures for labor outsourcing industries and education controls. I use the
45

See Eckert et al., 2020 for an ongoing project on making CBP available for historical comparisons.
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Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) samples of CPS through IPUMS
CPS. The IPUMS database provides an industry classification system ‘ind990’ that
is based on the classification system used in 1990 Census and provides comparability
over time. See Table 1.7 for the list of included industries. I also construct statelevel manufacturing employment measures using Census 1990 industries with codes
between 100 to 392 and total employment measures using employment status variable
being at work (empstat=10). Lastly, IPUMS censors state-industry level employment
estimates when the data quality is too low, hence the final sample becomes an unbalanced panel ranging from 1970 to 2019. I construct the state and industry level
educational attainment measures from the ASEC samples, restricting attention to individuals of age 25 to 65. I use the ‘educ’ variable and classify values 71 to 100 as high
school and above, and 110 and above as 4-year college and above. When necessary, I
classify the industries that have educational attainment levels significantly above the
U.S. average as high-skill labor outsourcing industries and those with significantly
below as low-skill labor outsourcing industries.
The Trade Secret Protection Index: ”The index is constructed as a simple
average of scores for three items of substantive law (i to iii), one item of civil procedure (iv), and two items of remedies (v to vi): (i) Whether a trade secret must
be in continuous business use; (ii) Whether the owner must take reasonable efforts
to protect the secret; (iii) Whether mere acquisition of the secret constitutes misappropriation; (iv) The limitation on the time for the owner to take legal action for
misappropriation; (v) Whether an injunction is limited to eliminating the advantage
from misappropriation; and (vi) The multiple of actual damages available in punitive
damages. The index is the sum of the scores for each of the six items divided by six,
so it is scaled between 0 and 1. For each item, a higher score represents stronger legal
protection of trade secrets based on milestones including both common law (decisions
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in cases that set legal precedent) and the UTSA taking effect.” (Png, 2017a). Png,
2017b extends this measure further until 2010.
The Control Variables: I use data from the BEA to construct state level
employment, population and gross domestic product (GDP) measures to serve as
controls. The population measures are from the Table SA30, the employment measures are from SA25, and the inflation-adjusted GDP measures from SAGDP2S. The
BEA/BLS Account covers 1987-2018 period while the BEA publishes another table
for 1963-1997 period with the same industry definitions. I merge the two and compare
the series in the period they coincide. The differences are very small compared to
the trends I document. The decomposition results in Section1.3.1 are broadly similar when I only use 1963-1997 or the 1987-2018 periods. I use the state-level union
membership density estimates from Hirsch, Macpherson, and Vroman, 2001 who uses
the CPS Outgoing Rotation Group earning files. I use the data on the state-level
Wrongful Discharge Laws (WDL) from Autor, 2003 who provides public access to
the data sample through his website. Figure 1.9 plots how the adoption dates of the
WDL across states compare against the adoption of the UTSA.
I use the adoption data presented in Ribstein and Kobayashi, 1996 and Autor,
2003 which document the state-level adoption for 103 uniform laws and the exceptions
to the at-will employment respectively to argue the UTSA adoption dates do not
coincide with other laws. See also Figure 1.9.
Data Sources for the Cross-Sectional Analysis
The Census of Manufactures: The CMF collects information from the universe
of manufacturing establishments as part of the Economic Census. The public data
from CMF provides state and industry level data on revenues and detailed expenses,
including expenses related to purchase of labor outsourcing services. I construct the
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Figure 1.9: Employment Protection Laws and the UTSA The Figure has the adoption year
for the Uniform Trade Secrets Act on the x-axis and for the exceptions to the at-will employment
(Good Faith, Implied Contract, and Public Policy) on the y-axis. For the states that did not adopt
the UTSA, the adoption year has been set to 2016 for the adoption of the DTSA. For the states
that did not adopt the exceptions, the adoption year has been set to 2021.
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labor outsourcing expenses by combining expenses on ‘Temporary staff and leased employee expenses’ (PCHTEMP), ‘Data processing and other purchased computer services’ (PCHADPR)46 , ‘Purchased professional and technical services’ (PCHPRTE),
and ‘Advertising and promotional services’ (PCHADVT). I use the ‘Annual Payroll’
(PAYANN) as total expenses on employees on payroll, ‘Total value of shipments’
(RCPTOT) as total revenues, and ‘Value Added’ (VALADD) as value added. I use
the 2007 CMF for the structural model estimation and the 2017 CMF for documenting
cross-state heterogeneity in the use of labor outsourcing.
The public tables for 2007 Economic Census have state-industry level estimates
for payroll, revenues, and value added but outsourcing expenses are only tabulated
separately at the state and industry level. The identification only requires the state
and industry level aggregates for identification. However, the two-stage estimation
method I use requires state-industry level estimates for outsourcing, even though the
46
This expense does not include ‘Expensed computer hardware and other equipment’ and ‘Expensed purchases of software’, hence only documents the purchase of IT services. See Appendix 1.B
for how I define labor outsourcing.
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extra information is not used to identify the parameters. I construct synthetic stateindustry estimates that are consistent with the state and industry level estimates and
use these in the first-stage estimation47
The Statistics of U.S. Businesses: The SUSB uses data from the universe of
employer establishments and publishes statistics on establishment size distributions.
I use it to construct and estimate the fraction of establishments with fewer than 20
employees and the average establishment size in each state-industry pair. To estimate
the average establishment size, I compute a weighted average of average establishment
sizes in each bin by weighting the bins by the listed number of establishments.
The Business Dynamics Statistics: The BDS is created from the Longitudinal Business Database and provides information on the universe of the U.S. establishments. Unfortunately, the state-level data the BDS provides is only available at
the level of major industry sector. Hence, I use the BDS information to discipline
state-level parameters only. In particular, I construct establishment-level job destruction and exit rates for the manufacturing sector in each state. I also use the exit rate
of establishments with more than 250 employees to discipline the exogenous exit rate
parameter.
The job destruction rate is very widely used as an estimator for the total separations subject to a firing cost (Boedo and Mukoyama, 2012, Decker et al., 2020), due to
its standard definition and widespread availability. Yet, it is subject to two sources of
bias, which act in opposite directions. First, it is subject to a time aggregation bias:
because it is based on measures of establishments at certain points in time, it doesn’t
account for the separations in the middle that were replaced with a hire before the
47

The 2017 tables do report estimates for outsourcing expenses at the state-industry level. I
use the same synthetic construction for 2017 as if only the state and industry level estimates are
observed. The correlation between the actual and the synthetic estimates is 0.6. Considering the
frequent censoring applied at the state-industry level, the synthetic data should closely follow the
actual data.
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next observation. Hence it underestimates the number of total separations. The bias
becomes larger as the frequency of observations gets lower. Second, it overestimates
the separations that are subject to a regulatory firing cost, as some job destruction
is due to voluntary quits or retirement instead of layoffs48 .
I use the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) by BLS to get
a rough estimate of the direction and the size of the total bias. JOLTS provides
estimates for the total count of separations in a time period, hence it is not subject
to the time-aggregation bias. Furthermore, it distinguishes the separations as quits
and layoffs. The (nationwide) approximate yearly rate of quits equals 14.5% relative
to the job destruction rate of 11.4% for the manufacturing sector in 2007 (JOLTS
doesn’t publish state-level estimates). Since the discrepancy is not very large, I follow
the literature and use the job destruction rate as the primary moment to target.
Data Conversions
The Elasticity of Substitution: I use the estimates from Chan, 2017 as elasticity of substitution parameters (between permanent and outsourced workers) in the
structural model. Chan, 2017 groups 3-digit manufacturing industries in the second revision of The Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European
Community (NACE) industry classification into four broad manufacturing industry
groups: Food Products, Wood and Paper Products, Heavy Industry and Extraction,
and Tools, Machinery and Consumer Goods. I match the NACE 2-digit sectors to
2007 NAICS 3-digit sectors using the official correspondence table from the Eurostat.49 I leave NAICS industries out of my analysis if they do not strongly match
to one of the 2-digit NACE industries. Table 1.8 lists both the NACE and NAICS
48

See Mukoyama, 2014 for a more detailed description of the first bias and Fujita and Nakajima,
2016 for the second bias.
49
See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/miscellaneous/index.cfm?TargetUrl=DSP_
NACE_2_US_NAICS_2007.
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industries included in this classification.
Food

Wood

Heavy

Machinery

10

2

6

25

11

16

9

26

12

17

19

27

20

28

21

29

22

30

23

31

24

32

Food

Wood

Heavy

Machinery

Left Out

311

321

324

332

313

312

322

325

333

314

326

334

315

327

335

316

331

336

323

337

339

Table 1.8: Manufacturing Industry Groups (Chan, 2017) for 2-digit NACE and 3-digit
NAICS Classifications
The TFP Process: I use the estimates from Bloom, Floetotto, et al., 2018 to
discipline the industry-level estimates of the variance of the productivity process. It
is impossible to reach at the variance estimates at the group level without the microdata, so I equate variance of the group equal to the weighted average of the variances.
Since the average level of the TFP/demand shock is not identified in my model, I
80

only need the relative variances of different industries. In addition, since I model the
TFP/demand as a log-normal process, errors in the parametrization of the variance
process are partially corrected through the estimation of the persistence parameters.
Bloom, Floetotto, et al., 2018 provides the estimates with the 4-digit 1987 SIC classification. Using the conversion table by Eckert et al., 2020, I first construct weights
to compute variance estimates at the NAICS level and take a weighted average to get
group level variance estimates.
Data Sources for the Cross-Country Analysis
The EU KLEMS Accounts: The EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts
aims to provide data on industry level employment, output, and productivity estimates. The accounts include several updates that extend the coverage of countries,
include more detailed industries, and make changes and corrections to the previous
releases. I use the March 2008 release (Timmer, O Mahony, Van Ark, et al., 2007)
which has a smaller coverage of countries relative to more recent releases, but goes
back as early as 1970. In particular, I use the ‘Number of Persons Engaged’ (EMP)
variable and use industry code 74 (Other business activities) as labor outsourcing.
Although this industry code is not as precise as the definitions I have used with the
Census and NAICS classifications, the implied labor outsourcing share is remarkable
similar to the one I have derived for the U.S. through the 1990 Census classification.
The OECD Structural Analysis Database: The STAN collects and estimates data on industry level input and output from the countries’ own national
accounts, using a harmonized industry definition in the process. I use the industry
codes M-N (Professional, scientific and technical activities; administrative and support service activities) as labor outsourcing, which roughly corresponds to NAICS 54
and 56 but also includes equipment rental and leasing activities.
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The OECD Employment Protection Index: The OECD have information
on several types of employment protection, “...compiled using the Secretariat’s own
reading of statutory laws, collective bargaining agreements and case law as well as
contributions from officials from OECD member countries and advice from country
experts.” The index has four versions that improves the method and increases the
scope of the previous one. I restrict attention to the first version because it provides
the longest panel of data. I use the strictness of employment protection (individual
and collective dismissals) as a measure of firing cost consistent with the cross-state
analysis I do in the main text. The index ranges from 0 to 5 from the weakest to
strongest protection and is available yearly from 1985 to 2019.
The OECD Trade Secret Protection Index: I use two cross-country measures of trade-secret protection. The first one is an index constructed by Lippoldt
and Schultz, 2014 for the OECD, which combines information on whether 26 criteria
were satisfied in the trade secret law of 37 between 1985 and 2010. It ranges from 0
to 5 from the weakest to strongest protection. The index is only available for years
ending in 0 and 5.
The Global IP Trade Secret Protection Index: The second index I use is
constructed by the Global Innovation Policy Center of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. It ranges from 0 to 3 from the weakest to strongest protection. Its country
coverage is much larger than the OECD index with 50 countries but it only goes back
as far as 2012.

1.C

Cross-Country Evidence

In this section, I analyze the cross-country patterns of labor outsourcing and trade
secret laws and discuss four more facts on (1) the growth of outsourcing, (2) the cross82

Figure 1.10: The Employment Share of the Labor Outsourcing Sector in 1970 and
2005 The total height of the bar denotes the size of the employment share of the labor outsourcing
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sector in 2005 while the shaded height denotes the share in 1970. The employment data is from the
2008 Revision of the EU KLEMS Accounts. I define the labor outsourcing sector as the industry
code 74 (Other business activities). See Appendix 1.B for details.
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country heterogeneity in outsourcing, (3) the cross-country heterogeneity in trade
secret protection and (4) how these patterns relate to the trade secret laws. I restrict
attention to the analysis of the supply of labor outsourcing through employment
data, because there is no available data for the demand side that allows cross-country
comparisons. Hence, the scope of my analysis is determined by the availability of
industry level employment data that allows cross-country comparisons.
Fact 3: The employment share of the labor outsourcing sector has grown
globally since the 1970s.
The large growth in the employment share of the labor outsourcing sector was not
specific to the U.S. I use the EU KLEMS Accounts (2008 Rev.) to construct measures
of employment in labor outsourcing sectors for 14 countries in 1970 and 2005. Figure
1.10 presents how the employment share of the labor outsourcing sector has changed
from 1970 to 2005. The sector has grown dramatically across all the countries in my
sample and the growth in the U.S. is not an anomaly.

83

Figure 1.11: The Employment Share of the Labor Outsourcing Sector in 2017 The

total height of the bar denotes the size of the employment share of the labor outsourcing sector.
I depict the share of the high-skill labor outsourcing sector with the shaded height of the bar for
countries where the data is separately available. The employment data is from the 2017 OECD
STAN Accounts. I define the labor outsourcing sector as the industry codes M-N (Professional,
scientific and technical activities; administrative and support service activities). See Appendix 1.B
for details.
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Fact 4: There is a large cross-country heterogeneity in the intensity of
labor outsourcing.
The employment share of the labor outsourcing sector differs significantly across countries, similar to the heterogeneity present across the states of the U.S. I use the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) STAN Accounts to
construct measures of employment in labor outsourcing sectors for 34 countries in
2017. Figure 1.11 presents how the employment share of the labor outsourcing sector
differs across countries. The employment share for the country in the 90th percentile
(France, 15%) is twice of the country in the 10th percentile (Croatia, 7%) .
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Fact 5: There is large variation in trade secret protection globally.
There have been many developments in the protection of trade secrets globally since
1970. The World Trade Organisation proposed the TRIPS Agreement (Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) in 1994. The Article 39 of
the TRIPS Agreement is specifically dedicated to trade secrets and describes broadly
what is protected under the definition. The member countries promise to enforce the
protection of trade secrets, yet there is substantial heterogeneity in both the form
and the enforcement of the laws across countries.
China has been at the center of trade secret violation discussions for some time
(Bradsher, 2020). China provides protection for trade secrets under the Anti-Unfair
Competition Law (AUCL) which was enacted as early as 1993, and amended in 2017
and 2019. Yet, foreign firms operating in China frequently complain about the lack
of enforcement. The U.S. International Trade Commission conducted a survey of
firms (USITC, Commission, et al., 2011) that are in IP-intensive sectors and are
“particularly susceptible to IPR (intellectual property rights) violations in China.”
According to their report, “Firms that provided quantitative responses estimated
that improved IPR protection and enforcement in China could result in as much as a
10–20 percent increase in sales, royalties, and license fees earned in China, and a 2–5
percent increase in employment in their U.S. operations. These employment gains
could translate into approximately 922,588 new U.S. jobs among IP-intensive firms.”
More importantly, even though firms were suffering from trade secret theft, “Only 0.6
percent of those firms that reported material losses due to trade secret misappropriation during 2007–09 stated that they had pursued any trade secret misappropriation
proceedings in China.”
Sherwood, 1990 reports the results of a survey on 1800 Brazilian firms in 1989. In
the survey, although half of the firms have had ‘trade secret losses’, in 86% of those
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cases, there was no attempt for a legal procedure. The firms reported as the main
reasons they did not take legal action were “...lack of sufficient proof, a gap in the
law on which to base a legal action, or the expectation that litigation would be too
expensive or that enforcement would be poor even if the case were won.”.
The European Union has enacted the Directive on the Protection of Trade Secrets
(EUTSD) in 2016 after a lengthy process of drafting and consultations ”to harmonise
the existing diverging national laws [within the EU] on the protection against the
misappropriation of trade secrets, so that companies can exploit and share their
trade secrets with privileged business partners across the Internal Market, turning
their innovative ideas into growth and jobs”. Before 2016, even the provision that
guided the trade secret protection changed across countries. A large majority used
their criminal code or an unfair competition law and the only country that had a
specific trade secret law was Sweden. Furthermore, the countries differed in which
types of damages were granted and on what conditions injunctive reliefs were issued.50
According to an industry survey on 537 firms in 13 countries ran by Baker and
Mckenzie for the EU,“40% of EU companies would refrain from sharing trade secrets
with other parties because of fear of losing the confidentiality of the information
through misuse or release without their authorisation” and among 110 firms who had
at least one case of misappropriation “only 57 (40.7% of responses) sought remedies
in EU courts”.
Fact 6: The strength of trade secret protection and the size of the labor
outsourcing sector are positively correlated across countries.
In this section, I ask whether there is any evidence of a link between the protection
of trade secrets and labor outsourcing decisions across countries. Since there are
50

See Figure 4, Table A9, and Table A2.2 in https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2013:0471:FIN:EN:PDF
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Figure 1.12: The Labor Outsourcing Sector and Legal Protection The x-axis is the OECD

Trade Secret Protection Index in the left panel and the OECD Employment Protection Index in
the right-panel. Each box refers to one country-year observation where the boxes with darker colors
refer to earlier years. The employment data is from the 2008 Revision of the EU KLEMS Accounts.
I define the labor outsourcing sector as the industry code 74 (Other business activities). Both indices
range from 0 to 5 with 5 being the strongest protection. See Appendix 1.B for details.
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large unobserved differences across countries beyond the intellectual property law, I
treat the evidence here more descriptive rather than causal. I use a panel data on
the employment shares of labor outsourcing sector through 2008 EU KLEMS and
the trade secret protection index constructed by Lippoldt and Schultz, 2014. The
final sample has quintennial observations for 12 countries between 1985 and 2005.
The left panel of Figure 1.12 presents the patterns of trade secret protection and the
extent of labor outsourcing. There is overall a positive correlation, with countries
improving in both dimensions (e.g. Korea) and others that do not really increase
the extent of outsourcing even though the law has improved (e.g. Lithuania). I do a
similar analysis using the OECD employment protection index as shown in the right
panel of Figure 1.12, and no real pattern emerges having in mind the little time-series
variation present in employment protection laws.
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Table 1.9: Cross-Country Panel Regressions

TSP

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.52∗∗

0.68∗∗∗

0.22∗∗∗

0.24∗∗

0.16∗∗∗

0.18∗∗∗

(0.21)

(0.10)

(0.08)

(0.09)

(0.06)

(0.06)

log(ManufShare)

0.38

0.35

(0.34)

(0.34)

EPL

FE

−0.22

−0.21

(0.13)

(0.13)

Year

Country

Both

Both

Both

Both

Range

’85-’05

’85-’05

’85-’05

’85-’05

’85-’05

’85-’05

Nobs

49

49

49

49

49

49

Notes: The dependent variable is the log outsourcing sector share of employment.
TSP refers to the OECD Trade Secret Protection index and the EPL refers to the
OECD Strictness of Employment Protection index. There are country and year fixed
effects.Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The employment shares of
the outsourcing sector and the manufacturing sector are computed from the 2008
EU KLEMS Accounts. See Appendix 1.B for details on sample construction and
included industries.

To dig deeper, I run simple panel regression, controlling for country and year fixed
effects. The country fixed effects allow controlling for important country-specific
variables that are important for outsourcing but does not change much over time,
such as the degree of corruption and trust. The time fixed effects allow controlling
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Figure 1.13: Trade Secret Protection and GDP per capita The x-axis is the Global IP

Trade Secret Protection Index and y-axis is the GDP per capita. Each box refers to one country
observation. The GDP per capita data is from the 2008 Revision of the EU KLEMS Accounts.
Global IP Trade Secret Protection Index ranges from 0 to 3 with 3 being the strongest protection.
The line is the ordinary least squares estimate together with a 95% confidence interval. See Appendix
1.B for details.
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for global trends in outsourcing, for example due to increasing use of information
technology. I also use the share of manufacturing employment in each country to
control for country-specific structural change. Table 1.9 presents the results of the
panel regressions. The trade secret protection index has a statistically significant
correlation with the outsourcing shares, after controlling for country and year specific
variables.
Even though the trade secret protection and the extent of outsourcing tend to
evolve together across countries, my analysis here does not rely on an exogenous
variation in trade secret laws. Hence, it is important not to derive causal implications
from this analysis.

1.D

Estimation Details

The estimation of the structural model requires solving for the distribution of firms
across the number of permanent workers and idiosyncratic shocks. Since I do the
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estimation for multiple industries and multiple states of the U.S., even solving for
the equilibrium can quickly become infeasible. I do several tricks to decrease the
computational burden. I describe these tricks in three levels: the design of the model
environment, the assumptions that allow approximating the equilibrium, and the
estimation algorithm.

The Design of the Model Environment
I design the model environment in a way that allows estimating each state separately.
This requires each state to have separate product and labor markets. Since neither
the aggregate size of the workforce nor aggregate output is identified for states in
the model, these restrictions do not play a role in the estimation. In other words,
one can do the estimation ignoring cross-state interactions, then appropriately weight
the states according to their size to compute nation-level aggregates. However, these
restrictions do play a role in the counterfactual exercises. In particular, I assume the
policies do not change the extent of cross-border activities: when one state improves
its trade secret law, increased productivity does not attract workers or businesses
from other states. Although this assumption is restrictive, it is necessary to keep
the problem feasible. Another alternative would be to allow cross-state interactions,
but decrease the cross-industry and cross-state heterogeneity across firms substantially. I anticipate the bias in policy evaluations that would arise from assigning the
heterogeneity from other factors to trade secret protection would be larger than the
bias from ignoring cross-state interactions. I leave the formal assessment for future
projects.
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Approximating Assumptions
The main identification assumption, i.e. the benefits to outsourcing varies across industries but not over time, implies a parameter that is constant across states. This
parameter does not preclude separately computing the equilibria for each state, but
requires the estimation to be done simultaneously for all states. Estimating all states
simultaneously would necessitate the estimation of 1050 parameters altogether, which
is computationally infeasible. To avoid this issue, I do the estimation under Assumption 2, where the parameters for the trade secret protection (πj ) and the outsourcing
efficiency δ reduce to a factor share in a CES production function. Then, I treat the
estimated factor shares (α̂jk ) as the sum of the model implied factor shares (α(πj , δk ))
and a symmetric zero-mean error term. This allows separately estimating each state,
collecting the factor shares, and estimating the trade secret protection parameters
(πj ) in the second stage.
At the estimated parameters, the assumption does not impact the vast majority of
firms and does not have a large impact on the model implications.51 I do not impose
Assumption 2 when I compute the counterfactuals, i.e., firms are not forced to use
more outsourced workers when the trade secret protection improves.

Estimation Algorithm
Computing the stationary equilibrium requires two computationally intensive steps:
(1) computing the value function of firms for each industry, and (2) computing the
equilibrium rate of entry in each industry that ensures market clearing under the
51

This does not preclude the possibility that it significantly impacts the estimated parameters, i.e.,
imposing the assumption at the ‘correct’ parameters would impact a significant portion of the firms.
A complete verification requires simulating data from the model under different parameter sets and
assessing the ability of the model to estimate those parameters accurately when the assumption is
imposed.
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implied steady state distribution of firms. I use Value Function Iteration (VFI) for
the first step and a forward iteration with an exact transition function for the second step. It is possible to compute the equilibrium under a second with 200 grids
points for permanent workers and 10 grid points for the idiosyncratic shock process
with the classical algorithm by Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993.52 My model has two
added levels of complexity on top of the classical version. First, due to the non-convex
adjustment cost for permanent workers together with the task-based production function, the choice of outsourced workers requires the use of a non-linear solver for each
choice of the number of permanent workers. Second, my model requires computing K
(number of industries) prices, stationary distributions, and entry rates and the computation time does not scale linearly in K. I estimate the model efficiently without
adding an extra layer of approximation. The classical algorithm (for one industry)
prescribes
1. Use the free entry condition to determine the price of output
2. Find the mass of entrants that clears the labor market in the stationary distribution
When there are K industries that source from the same labor market, I need
additional conditions to pin down the relative sizes of each industry. The final good
industry provides K intermediate good demand conditions on top of the labor market
clearing condition that help pin down the final good price and the K entry masses
for each industry. Normally, for each guess of the parameters, solving the equilibrium
requires simultaneously finding K prices that satisfy K free entry conditions, where
each guess for the price requires running the VFI again to find the implied value of
52

I utilize the monotonicity and the concavity of the policy function in the stock of permanent
workers, and the Howard’s improvement algorithm. All three generate significant gains in computation speed.
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entry. I use two tricks to ensure that I only need to run the VFI once for each industry
for each guess of the parameters.
First, instead of finding the equilibrium intermediate good price for a given entry
cost parameter, I treat the price as the parameter and the entry cost as the equilibrium
object in the estimation. Hence, I only need to evaluate the VFI once for the given
price, and the associated value of entry gives the ‘equilibrium’ entry cost. This uses
the fact that the demand shares for the intermediate goods, intermediate good prices,
and the level of productivity/demand shocks across industries are not separately
identified. Hence, I can assume any K product prices, compute the associated entry
cost, and set the demand shares to equate the relative size of each industry to data.
Second, although I model the entry cost and the fixed cost in the units of the
final good, I measure them in units of the market wage which I normalize to unity.
Hence, each firm’s value function only requires knowing the intermediate good price
of its own industry and not the prices of the other intermediate goods. This allows
computing the intermediate good prices separately. This trick uses the fact that the
full equilibrium does not need to be computed for the estimation. When I compute
the counterfactuals, I revert to measuring these costs in units of the final good price,
hence computing the full equilibrium.
To sum up, for each set of (remaining) parameters, I use K − 1 relative industry sizes from the data, K − 1 conditions that ensure that the industry sizes are
consistent with the equilibrium, K free entry conditions, one labor market condition
and one aggregate entry rate to pin down K entry costs, K masses for entrants, K
intermediate good price.53 The gains in speed come from using the parameters to
ensure equilibrium conditions while using the equilibrium objects to match moments.
53

The use of the entry rate to pin down the price level happens over the whole estimation, rather
than for each set of parameters.
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So my algorithm is to do the following steps for each set of ‘parameters’, where the
parameters have the equilibrium price level but do not have the entry costs.
1. Use the revenue shares of industries from the data to pin down the price ratios54 ,
hence pk (since the price level is a parameter)
2. Use the free entry condition to pin down the associated entry costs cE
k
3. Choose the mass of entrants for each industry mk to ensure the equilibrium
distribution of firms in each industry is consistent with the revenue shares of
industries from the data and the labor market clearing conditions
These tricks significantly speed up the computation of the equilibrium moments
for each set of parameters without relying on any approximation. However, they
also distort how the moments respond to changes in parameters. In particular, it
reduces the efficiency of gradient based solvers, because once the parameters change,
the normalization also changes. Since my model already has non-convexities due to
adjustment costs and exit decisions, I prefer the gains in the speed of evaluating
moments over the lost gains in efficiently searching the parameter space.

1.E

Trade Secret Protection

In this section, I analyze some of the legal concepts and issues that relate to trade
secret protection in more detail. Section 1.E.1 discusses the problems with trade secret
protection under common law, Section 1.E.2 discusses why non-disclosure agreements
are not sufficient to ensure trade secret protection, and Section 1.E.3 discusses how
the courts determine which state’s law should govern a trade secret dispute.
54

This step practically puts infinite weight on the revenue share moments, forcing the estimation
to match revenue shares exactly. I can always run my estimation algorithm to get a very good
starting point, and let the usual procedure run without imposing this condition before finalizing the
estimation.
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1.E.1

Trade Secret Protection under Common Law

Before 1979, protection of trade secrets was established exclusively through common
law. In addition, trade secret protection varied substantially across U.S. states. This
created further uncertainty: to understand the legal practice, one had to analyze a
separate set of cases for each state.
This problem was further amplified when the Supreme Court has ruled that state
courts cannot use decisions made by federal courts as common law in Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This landmark decision led to each state
relying on the decisions made by their own courts, removing the only unifying body
from the picture. Edward S. Rogers, who was chairman of the board of executives of
Sterling Drug Co. and a member of Lawyers’ Advisory Committee of U.S. Trademark
Association would later say “Soon there was built up by decisions of the Federal Court
a great body of Federal Law dealing with trademarks and unfair competition. It was
a great convenience to the bar because lawyers knew or could easily learn what the
decisions were and there were enough of them to give a comprehensive picture. Then
came Erie ... which required Federal Courts to apply the law of the State in which they
sit, and there was chaos. There were 48 different sovereignties, the decisions of whose
courts were the only law. The body of Federal decision which was 50 years evolving
was not binding either on the State or the Federal Courts. Nobody knew what the
law was. It was frequently found that there were no applicable State decisions or that
the decisions in the States comprising the same circuit were not uniform.” (Rogers,
1964). Justice Joseph Story explained what creates this uncertainty as early as 1837:
“One great advantage, therefore, of a code, an advantage which in a practical view
can scarcely be over-estimated, is that it supersedes the necessity, in ordinary cases at
least, of very elaborate researches into other books; and indeed, it often supersedes in
all cases, but those of rare and extraordinary occurrence, the necessity of consulting
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an immense mass of learned collections and digests of 243 antecedent decisions.”
(Sandeen, 2010)
To resolve these issues, the American Law Institute has published several ‘Restatements of Torts’ before 1979, which summarized the theme of the previous decisions.
However, the statements had no legal binding and were necessarily vague where uncertainty was the highest.

1.E.2

Non-Disclosure Agreements

A natural solution to prevent trade secrets from reaching the competitors would be
to sign a non-disclosure agreements (NDA)55 , which are common practice today in
outsourcing. However, the majority of cases do not involve a spy with malicious
intent who steals obvious secrets hoping not to get caught. Instead, the issue either
arises from a disagreement between the parties on what is secret and what would
constitute a misappropriation, or an otherwise legitimate actor who sees a loophole
in the agreement and tries to make quick profits.56 In these scenarios, the NDA
is far from being sufficient to ensure protection. First, to be enforceable, an NDA
should explicitly designate what pieces of information are secret, which is very hard
in practice (Elzankaly, 2018). The agreements that try to make an exhaustive list
tend to fail, hence, the majority define secrets as broad and vague as possible to leave
room for potential litigation. Pooley, 1989 prescribes “Overnarrow definitions of your
trade secrets may restrict available protection.” and
As a practical matter, many experienced consultants will require you to
55

See Footnote 47 in Martinis, Gaudino, and Respess III, 2013 for example of a standard NDA.
According to the analysis of trade secret cases in federal courts in 2008 by Almeling, Snyder, and
Sapoznikow, 2009, of cases where plaintiff eventually lost, 61% were because the plaintiff could not
validate the information was a trade secret, 30% were because plaintiff could not prove information
was misappropriated and 30% were because plaintiff could not prove it took reasonable measures to
protect the secret. The percentages do not necessarily add up to 100% due to multiple issue being
present in some cases.
56
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define and describe your trade secrets in some detail. After all, consultants make their living by hopping from one firm to another in the same
industry. They may justifiably insist on a strict limitation of their obligations not to use what you consider to be your trade secrets.
A word to consultants: do not sign a general nondisclosure clause if you
can avoid it. Remember more than one person can possess the same trade
secret, discovered independently. If you have to sign, insist on a precise
definition and clarify your other consulting relationships.
Second, an NDA is only enforceable on information that is not readily available
elsewhere. For example, if the secret is previously presented in a public fair, or if it is
not clear what portion of the secret is already known in the industry, the NDA may
not be enforced. Third, enforcement of the NDA requires taking proper precautions to
protect the information, where the definition of proper is purposefully vague. While
verbally discussing a document which is explicitly classified to be secret, additional
information the firm gives may not be protected (Pooley, 2020). Fourth, the NDA
can assign damages to violations, but cannot prevent further use or the disclosure of
the secret once it is revealed. Fifth, although the NDA may designate a monetary
transfer in case of a violation, it is rarely enforced and the court tends to update the
number according to its own estimate of the actual damages. Last, but not least,
small and inexperienced companies may not be able to draft a functional NDA. The
trade secret law still provides protection if there is an implied confidentiality in the
agreement when the NDA is missing or invalid (Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369
(7th Cir. 1953)). Since the NDA fail to ensure a common understanding in most
cases, the details of the trade secret law becomes important in how well the secrets
are protected.
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1.E.3

Governing Law in Trade Secret Disputes

If the governing law is important for trade secret disputes, can the sides benefit from
the non-uniformity of laws across the U.S. by designating their favorite choice-of-law?
The answer is largely no.
In transactions where both sides operate in the same state, the laws of that state
govern the trade secret disputes.57 In multi-state transactions, the U.S. law permits
the sides to put a choice-of-law clause in their contract, designating which state-law
should govern the disputes over it. There is no definitive rule that determines the
enforceability of these clauses, but two legal principles favor the state the client is
based.
First, either the disputed action or one of the sides should have an organic connection to the state that will handle the case. Designating a ‘choice of law’ in a contract
(e.g. a non-disclosure agreement) is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure the
designated state court will handle the dispute. Either side can file a lawsuit in a
state court that is different from the one designated on the contract and the state
court designated on the contract can reject handling the dispute if it feels there is
no organic connection between the state and the dispute. The organic connection
requirement also prevents the sides to use simple loopholes in the legal system: a firm
that operates in Florida cannot request the laws of Delaware to be applied in disputes
just because it is officially established there. On the contrary, the courts tend to reject attempts to pick a ‘favorite state law’ in disputes. Schaller, 2009 summarizes the
procedure for trade secret disputes:
The choice of law can be complex in trade secret cases. There is no federal choice-of-law code that dictates the application of governing law in
57

The discussion in this section is largely based on Covey and Morris, 1983.
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state law diversity cases. Instead, in diversity jurisdiction cases, absent an
enforceable contractual choice of law clause, a district court must apply
the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits... For trade secret purposes, the applicable law might be that of the place where the secrets were
stolen, the place where the secrets were disclosed or used, the place where
the economic effects of misappropriation were felt, or possibly the place
where products incorporating the secrets were ultimately sold. The test
employed usually focuses upon which jurisdiction has the greatest “interest” or “governmental interest” in the litigation, upon which jurisdiction
has the most significant relationship to the dispute, or some combination
of these rules. Other jurisdictions follow the lex loci delecti rule, meaning
they apply the law of the place where the misappropriation actually took
place. At times, however, courts seem to follow no specific standard at
all...This costly, confusing and uncertain inquiry can be bypassed in some
jurisdictions if an enforceable choice-of-law clause exists in a nondisclosure
or similar contract between the parties. The chosen law will be honored if
the contract bears some reasonable relationship to the designated jurisdiction and does not offend any public policy of the state in which the court
is sitting. Thus, designating the law of plaintiff’s state of incorporation
will not carry the day if plaintiff and defendant have their relationship
centered elsewhere...See e.g. Curtis 1000, Inc. v Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 94344 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the designated law of Delaware lacked
sufficient connection to trade secret and non-compete dispute between
plaintiff headquartered in Georgia and defendant working in Illinois.
Second, when the outsourcing firm signs multiple contracts with multiple clients
with the same choice of law clause, the courts may interpret these non-disclosure
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agreements as one of adhesion. In other words, the choice-of-law clause could be perceived as one dictated by the outsourcing firm to the client, resulting from inequality
of bargaining power. In the case where the choice of law favors the outsourcing firm
over the client, the court may not enforce the choice-of-law clause.
There is another fundamental force that steers the choice of law towards the
client’s state: if a dispute ends up in a court, the client will have to be physically
present in the courtroom. Hence, the clients have an intrinsic motive to designate the
home state as the governing law.
This is also supported in Almeling, Snyder, and Sapoznikow, 2009 and Almeling,
Snyder, Sapoznikow, and McCollum, 2010 for trade secret disputes. Although their
data do not include the location of the sides or the dispute, they find the applied law
differed substantially in cases, indicating that there was no convergence to the law of
a particular state.

1.F

Generalized Differences-in-Differences Methods

In a setting with two time periods and two groups (treatment and control), the
differences-in-differences (DiD) estimator gives a consistent estimate of the average
treatment effect for the treated (att) under the parallel trends assumption. Furthermore, one can test the parallel trends assumption using pre-treatment trends under
additional assumptions.
The staggered adoption setting allows aggregating the information from DiD comparisons across multiple pairs of units over many periods. One simple counterpart
of the DiD estimator with multiple periods and staggered adoption is the Two-Way
Fixed Effects (TWFE) estimator and it is widely used in empirical studies. This
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estimator corresponds to a regression with both time and unit fixed effects where the
main regressor is a dummy Dit that equals 1 if unit i is under the effect of the treatment at time t. The TWFE does not adopt the nice properties of the DiD estimator
due to two reasons. First, Goodman-Bacon, 2018 and Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille, 2020 have recently shown TWFE estimate does not have a clear economic
interpretation when the treatment effect is heterogeneous across units. The estimate
can even be outside the convex hull of the pairwise DiD estimates of individual adoptions. Second, Sun and S. Abraham, 2020 pointed out that the TWFE estimator
estimates the treatment effect by comparing units whose treatment has changed to
those whose treatment remained constant. Thus, the control group includes units
who have recently received treatment. In the presence of dynamic treatment effects,
this introduces a bias in the estimates as well as tainting the tests for pre-treatment
trends.58
My setting is likely subject to both dimensions of heterogeneity. First, the effect
of the UTSA can be smaller or larger for the states who adopted it later. It can be
smaller if there are treatment spillovers to the control states, e.g. through the interstate provision of these services. It can also be larger if the UTSA becomes more
effective as states that already adopted it accumulate decisions based on it to be used
as a reference for future decisions. Second, the adoption potentially has dynamic
effects, i.e., its effect on outsourcing may depend on how much time has passed since
adoption. It is reasonable to think the effect may take a few years to fully realize
since (1) it takes time for the clients to understand the law changes and demand
more outsourcing and (2) it takes time for the outsourcing sector to grow to meet the
growing demand.
58

See Roth, 2018 for further issues with statistical tests for pre-trends, even in the classical DiD
settings.
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1.G

Outsourcing and Trade Secrets

In this section, I provide some direct evidence on how the concerns over protecting
trade secrets indeed impact the outsourcing decisions of the firms. First, I discuss the
government regulations that limit the form and extent of outsourcing due to concerns
over loss of trade secrets.59 Second, I provide anecdotes from experts and practitioners
that emphasize the importance of trade secrets in outsourcing relationships.

1.G.1

Government Regulations

Financial Institutions
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council60 publishes the Outsourcing
Technology Services Booklet that regulates whether and how financial institutions can
outsource a variety of IT functions “... to help ensure financial institutions operate in
a safe and sound manner.”.
Health Providers
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulates the use of
outsourcing by health institutions through the Omnibus Rule which requires the
‘business associates’ of health providers to also comply with the HIPAA Rules (Breach
Notification Rule, HIPAA Security Rule, HIPAA Privacy Rule, etc.) and holds the
health provider responsible for any loss of private information that happens through
the business associate.
59
I do not model regulation explicitly, but the information sharing constraint can easily be interpreted as such.
60
The FFIEC consists of five banking regulators—the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (FRB),
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration
(NCUA), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).
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Governmental Agencies
The Privacy Act of 1974 regulates the extent to which governmental agencies can share
information that pertains to an individual: “No agency shall disclose any record which
is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or
to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written
consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains [subject to 12 exceptions]”
5U.S.C. § 552a(b). The first of these 12 exceptions, namely “need to know within
agency”, makes it easier to communicate this information within the agency relative to third-party agencies such as outsourcing firms.61 There are also supplemental
clauses through other regulations, such as the Protection of Privacy and Freedom of
Information chapter of Federal Acquisition Regulation. Specific governmental agencies also have additional regulations restricting the use of contractors. For example,
Department of Defense Privacy Program of 2007, C1.3.1.4. requires that for any contracted job, an internal system of contractor performance review to be established
and special training to be given on the privacy programs.

1.G.2

Self-regulation

I restrict attention to either self-reports of firms and managers, first-hand documentation of these practices by observers, or recommendations from experts. Some of the
evidence here explicitly mention outsourcing decision, while some imply it through
emphasizing the importance of the length of a relationship to build trust.
“Because consultants have many of the privileges of a regular employee, though
for a shorter period of time, they must be subject to nondiclosure obligations as well.
61

In certain instances, the courts allow treating the employees of contractors as the employees of
the agency, e.g. Mount v. USPS, 79 F.3d 531, 532-34 (6th Cir. 1996), in some others they do not,
e.g. Minshew v. Donley, 911 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1072 (D. Nev. 2012).
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Indeed, it is essential to secure such agreements from consultants: the nature of their
work suggests they will work later for a competitor, or may compete with you directly.
In fact, the consultant may be serving other masters at the same time as working for
you. The consultant presents all the problems of the ‘peripatetic employee’ magnified
several times. Therefore, you must be extremely cautious and clear in establishing
and managing your relationship. ” Pooley, 1989
“Limit the consultant’s access to that portion of your facilities, records, and staff
that is necessary to complete the work. Closely supervise what is done. At termination of the relationship, get additional reassurances of what the consultant will do to
protect the integrity of your data, including the results of this project.” Pooley, 1989
“Contracting with a supplier can expose a company to the possibility that confidential information might leak, perhaps even to competitors. The risk is heightened
when the out-sourced activity involves technology that is novel in some competitively
significant way and when the protection for it (for example, patent laws) is weak or
unclear and the innovation is easy to imitate. Interdependencies are also of concern:
Spillover risks are exacerbated when the interface between the outsourced activity
and other internal functions is complex, requiring a company to reveal proprietary
information to ensure a good fit between the two.
To protect against dependency and spillover risks, a company can rely on detailed legal contracts with vendors. But such documents are time-consuming and
expensive to negotiate, and enforcement is uncertain and costly, thus discouraging
outsourcing. Instead, outsourcing is greatly facilitated by trust between the two parties, particularly when both organizations are keen on maintaining their reputations
as trustworthy partners. However,given the possibility of divergent business interests,
trust between independent firms is, by nature, conditional. Note too that the trustworthiness of external partners should be compared with that of internal suppliers,
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which sometimes rate poorly.” Adler, 2003
“Referred to by Adler (2003) as spillover risk, outsourcing firms are exposed to
the possibility that confidential or critical information might leak to competitors or
be used by the outsourcing firm to eventually take over the client firm’s business.”
M. J. Schniederjans, A. M. Schniederjans, and D. G. Schniederjans, 2015
“Much essential company information, including strategic plans, is stored in computers. Under no circumstances should such information fall into the hands of competitors. The security risks involved in outsourcing are therefore frequently cited as
a reason for not contracting out one’s information services delivery; these companies
prefer to keep their internal IT departments (Willcocks and Fitzgerald 1994; Klepper
and Jones 1998; Miller and Anderson, 2004). The IT procurement manager of Case
III explains:
Our primary processes of producing coatings, fibres, chemicals and pharmaceuticals are supported by IT, which consequently has very much added value. Contracting
out activities so close to our primary processes is not desirable. The risk of production
secrets falling into the hands of our competitor by way of external suppliers is far too
great.” Beulen and Ribbers, 2010
“Outsourcing the IT function is likely to involve the supplier processing the organisation’s data in some form. The organisation remains responsible for compliant
handling of its data even if this is under the control of a supplier. Risks may arise over
the confidentiality of the organisation’s data and intellectual property. For instance,
there may be misuse of confidential data relating to the organisation, its employees and customers; and inadequate security measures implemented by the supplier.”
Kendrick, 2009
“It is not unusual, however, for confidentiality orders to require that all experts
or consultants, whether testifying or not, be disclosed before they receive access to
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confidential documents produced by the other side. Such provisions reflect legitimate
concerns that the disclosure of trade secret information to a consultant who has other
clients in the industry or who may participate in the industry in other capacities,
creates the risk of competitive injury.” Quinto and Singer, 2012
“The principal issue at the start of the Du Pont-Masland litigation was whether
Masland was using Du Pont’s trade secrets in manufacturing artificial leather, or
whether he was using methods that were common knowledge among chemists in that
line of business. The district court initially denied a preliminary injunction because
Masland insisted that he was not using Du Pont trade secrets. During the litigation,
Masland proposed to get expert testimony to establish that the processes that Du
Pont claimed as trade secrets were in fact common knowledge among chemists. Fearing that litigation would reveal their secrets to their competitors, Du Pont wanted
to prevent Masland from drawing his experts from the ranks of their competitors,
preferring that he serve as his own expert or that he use experts drawn from the
Government or academia.” Fisk, 2000

1.H

Additional Figures and Tables

Table 1.10: Externally Calibrated Industry-level Parameters Notes: The σk values are
computed from Bloom, Floetotto, et al., 2018 by taking weighted averages of ’Uncert_tfp’ estimates
for 4-digit SIC sectors. The γk values are from Table 9 in Chan, 2017.

Industry Group
σk
γk
Food
0.555 0.417
Wood
0.407 0.653
Heavy
0.516 0.568
Light
0.427 0.62
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Table 1.11: First-stage Estimation Results (Michigan)
Parameter
τ
cE
1
cE
2
cE
3
cE
4
cF1
cF2
cF3
cF4
θ1
θ2
θ3
θ4
ρ1
ρ2
ρ3
ρ4
α1
α2
α3
α4

0.2
176
463
280
490
194
93
172
101
0.092
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.95
0.97
0.95
0.98
0.81
0.73
0.72
0.75

Moment
% Job Dest. Rate
% Exit Rate
Revenue Share 1
Revenue Share 2
Revenue Share 3
Avg Estb. Size 1
Avg Estb. Size 2
Avg Estb. Size 3
Avg Estb. Size 4
Revenue/Payroll 1
Revenue/Payroll 2
Revenue/Payroll 3
Revenue/Payroll 4
Size < 20 Share 1
Size < 20 Share 2
Size < 20 Share 3
Size < 20 Share 4
Outsourcing/Payroll
Outsourcing/Payroll
Outsourcing/Payroll
Outsourcing/Payroll
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1
2
3
4

Model
9.24
6.15
0.314
0.0424
0.264
35.5
44.7
54
62.6
12
7.62
8.14
8.22
0.762
0.505
0.46
0.538
0.0868
0.0604
0.115
0.0836

Data
8.74
6.29
0.323
0.0461
0.287
35
44
53.5
60.5
12
7.26
8.07
7.81
0.715
0.591
0.454
0.608
0.0855
0.0596
0.109
0.0847

Table 1.12: State-Level Estimates for Trade Secret Protection The first-stage estimation
results for αjk and the associated second-stage estimation results for πj

State
AL
AZ
CA
CT
FL
GA
IL
IN
KS
LA
MA
MI
MO
NE
NJ
NY
NC
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
TN
TX
UT
VA
WA
WI

π αF ood
0.17
0.19
0.21
0.21
0.24
0.23
0.20
0.21
0.24
0.22
0.15
0.16
0.23
0.22
0.18
0.20
0.21
0.21
0.26
0.25
0.21
0.21
0.16
0.19
0.13
0.17
0.14
0.17
0.21
0.21
0.16
0.19
0.18
0.16
0.16
0.19
0.15
0.19
0.18
0.19
0.16
0.19
0.17
0.18
0.17
0.19
0.18
0.23
0.20
0.21
0.18
0.18
0.22
0.22
0.17
0.20

αW ood
0.27
0.28
0.30
0.28
0.30
0.26
0.29
0.28
0.29
0.28
0.29
0.27
0.25
0.26
0.28
0.27
0.30
0.27
0.23
0.27
0.26
0.28
0.29
0.30
0.28
0.28
0.29
0.26
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αHeavy
0.28
0.29
0.30
0.28
0.31
0.29
0.30
0.28
0.30
0.31
0.29
0.28
0.25
0.26
0.29
0.27
0.31
0.27
0.27
0.28
0.27
0.28
0.31
0.19
0.28
0.29
0.30
0.28

αLight
0.27
0.30
0.31
0.29
0.31
0.28
0.31
0.28
0.30
0.32
0.30
0.25
0.25
0.26
0.29
0.27
0.29
0.27
0.27
0.29
0.27
0.28
0.23
0.31
0.29
0.29
0.30
0.27

Figure 1.14: The Distribution and the Coefficient of Variation for Outsourcing to
Payroll Ratios Under Baseline and the Counterfactual Scenarios Notes: Base refers to

the baseline, Avg Ind refers to the counterfactual with the average composition of industries, Avg τ
(π) refers to counterfactual with the average level of τ (π). The last two refers to counterfactuals
where multiple objects are equal to their average values across states. See Table 1.13 for state-bystate details.

Share of Outsourcing Expenses

0.20

0.16

0.12

0.08

CoV: 0.190
Base

0.163

0.216

0.153

0.173

0.152

Avg Ind

Avg τ

Avg π

Avg τ and π

Avg Ind, τ, and π
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Figure 1.15: First Stage Estimates and Revenue Payroll Ratios Notes: The first three

panels plot the first stage estimation results for returns to scale parameters (θj k), entry costs cE
jk ,
and fixed operating costs cjk respectively. The bottom right panel has the revenue payroll ratios
from the CMF for each state-industry pair. See Appendix 1.B for details on the data sources.
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Figure 1.16: The Number of States that Adopted the UTSA (1980-2016) Notes: EEA

refers to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 and DTSA refers to the Defend Trade Secrets Act of
2016. The figures combines adoption years in Png, 2017b with public announcements.
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2010

2016

Table 1.13: The Baseline and the Counterfactual Outsourcing to Payroll Ratios for
States of the U.S.The last row reports the coefficient of variation.
State
AL
AZ
CA
CT
FL
GA
IL
IN
KS
LA
MA
MI
MO
NE
NJ
NY
NC
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
TN
TX
UT
VA
WA
WI
CoV

Base Avg τ Avg π
0.19
0.17
0.22
0.16
0.15
0.15
0.22
0.19
0.17
0.15
0.16
0.15
0.17
0.22
0.19
0.15
0.15
0.16
0.19
0.17
0.22
0.16
0.15
0.15
0.22
0.19
0.17
0.15
0.16
0.15
0.17
0.22
0.19
0.15
0.15
0.16
0.19
0.17
0.22
0.16
0.15
0.15
0.22
0.19
0.17
0.15
0.16
0.15
0.17
0.22
0.19
0.15
0.15
0.16
0.19
0.17
0.22
0.16
0.15
0.15
0.22
0.19
0.17
0.15
0.16
0.15
0.17
0.22
0.19
0.15
0.15
0.16
0.19
0.17
0.22
0.16
0.15
0.15
0.22
0.19
0.17
0.15
0.16
0.15
0.19
0.22
0.15

Avg Ind
0.19
0.16
0.22
0.15
0.17
0.15
0.19
0.16
0.22
0.15
0.17
0.15
0.19
0.16
0.22
0.15
0.17
0.15
0.19
0.16
0.22
0.15
0.17
0.15
0.19
0.16
0.22
0.15
0.16
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Avg τ and π
0.17
0.15
0.19
0.16
0.22
0.15
0.17
0.15
0.19
0.16
0.22
0.15
0.17
0.15
0.19
0.16
0.22
0.15
0.17
0.15
0.19
0.16
0.22
0.15
0.17
0.15
0.19
0.16
0.17

Avg Ind, τ and π
0.22
0.15
0.17
0.15
0.19
0.16
0.22
0.15
0.17
0.15
0.19
0.16
0.22
0.15
0.17
0.15
0.19
0.16
0.22
0.15
0.17
0.15
0.19
0.16
0.22
0.15
0.17
0.15
0.15

Table 1.14: The State-Level Counterfactual Results After an Improvement in Trade
Secret Protection The values for columns 4 to 7 are relative to a baseline value of 1.
State
Base Best TSP Gross Out
AL
0.11
0.16
1.006
AZ
0.14
0.17
1.007
CA
0.16
0.17
1.000
CT
0.13
0.18
1.010
FL
0.13
0.14
1.003
GA
0.11
0.17
1.010
IL
0.15
0.17
1.001
IN
0.12
0.17
1.009
KS
0.13
0.15
1.004
LA
0.17
0.17
1.000
MA
0.14
0.17
1.006
MI
0.11
0.17
1.012
MO
0.09
0.18
1.017
NE
0.09
0.15
1.008
NJ
0.15
0.18
1.009
NY
0.12
0.19
1.019
NC
0.13
0.17
1.007
OH
0.12
0.18
1.013
OK
0.10
0.17
1.015
OR
0.11
0.15
1.010
PA
0.12
0.20
1.015
RI
0.12
0.19
1.017
TN
0.16
0.22
1.005
TX
0.20
0.26
1.007
UT
0.13
0.17
1.010
VA
0.11
0.16
1.008
WA
0.12
0.14
1.005
WI
0.11
0.16
1.010
Median 0.12
0.17
1.009
Max
0.20
0.26
1.019
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Net Out
1.006
1.008
1.000
1.011
1.003
1.011
1.001
1.010
1.004
1.000
1.007
1.013
1.019
1.009
1.010
1.020
1.007
1.015
1.017
1.010
1.018
1.019
1.006
1.007
1.011
1.009
1.005
1.010
1.009
1.020

# of Firms
1.004
1.007
0.999
1.010
1.003
1.009
1.000
1.009
1.003
1.000
1.006
1.011
1.016
1.007
1.009
1.020
1.006
1.013
1.015
1.010
1.016
1.017
1.002
1.005
1.011
1.007
1.005
1.010
1.008
1.020

Wage
1.015
1.010
1.004
1.014
1.002
1.020
1.005
1.014
1.008
1.000
1.009
1.020
1.029
1.017
1.011
1.022
1.014
1.022
1.024
1.012
1.025
1.021
1.019
1.023
1.012
1.014
1.005
1.013
1.014
1.029

Chapter 2
Price Informativeness and Business
Cycle Misallocation
by Gorkem Bostanci and Guillermo Ordoñez†

2.1

Introduction

Economic downturns are associated with a decrease in measures of aggregate productivity. Two consistent findings so far are that misallocation of inputs increases during
downturns, and capital reallocation decreases.1 These findings contradict the Schumpeterian growth theory, which suggests decreased demand makes recessions ideal for
reallocation. One suspect is the counter-cyclical information quality on investment
opportunities. In particular, stock prices reflect the actions of traders who spend
time, money, and effort to evaluate firms’ future potential and are commonly used to
guide investment.2 Hence, understanding the cyclical behavior of stock price infor†University of Pennsylvania.
See Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006.
2
Baker, Stein, and Wurgler, 2003 shows stock prices are important for the corresponding firm’s
investment when the firm is dependent on equity with external financing needs. Chen, Goldstein,
1
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mativeness, i.e., the amount of information revealed by stock prices might shed some
light on the capital (re)allocation puzzle.
Stock price informativeness crucially depends on (1) how informed traders are
in the first place and (2) how well prices reflect their information. In this paper,
we theoretically analyze how asset liquidity interacts with these two channels. We
first build a model of information acquisition and trading where the noise in prices is
endogenously determined. Second, we incorporate it into a neoclassical growth model
where stocks are claims on real assets, and the real sector learns from the trades in
the stock markets. Then, we study how the informativeness of these prices interacts
with shocks to the economy.
A comprehensive analysis of price informativeness requires relaxing the commonplace assumption of exogenous noise in prices, which followed Grossman and Stiglitz,
1980. Exogenous noise prevents prices from perfectly revealing and maintains an
equilibrium with incentives to acquire costly information. However, the assumptions
made about the noise’s exogenous characteristics also dictate how it responds to
shocks. We start by building a model with different trading motives across investors.
Specifically, we model two types of traders -day and night- interested in different asset
properties -liquidity risk and fundamental payoff-. This structure creates endogenous
noise in prices: a high price may indicate a low liquidity risk or a high fundamental
payoff.
The stock trading model offers several insights by itself. First, when a larger
share of traders are worried about the liquidity risk, the price informativeness on the
fundamental payoff goes down. Second, traders may acquire more information about
and W. Jiang, 2006 and Bennett, R. Stulz, and Z. Wang, 2019 show that the sensitivity of the
firm’s investment and CEO turnover on its stock price increases as empirical measures of price
informativeness increase. Edmans, Goldstein, and W. Jiang, 2012 shows a decrease in stock prices
increases the likelihood that the corresponding firm will be subject to a takeover. Feldman and
Schmidt, 2003 describes how regulators use stock prices in their decision making.
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the firm’s performance even when nothing changes about its profitability outlook. In
particular, information acquisition intensifies when (1) more traders care about its
stock’s liquidity, (2) the quality of public information about its liquidity decreases,
and (3) the quality of costly information about its liquidity increases. Third, in an
otherwise symmetrical setting, the total resources spent on information acquisition
are the largest when there is an equal number of day and night traders.
Next, we incorporate this stock market module inside a neoclassical growth model
with heterogeneous firms. In the absence of information frictions, the investors would
allocate capital across firms based on their true idiosyncratic productivity. In our
model, the allocation is based on the investors’ best guess, given the stock prices.
While the stock traders acquire costly information and trade based on their information, the economy’s real side uses the prevailing stock prices as signals of true
productivity. Hence, the stock markets affect the resource allocation in the real sector through prevailing prices. On the other hand, real shocks affect the stock markets
by changing the profitability of firms. This structure allows the amplification of small
shocks through feedback loops between the real and financial sectors.
The main mechanism of the model works as follows. A shock that increases
liquidity traders’ share in the economy masks the information about fundamentals
in prices. This mechanism raises two real distortions: (1) increased spending on
acquiring costly information by traders and (2) worse allocation of capital across
firms by the investors. The first effect allocates resources away from productive
capital and towards information producing, while the second causes a misallocation
of capital across firms and lead to lower aggregate investment. Hence a financial
shock that increases the liquidity needs increases misallocation, decreases aggregate
investment, and increases the resources spent on information production, consistent
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with the patterns observed during recessions.3
The model also allows separately accounting for the efficiency losses through different channels. We look at the efficiency loss due to capital allocated to information
production and the loss due to misallocation. We find the efficiency loss due to information production disappears when the share of liquidity traders is either close to
0 or 1.
Our paper lies at the intersection of the literature on price informativeness and
the literature on input misallocation. The vast majority of the theoretical literature on price informativeness assumes an exogenous source of noise to prevent prices
from being perfectly informative, following the impossibility theorem of Grossman
and Stiglitz, 1980. We endogenize the information/noise ratio by assuming two dimensions of information condensed in a single price. The closest papers to ours here
are Stein, 1987 and Vives, 2014. The former uses heterogeneity in market access
while the latter uses heterogeneity in preferences to generate imperfectly informative
prices without exogenous noise. Both papers are theoretical and restrict attention to
implications for the stock markets. We extend their framework and allow the heterogeneity itself to change over time. The empirical literature focuses on measuring price
informativeness. Dávila and Parlatore, 2018 are the first to map empirical regression
estimates to parameters in a Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980 structure to infer price
informativeness. They use time-series regressions to measure price informativeness
for each stock, which requires them to make assumptions on how model parameters
change over time to keep the cross-sectional variation flexible. We, on the other hand,
use cross-sectional regressions to measure price informativeness over time. Thus, we
make assumptions on the extent of heterogeneity across stocks to allow parameters to
3

See H. Jiang, Habib, and Gong, 2015 and Loh and R. M. Stulz, 2018 for evidence on countercyclical information production by investors.
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change flexibly over time. J. Bai, Philippon, and Savov, 2016, similar to us, analyzes
the long-run trend in price informativeness using cross-sectional regressions. However,
they are interested in the ability of prices to predict future stock performance, which
is determined jointly by the availability of information on future prices and the ability
of stock markets to communicate such information. Our model allows disentangling
the two components.
One strand of the literature on input misallocation analyzes the patterns of input misallocation across firms in recessions. Foster, Grim, and Haltiwanger, 2016
find the extent of reallocation across the U.S. firms has declined during the great
recession. Kehrig, 2015 finds dispersion of productivity distribution in the U.S. is
larger in recessions than booms.4 Furthermore, Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006 shows
the amount of capital reallocation is procyclical and large countercyclical reallocation
costs are required to justify it. Tighter financial constraints, counter-cyclical adverse
selection in the market for used-capital, managers’ incentives to hide reallocation
needs from owners during recessions have been proposed as potential mechanisms
for the counter-cyclical misallocation.5 On the other hand, others take increased
uncertainty/misallocation as a primitive shock and analyze its effects to understand
business cycles.6 We contribute to this literature by first proposing a novel mechanism that creates misallocation and analyzing how the misallocation caused by the
drop in productivity can feedback to the price informativeness and amplify the initial
shock.
4

The increased misallocation is not specific to the U.S. and has been documented for other
countries in economic crises as well. See Oberfield, 2013 for Chile, Sandleris and Wright, 2014 for
Argentine, Dias, Marques, and Richmond, 2016 for Portugal and Di Nola, 2016 for the U.S.
5
See Ordonez, 2013, Khan and Thomas, 2013, Fajgelbaum, Schaal, and Taschereau-Dumouchel,
2017 and Straub and Ulbricht, 2017 for tighter financial constraints, Fuchs, Green, and Papanikolaou,
2016 for adverse selection, and Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2008 for managerial incentives.
6
See Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno, 2014, Arellano, Y. Bai, and Kehoe, 2016, and Bloom
et al., 2018.
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There is a recent, but growing, literature at the intersection of these two strands.
Benhabib, Liu, and P. Wang, 2019 does a theoretical analysis similar to ours with
two-way learning between the real and the financial sectors. Their model exhibits
complementarity in information acquisition. Thus, a shock that reduces incentives to
acquire information in one sector induces the other to reduce information acquisitions,
creating equilibrium switches that amplify the initial shock. David, Hopenhayn, and
Venkateswaran, 2016 and David and Venkateswaran, 2019 are the closest papers to
our study. The former focuses on the role of informational frictions in resource allocation and measures how much each source of information contributes to productivity
gaps. The latter has a larger scope and incorporates many potential frictions that can
distort resource allocation on top of informational frictions. Both analyses provide
static measures; thus, they are silent about cyclicality. While our framework restricts
attention to stock markets as the main source of information, we introduce endogenous noise, time-varying model parameters, and a two-way interaction between real
and financial sectors.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the
stock market model with endogenous noise, and Section 2.3 incorporates it into an
RBC model. Section 2.4 concludes.

2.2

Static Model

In this section, we present a simple static environment with a single risky asset. The
setting is designed to be symmetric to flesh out the main mechanics of our mechanism.
The price functions as a signal for two properties, which are valued differently by
different traders. The trading behavior of one type of trader masks the information
for the other type.
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2.2.1

Environment

Preferences There is a measure one of traders with CARA period utility functions.
That is, utility from consuming an amount W is given by V (W ) = −e−aW . A
γ ∈ (0, 1) fraction of traders live on a sunny island (sunny traders) and 1 − γ fraction
live on a cloudy island (cloudy traders).
Technology There is a safe asset (money) with return R regardless of where it is
consumed. There is also a risky asset (orchid) which gives a random return u1 when
planted in the sunny island and u2 when planted in the cloudy island. Returns of this
risky asset consist of two parts:
u1 = θ1 + 1
u2 = θ2 + 2
where θk can be privately observed at a cost ck (.) while k are unobservable. Both θk
and k are random variables. The cost of acquiring information ck (.) is assumed to
be an increasing function of the number of informed traders.7 .
Endowments Trader j is assumed to be endowed with M̄j of safe asset and X̄j of
the risky asset. The total supply of risky asset in the economy is assumed to be 0 and
it is common knowledge. We denote the price of the risky asset with P where the
price of safe asset is normalized to 1. Trader j’s starting wealth becomes M̄j + P X̄j .
Distributional Assumptions We assume θk ∼ N (θ¯k , σθ2k ) and k ∼ N (0, σ2k ). We
also assume θ1 , θ2 , 1 , 2 are jointly independent.
7

This rules out any complementarity in information acquisition and prevents multiple equilibria.
This assumption can be derived from a model where the cost of acquiring information is heterogeneous across traders and those with the smallest cost acquire the information first.
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2.2.2

Portfolio Choice Problem

Both the sunny and cloudy traders first decide whether to pay the cost ck (λk ) to get
information and then decide on a portfolio of assets. After the informational decision,
the portfolio choice problem of trader j from island k becomes


i
max E − exp − a[RMj + uk Xj ]
h

Mj ,Xj

(2.1)

s.t. Mj + P Xj = M̄j + P X̄j
where Mj and Xj are safe and risky asset demands of trader j. Let’s define W0j ≡
M̄j + P X̄j . Since uk is normally distributed, the end-of-period wealth of trader j is
also normally distributed. Therefore, we can re-write the problem as


i
a 2
max −exp − a RW0j + Xj E[uk ] − RP − Xj V ar[uk ]
Mj ,Xj
2
h





(2.2)

which yields
Xj∗ =

E[uk ] − RP
aV ar[uk ]

Informed traders know the relevant θ. Therefore, they form their expectations on uk
based on θ and do not need to use the market price P . Uninformed traders look at the
market price to form their expectations. For these traders, the price is not perfectly
informative. The reason is, agents only care about the asset’s payoff on the island
they plant it but the market price is a function of payoffs in both periods. Therefore,
a high price might be the outcome of a high payoff on island 1 as well as in island 2.
Demand for the risky asset for an informed trader j that lives in island k becomes
Xj∗ =

θk − RP
aσ2k
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Demand for the risky asset for an uninformed trader that lives in island k becomes
Xj∗ =

2.2.3

E[uk |P ] − RP
aV ar[uk |P ]

Solution

Let’s define λ1 and λ2 as the fraction of traders that pay the cost to be informed on
island 1 and 2 respectively. We denote λ ≡ {λ1 , λ2 }. Market clearing for the risky
asset requires

 h
h E[u |P ] − RP i
θ1 − RP i
1
γ λ1
+(1 − λ1 )
aσ21
aV ar[u1 |P ]
 h
(2.3)
h E[u |P ] − RP i
θ2 − RP i
2
+ (1 − γ) λ2
+ (1 − λ2 )
=0
aσ22
aV ar[u2 |P ]
Lemma 2. Given the distributional assumptions, there exists a market price for a
given λ with the form

Pλ (θ) = α0λ + α0λ θ2 +

γλ1 σ22
θ1
(1 − γ)λ2 σ21



(2.4)

where α0λ and α0λ are real numbers that possibly depend on λ but not on θ1 or θ2 .
Proof. Appendix 2.A.



Corollary 2. For a given λ, price becomes more informative about θ1 when
(i) a larger fraction of traders are from island 1
(ii) a larger fraction of island 1 traders are informed compared to island 2 traders
(iii) the payoff at island 1 is less volatile conditional on information on θ compared
to payoff at island 2.
Proof. Immediately follows from Equation 2.
122



Let’s denote the end-of-period wealth for trader j from island k for a given λ as
Wjλk . That is
λk
WIj
= R(W0j − ck (λk )) + [uk − RPλ (θ)]XIj (Pλ (θ), θ)

(2.5)

WUλkj = RW0j + [uk − RPλ (θ)]XUj (Pλ (θ), Pλ∗ )

(2.6)

where subscripts I, U refer to being informed and uninformed and Pλ∗ is the realized market price. Trader j would be willing to pay to be informed if and only if
λk
E[V (WIj
)|Pλ ] ≥ E[V (WUλkj )|Pλ ].

Lemma 3. Under the distributional assumptions,
λk
E[V (WIj
)|Pλ ]
= eack (λk )
E[V (WUλkj )|Pλ ]

s

V ar[uk |θk ]
≡ ψ k (λ)
V ar[uk |Pλ ]

(2.7)

for k ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Appendix 2.A.



Corollary 3. ψ k (λ) is monotone in each λk . Therefore,
(i) If ψ k (λ) > 1 ∀λk ∈ [0, 1], all island k traders become informed, i.e. λ∗k = 1.
(ii) If ψ k (λ) < 1 ∀λk ∈ [0, 1], no island k traders become informed, i.e. λ∗k = 0.
(iii) Otherwise, λ∗k as a function of λ−k is given by ψ k (λ) = 1.
Definition 1. P (θ)∗ , λ∗1 , λ∗2 constitutes a stochastic Rational Expectations Equilibrium
(REE) such that
(i) λ∗1 , λ∗2 are given by Corollary 3, given P (θ)∗ .
(ii) P (θ)∗ satisfies the market clearing condition given in Equation 2.3, given λ∗1 , λ∗2 .
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Proposition 2. Let c(λk ) be strictly increasing and strictly concave. There exists a
unique linear REE where price has the form given in Lemma 2.
Proof. There exists a P (θ)∗ for any λ∗1 , λ∗2 ∈ [0, 1] since market clearing condition is
unbounded below and above for P (θ) ∈ R+ . Therefore, showing λ∗1 , λ∗2 ∈ [0, 1] exists
that satisfies Corollary 3 is sufficient. Given the structure of Corollary 3, λ∗1 , λ∗2 ∈ [0, 1]
has to exist. Thus an equilibrium, which is not guaranteed to be interior, exists.
There exists a unique P (θ)∗ for any λ∗1 , λ∗2 ∈ [0, 1] since market clearing condition
is strictly monotonic in price. By Lemma 3, λk is unique for a given λ−k since ψ k (λ)
is strictly monotonic in λk . Therefore, there cannot exist multiple equilibria that
are not interior. For interior equilibria, λ∗k (λ−k ) is a proper function and is strictly
increasing and concave in λ−k for k = 1, 2. Therefore, λ∗1 (λ2 ) and λ∗2 (λ1 ) can only
have a single crossing inside [0, 1] × [0, 1]. Thus the equilibrium is unique.



Corollary 4. Let limλk →0 c(λk ) = 0 and limλk →1 c(λk ) = C̄ where C̄ is large enough.
Then the unique linear REE is interior.

2.2.4

Equilibrium Characterization

Here, we focus on interior equilibria and follow Goldstein, Li, and Yang, 2014 to define
price informativeness as the reduction in payoff variance faced after observing the
price. However, we normalize it with the reduction in payoff variance after acquiring
the costly signal.
Definition 2. Price informativeness measure for island 1 traders is defined as
1

P I1 =
1+

σθ2



2

σθ2

1
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(1−γ)λ2 σ21
γλ1 σ22

2

(2.8)

and for island 2 traders is defined as
1

P I2 =
1+

σθ2



1

σθ2

2

γλ1 σ22
(1−γ)λ2 σ21

2

(2.9)

An immediate implication is whatever increases the informativeness of the price
for the island 1 traders decreases it for the island 2 traders and vice versa.
Using Lemma 3, in interior equilibria, we can write price informativeness for island
i trader (to be denoted as P Ii ) as
P Ii = σθ2i + σ2i (1 − e2aci (λi ) )

(2.10)

In Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980, equilibrium objects do not appear on the RHS, thus
comparative statics become trivial. In our case, combining Definition 2 and (2.10)
we have two equations to solve for two equilibrium objects λ1 and λ2 . We further
assume a cost function form c(λk ) = Ck C(λk ) where Ck is a parameter.
Proposition 3. In interior equilibria, fraction of informed island 2 traders λ2 increases as
(1) a, C1 , C2 and σ21 decreases
(2) σθ21 and γ increases
(3) σ22 decreases and σθ22 increases.
Symmetric results hold for island 1 traders.
Proof. Appendix 2.A.



In Proposition 3, the comparative statics w.r.t. the parameters of the island 2
payoffs are similar to Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980. A larger fraction of island 2
traders acquire information when they are less risk averse, information acquisition
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is cheaper, pre-acquisition uncertainty is higher, and post-acquisition uncertainty is
lower.
What is new to our setting is the comparative statics w.r.t. to the payoffs in
the other island. In particular, Corollary 2 shows the informed trades by one island
masks the information about the other island in prices. Proposition 3 adds to it
by describing how traders respond by changing their information acquisition. In
particular, a larger fraction island 2 traders acquire information when for island 1
traders information acquisition is cheaper, pre-acquisition uncertainty is higher, and
post-acquisition uncertainty is lower.

2.2.5

Comparative Statics

The model does not give closed-form solutions for all equilibrium objects, therefore,
we rely on numerical solutions for comparative statics. To isolate the role of price informativeness, we focus on a fully symmetric structure, where beliefs and realizations
of each island are identical. The benchmark values for parameters are given in Table
2.1. We analyze a case where both island 1 and island 2 payoffs turn out to be lower
than expected.
Figure 2.1 presents comparative statics with respect to fraction of island 1 traders:
γ. Here, we interpret the comparative statics as a response to a liquidity shock8 . The
equilibrium response crucially depends on the initial and final values of γ. Panel 1
shows an increase in γ increases λ2 and decreases λ1 as predicted by Proposition 3.
Meanwhile, the fraction of all the traders that acquire information can increase or
decrease based on γ0 . In a situation where γ0 is low, however, an increase is more
likely to increase information acquisition than decrease.
8

This can be justified in an infinitely played market game where θ realizations are i.i.d. over
time, so static equilibria are played in each game. Therefore, transition dynamics can be ignored.
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Figure 2.1: Comparative Statics for the Benchmark Model with respect to γ
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1

Table 2.1: Comparative Statics Benchmarks
Parameter
Technology and Preferences
a
Risk Aversion Parameter
γ
Fraction of Island 1 Traders
R
Risk Free Return
C1 Cost of Acquiring Information for Island 1 Traders
C2 Cost of Acquiring Information for Island 2 Traders

Value
0.03
0.5
1
0.5
0.5

Beliefs
θ¯1
Mean of Island 1 Payoff Signal
2
σθ1 Variance of Island 1 Payoff Signal
σ21 Quality of Island 1 Payoff Signal
θ¯2
Mean of Island 2 Payoff Signal
σθ22 Variance of Island 2 Payoff Signal
σ22 Quality of Island 2 Payoff Signal

1.35
0.01
0.05
1.35
0.01
0.05

Realized Values
θ1
Island 1 Payoff Signal
θ2
Island 2 Payoff Signal

1.25
1.25

The second panel shows the price response. As shown in Table 2.1, the signal is
1.25 for both island 1 and island 2 traders. In other words, the expected payoff is equal
for both islands conditional on the only piece of information available. Therefore,
when price informativeness is ignored, there is no reason for the price to depend on
γ. However, the price actually responds to changes in γ, since traders change how
they perceive prices and their information acquisition behavior.
Panels 3 and 4 show how trader demands change. As expected, informed traders
are on the buyers’ side as the price is always below the signal. When γ is low, the
price carries more information about θ2 . Island 2 uninformed traders interpret the
low price as low θ2 and sell the risky asset. Island 1 uninformed traders rely mostly
on their prior, since price doesn’t carry much information on θ1 , and buy the asset.
Panel 5 shows utilitarian welfare is lowest when the number of early and late
traders is similar. Since trades are only transfers between agents, welfare is mainly
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determined by the resources spent on acquiring information. Indeed, welfare function
closely resembles the total fraction of informed traders in Panel 1. Lastly, Panel 6
confirms Corollary 2: information about θ2 stored in prices decreases with γ 9 .
Comparison with a Noise Trader Economy
Here, we compare the properties of the model to a classical noise trader model as in
Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980. Specifically, we ask how does the equilibrium price and
behavior of island 2 traders would change if island 1 traders were replaced by noise
traders. We equate the ex-ante distribution of noise trader demand to the ex-ante
realized distribution of island 1 trader demand in the full model at γ = 0.5 as well
as the realized demand. Then, changing the parameters of the model, we ask how
these two models differ in their responses. Figure 2 summarizes the differences in
comparative statics with γ for both models.
Multiple Assets
The model generalizes naturally to settings with multiple risky assets. CARA utility functions imply that equilibrium objects (demand, price etc.) related to the risky
asset i only depend on its own payoff, not the availability of other risky assets. Therefore, the solution to the multi-asset problem is identical to the single-asset problem.
This setting allows us to do comparative statics on market variables, such as portfolio returns and cross-sectional price distributions. Since these variables are directly
observable, the results here are crucial for testing the model. Here, we focus on
a situation where each risky asset i is characterized by a θi = θ1i = θ2i , although
prior beliefs about the risky assets are identical, realized information θi is uniformly
distributed between 1 and 1.5.
9

The comparative statics of the model where the signal turns out to be better than expected can
be found in Figure 2.5 in Appendix.
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Figure 2.2: Comparative Statics for the Benchmark Model and ‘Noise Trader’ Model
with Respect to γ
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Dynamic Model

In this section, we integrate a close variant of the static model in Section 2.2 into
a neoclassical growth model with firm heterogeneity. We analyze how the degree of
misallocation (of inputs) depends on the information production in the stock markets.
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Figure 2.3: Comparative Statics for the Model with Many Risky Assets with respect to
γ, where assets differ on their payoffs
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Environment

Preferences There is a measure one of stock traders who live one period and a
measure one of infinitely lived households.
At the start of each period, newborn stock traders receive a liquidity shock and
a γ ∈ (0, 1) fraction of them (‘day traders’) need to consume early while the rest
(‘night traders’) consume after the production is finalized. Stock traders have CARA
period utility functions, that is, utility from consuming an amount W is given by
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ν(W ) = −e−aW .
The representative household has CRRA utility function with inter-temporal elasticity of substitution parameter η and discounts the future with β.
Technology There is a measure one of firms (indexed by i) with the production
function zin f (Ki ) where zin is the idiosyncratic productivity of firm i and Ki is the
capital used. zin are assumed to be iid across assets.
Endowments The firms are owned by stock traders who can freely trade the shares
of the firms among themselves. The outstanding share amount of each firm is normalized to 1. The households are not allowed to hold shares10 . The day traders sell their
stocks to incoming traders before the production is finished to be able to consume
early. Each stock loses a zid /zin fraction of its value when sold prematurely. Thus,
zid , is a measure of how much resale risk is associated with stock i. We assume zid
are iid across assets.
Since the stock traders are short lived, there is no capital trade between the stock
traders and the households. Total capital holdings of the stock traders are assumed to
be 0. All the capital is held by the households and rented to a hedge fund for a fixed
rental rate r. The hedge fund allocates the rented capital across firms to maximize
its return11 .
Information Both zid and the zin consist of two parts:
zid = θid + id θid ∼ N (θ̄id , σθ2id ) & id ∼ N (0, σ2id )
zin = θin + in θin ∼

N (θ̄in , σθ2in )

10

& in ∼

(2.11)

N (0, σ2in )

The allocation of the stocks across stock traders is irrelevant for aggregate quantities, since
CARA utility functions give rise to linear policy functions.
11
Here, the households face no risk since hedge fund offers a deterministic interest rate for the
capital. The hedge fund faces the idiosyncratic risk of each firm. Because the productivity shocks
are independent, the hedge fund can perfectly pool this risk and face no aggregate risk.
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where
θikt = θ̃ik (1 − ρk ) + ρk zik(t−1) + vikt
and vidt , vint , idt , int are assumed to be jointly independent. Thus
θ̄ikt = θ̃ik (1 − ρk ) + zik(t−1)
2
σθikt
=

(2.12)

2
σvikt

For each stock i, traders can pay a cost ci (λi k) to learn the realizations for θid and
θin 12 while id and in cannot be learned. We denote with λik the fraction of k ∈ {d, n}
traders that are informed about stock i and assume ci (λik ) is convex in λik .
The hedge fund doesn’t have access to the information technology. Thus, similar
to the traders who chose not to pay the cost, the hedge fund infers each θi by observing
the stock market prices.

2.3.2

Recursive Competitive Equilibrium

Portfolio Choice Problem
After receiving the liquidity shock, for each stock, the traders first decide whether
to pay the cost ck (λik ) to get information and then decide on a portfolio of assets.
After the informational decision, the portfolio choice problem of a night trader who
is endowed with k̄ amount of capital and X̄i amount of stock i becomes


Z

h

E − exp − a[(1 + r)k +
Z
Z
s.t. k + Pi Xin = k̄ + Pi X̄i
max

k,{Xin }i∈(0,1)

i
12

Xin
i

i
zin f (Ki ) − rKi − pi ]


(2.13)

i

Since the only random part in θid and θin are vid and vin learning thetas is equivalent to learning

vs.
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and the portfolio choice problem of a day trader becomes


Z

h

E − exp − a[(1 + r)k +
Z
Z
s.t. k + Pi Xid = k̄ + Pi X̄i
max

k,{Xid }i∈(0,1)

i

Xid

i
(zin − zid )f (Ki ) − rKi − pi ]

i


(2.14)

i

where k and {Xi }i∈(0,1) are capital and stock demands of the traders.
Given the information structure, we can write the demand for risky asset by the
informed and uninformed traders as follows:
E[zin − zid |pi ]f (Ki ) − rKi − (1 + r)pi
,
aV [zin − zid |pi ]f 2 (Ki )
(θin − θid )f (Ki ) − rKi − (1 + r)pi
I∗
Xid
=
a(σ2in + σ2id )f 2 (Ki )
E[zin |pi ]f (Ki ) − rKi − (1 + r)pi
U∗
Xin
=
,
aV [zin |pi ]f 2 (Ki )
(θin )f (Ki ) − rKi − (1 + r)pi
I∗
Xin
=
aσ2in f 2 (Ki )
U∗
Xid
=

(2.15)

Information Acquisition Problem
Each trader decides whether to acquire information about each stock i, by comparing
the cost of acquiring information with the decrease in the consumption variance.
Define ψ k (λik ) as
s
ψ k (λik ) ≡ eack (λik )

V ar[zik |θik ]
V ar[zik |pi ]

for k ∈ {d, n}.
Corollary 5. ψ k (λ) is monotone in each λik . Therefore,
(i) If ψ k (λi ) > 1 ∀λik ∈ [0, 1], all k traders become informed, i.e. λ∗ik = 1.
(ii) If ψ k (λi ) < 1 ∀λik ∈ [0, 1], no k traders become informed, i.e. λ∗ik = 0.
(iii) Otherwise, λ∗ik as a function of λi−k is given by ψ k (λ∗ik ) = 1.
134

(2.16)

Proof. Follows Lemma 3.



Problem of the Household and the Hedge Fund
The representative household solves
V (K, k) = max
u(k(1 + r(K)) − k 0 ) + βV (K 0 , k 0 )
0
k

(2.17)

0

K = G(K)
where V (.) is the value function, β is the discount factor, k is the individual capital
holdings and K is the aggregate capital holdings. G(.) determines how the household
forms expectations over the future path of the aggregate capital. The household has
the classical Euler Equation:
00

u0 (k(1 + r(K)) − k 0 ) = βu0 (k 0 (1 + r(K 0 )) − k )

(2.18)

The hedge fund allocates the capital to the firms to maximize expected profits, such
that
E[zin |p]f 0 (Ki ) = r ∀i

(2.19)

Market Clearing
Let’s define λid as the fraction of day traders that pay the cost to be informed and
λin as the fraction of night traders that pay the cost to be informed. We denote
λi ≡ {λid , λin }. Market clearing condition for stock i is




I
U
I
U
γ λid Xid + (1 − λid )Xid + (1 − γ) λin Xin + (1 − λin )Xin = 0
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(2.20)

The capital market clearing condition is
Z
Ki = K + K̄

(2.21)

i

where K is the total capital held by households and K̄ by the traders.
Equilibrium
I
U
I
U
Definition 3. V, r, k 0 , {Ki , Xid
, Xid
, Xin
, Xin
, λid , λin , φi0 , φid , φin , pi }i∈(0,1) constitute

a Recursive Linear Rational Expectations Equilibrium such that
(i)k 0 solves (2.18).
(ii)V solves (2.17).
(iii) pi = φi0 + φid θid + φin θin
(iv) φi0 , φid , and φin solve (2.20).
I
U
I
U
(v) Xid
, Xid
, Xin
, and Xin
solve (2.15).

(vi) r solves (2.21).
(vii) λid , λin are given by Corollary 5.

2.3.3

Discussion of the Model Ingredients

The model is similar to a neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous firms. The
main difference is in the problem of the hedge fund. In an environment with readily
available information, the hedge fund would allocate the capital across firms according
to
θin f 0 (Ki ) = r ∀i

(2.22)

in which case, the sole ‘misallocation’ would be due to in , which is inevitable. In our
setting, the hedge fund can only rely on the stock prices pi to infer θin . In terms of
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allocation of capital across firms, the stock liquidity is irrelevant. However, a high
price could stem from a high θin or a low θid . In other words, stocks may be priced
higher due to higher long term value or higher short term liquidity. Thus, compared
to the benchmark in (2.22), firms with lower (higher) than expected θid shocks are
allocated more (less) capital. In summary, the existence of day traders prevent prices
from perfectly revealing θin .
The discrepancy between the model’s allocation and the benchmark allocation in
(2.22) depends on how close E[zin |p] is to θin , that is, how informative the prices are
for inferring θin . Given that we restrict attention to linear pricing equilibria where
pi = φi0 +φid θid +φin θin , informativeness solely depend on φin /φid ratios of each stock.
This ratio depends on two components: (1) the fraction of informed night traders to
informed day traders and (2) how aggressively informed night traders trade based
off their information relative to informed day traders. The first component is simply
(1−γ)λin
.
γλid

Given the information, the sole uncertainty faced by the traders are the i s.

Thus, the second component is

2.3.4

σ2in +σ2 13
id
.
σ2in

Liquidity Needs and Misallocation

We now analyze how the degree of misallocation changes with the fraction of day
traders. Specifically, we look at (1) the ‘output gap’, which is the output difference
between the perfect information case and our model of inference from prices and
(2) the ‘maximum output gap’, which is the output difference between the perfect
information case and a no-information case where capital is allocated across all firms
equally.
Figure 2.4 presents the results of a comparative static of steady-state equilibria
where we change the fraction of day traders in the economy. The pricing ratio declines
13

See Definition 2 for more details.
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Figure 2.4: Comparative Statics for the Full Model with respect to γ, where assets differ
on their payoffs
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as γ increases, similar to the result in Section 2.2.5. The top right panel shows that
night traders respond by acquiring more information, as expected. Surprisingly, day
traders also acquire more information in this parametrization. A larger fraction of
day traders masks the information about the fundamental payoff which day traders
also care about. In a way, increasing day trader activity can mask the information for
themselves for some parameters. The input allocation depends on how much can be
learned from the price regarding the fundamental payoff. Following the deteriorating
information, the output gap increases with a decline in the output. Thus, the model
with a larger number of day traders has larger misallocation even though agents spend
more on information acquisition in steady-state.
The model structure also helps us disentangle the contribution of changing trading
behavior and the changing information acquisition behavior. The bottom panels also
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show what the output response would be if information acquisition did not change.
Shutting this channel amplifies the output drop by not letting the traders respond to
the deteriorating information.

2.4

Conclusion

Recessions are characterized by decreased investment and productivity, increased misallocation of capital, and information production activities. We suggest an increase in
the concern for asset liquidity may be behind all these patterns. We build a model of
stock trading with costly information acquisition where noise in prices is endogenously
determined. Then we introduce this stock trading model into a neoclassical growth
model where the real sector observes the stock markets to learn about investment
opportunities. The model can simultaneously generate an increase in information acquisition and an increase in input misallocation by a shock to the number of traders
that value asset liquidity. It also allows separating the decline in output due to costs
of information acquisition and increased misallocation of capital across firms.
The model provides a mapping between the evolution of structural parameters
and stock prices’ behavior over time. A next step would be to use the model to
quantify these channels’ contribution to the observed recessions.
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2.A

Proofs

Lemma 4. Under the distributional assumptions,
λk
E[V (WIj
)|Pλ ]
= eack (λk )
λk
E[V (WU j )|Pλ ]

s

V ar[uk |θk ]
≡ ψ k (λ)
V ar[uk |Pλ ]

(2.23)

for k ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. The proof adapts the corresponding proof in Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980 to
this environment. Expected value of being informed for investor j that consumes in
period k can be written as

E[V

λk
(WIj
)|Pλ ]

λk
−aWIj

= E[e



h
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λk
] = − exp − a E[WIj |θ] − V ar[WIj |θ]
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(2.24)

Using Equation 2.5, we can write

λk
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(2.25)
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(2.26)

since W0j and Pλ are not random given θ. Thus, we can rewrite Equation 2.24 as
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Now define

hkλ := V ar(E[uk |θ]|Pλ )
zλk :=

E[uk |θ] − RPλ
p
hkλ

Now we can rewrite Equation 2.27 as
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Since Pλ is a linear function of θ, conditional on Pλ , E[uk |θ] is normally distributed.
Therefore, (zλk )2 is distributed with Chi-squared. Hence, moment generating function
of (zλk )2 has the form

k )2
−t(zλ
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1
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(2.29)

Also, by definition, V ar[uk |Pλ ] = σ2k + hkλ . Thus we can simplify the second term
in Equation 2.28 as
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Using (2.30) we can rewrite (2.28) as
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Using similar steps, we can also write

E[V
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−E[uk |θ] − RPλ
= V (RW0j )exp
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The result immediately follows.

2 

(2.32)


Lemma 5. Given the distributional assumptions, there exists a market price for a
given λ with the form

Pλ (θ) = α0λ + α0λ θ2 +

γλ1 σ22
θ1
(1 − γ)λ2 σ21



(2.33)

where α0λ and α0λ are real numbers that possibly depend on λ but not on θ1 or θ2 .
Proof. Conjecture a linear price function for a given λ:

Pλ (θ) = α0λ + α1λ θ1 + α0λ θ2 1
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(2.34)

Then, the signal uninformed period i investor will use from observing the price
can be drawn from
Pλ − α0λ − αkλ θk
αiλ

θi =

(2.35)

where i and k denote opposite periods. Since prior distribution is normal and
the signal is a linear function of a normally distributed random variable, posterior
distribution for ui will also be normal with mean and variance:
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Plugging Equations 2.36 and 2.37 into the market clearing condition in 2.3, we
can rewrite as
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From Equation 2.38, after a basic but tedious algebra Pλ can be left alone. From
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there, coefficient of θ1 becomes α1λ , coefficient of θ2 becomes α2λ and the rest becomes
α0λ .
Lastly, it is trivial to see from Equation 2.38 that

α1λ =

γλ1 σ22
α2λ
(1 − γ)λ2 σ21

(2.39)

Hence the expression in the Lemma follows.



Proposition 4. In interior equilibria, fraction of informed period 1 investors λ1 increases as
(1) a, C1 , C2 , γ and σ22 decreases
(2) σθ22 increases.

Proof. Equating ψ k (λ) and taking the square of both sides, we can write
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Further algebra yields λ1 (λ2 ) and λ2 (λ1 ):
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−

σ21
σθ2

1

(2.42)

Table 2.2: Information Acquisition Possibilities The table shows which -if any- equations
would not be satisfied if the parameter in the row were to increase and the equilibrium objects λ1
and λ2 were to move as designated in the column.

Pararameter
γ
c1
c2
σ21
σ22
σθ21
σθ22

Direction of
λ1 , λ2
+,+
-,(2.44) X
(2.44) X
(2.44) X
(2.44) X
(2.44) X
X
(2.44)
X
(2.44)

+,(2.43)
(2.42)
(2.43)
X
(2.42)
(2.43)
X

-,+
(2.42)
(2.43)
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Lastly, using (2.42) and (2.43), we can derive
σ1 σ2
=
σθ1 σθ2

s

σ21
−
e2ac1 (λ1 ) − 1 σθ21
1

s

σ22
−
e2ac2 (λ2 ) − 1 σθ22
1

(2.44)

Comparative static results can be derived from impossibility results, i.e. whether
a certain direction of the movement in the parameters and the equilibrium object
can be compatible with the equations (2.42), (2.43) and (2.44). Below is a table
that summarizes which directions can be compatible with the equations and which
equations the other directions violate.
The results follow from the table.
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2.B

Comparative Statics

Figure 2.5: Comparative Statics for the Benchmark Model with respect to γ, where
θ¯1 = θ¯2 = 1.25 and θ1 = θ2 = 1.35.

Comparative Statics w.r.t.
1.37

1

+

2

0.6

0.4

0.2

Demand of Early Traders

2

1.365

1.36

1.355

0.5

0

1

20

0.5

-0.955

Utilitarian Welfare by Type

X I,2
X U,2

0

-20

-40

Early Investors
Late Investors

-0.96

-0.965

-0.97

-60
0

0.5

1

X U,1

0

-20

-40

1

0

0.5

149

1

Price Informativeness For Late Investors

0

X I,1

-60

1.35

0

Demand of Late Traders

20

1

0.8

Price of Risky Asset

Fraction of Informed Traders

1

0

0.5

1

0

0.5

1

1

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0

Chapter 3
Changing Jobs to Fight Inflation:
Labor Market Reactions to
Inflationary Shocks
by Gorkem Bostanci, Omer Koru and Sergio Villalvazo

3.1

†

Introduction

Since job switches are usually associated with wage and productivity increases1 , the
speed at which employees change employers is considered a measure of the health of
the economy. Understanding what drives differences in job-to-job transitions across
time and countries can be crucial for improving economic performance. In this paper,
we identify a novel policy tool that affects the rate of job-to-job transitions: monetary
†University of Pennsylvania.
See e.g. Fallick and Fleischman, 2004, Christensen et al., 2005 and Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, and
J.-M. Robin, 2006. Under a large variety of theoretical models, job changes come with changes in
both wage and productivity (See Postel–Vinay and J.-.-.-M. Robin, 2002 and Menzio and Shi, 2011).
1
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policy. When wages are not indexed to inflation2 , workers’ real wages decrease at a
faster rate in periods with unexpectedly high inflation. Therefore, potential gains
from being able to renegotiate wages are higher for workers. Workers could respond
to a positive inflationary shock by (1) increasing their search effort, thus, making it
more likely that they will receive a job offer and (2) being less selective, i.e., accepting
lower wage offers which lead to less productive matches. The first channel (search
effort, henceforth) increases the number of job transitions, while the extent to which
these transitions lead to more productive matches depends on the size of the second
channel (selectivity, henceforth). Hence, the impact of inflation shocks on output is
ambiguous and potentially depends on the size of the shock.
We measure how unexpected inflation affects aggregate productivity through its
impact on the job search behavior of workers. We first utilize reduced-form causal
inference to argue a quantitatively meaningful change in the rate of job switches following inflation shocks. We find that a 1% decline in real wages due to an unexpected
inflation shock leads to a 7 percentage points increase in the probability of receiving
a job offer in the following six-month period. To understand the resulting change in
productivity, we build a model of directed on-the-job search with aggregate shocks.
We calibrate the model to match the empirical job switching patterns and associated
wage increases. The calibrated model suggests a non-monotonic output response following inflation shocks, suggesting both channels (search effort and selectivity) are
quantitatively meaningful.
Although unexpected inflation movements have been relatively small for the U.S.,
they can imply a large drop in real wages once accumulated. Figure 3.1 summarizes
this idea. The black line represents the discrepancy between Survey of Professional
2

Existence of nominal frictions in wage setting has long been documented. See Appendix 3.B for
a broad overview of the evidence regarding the extent of wage indexation.
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Figure 3.1: The Discrepancy Between the SPF Forecast and Realized Inflation The x

axis refers to the calendar year. The black line represents the difference between the 1-year ahead
SPF forecast and the realized inflation. The values above 1 indicate inflation exceeded forecasts.
The red line represents the cumulative real wage loss for a worker who signed his contract two years
ago, based on SPF forecasts. The green line represents the cumulative real wage loss for a worker
who signed his contract five years ago, based on SPF forecasts.
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Forecasters (SPF) 1-year ahead inflation forecast versus the realized inflation. The
red (green) line represents what fraction of the intended real wage is received by a
worker who signed a contract 2 (5) years ago based on SPF forecasts. The real wage
losses can be as high as 8%, and gains can be as high as 16% for some workers3 even
though the surprise inflation never exceeds 6% and is mostly below 3% in magnitude.
Hence, the output response can be large once small inflation shocks accumulate.
Our paper is motivated by the recent finding by Moscarini and Postel-Vinay,
2017 and Karahan et al., 2017 that once job-to-job transition rates are controlled
for, unemployment-to-employment transition rates have little to no predictive power
3

See Appendix Figure 3.10 for the same plot with the Michigan Consumer Survey inflation
forecasts.
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on nominal wage growth. On the other hand, the job-to-job transition rate and
nominal wage growth have a large significant positive correlation. This is at odds
with the classical Philips Curve idea where low unemployment strengthens workers’
bargaining position and puts upward pressure on wages. It rather suggests the real
threat point of the workers being switching to another job, that is, firms are more likely
to increase wages when job-to-job transitions are more likely. Our analysis confirms
the co-movement between job-to-job transitions and the inflation rate. Acknowledging
that both objects are equilibrium outcomes, we try to unpack which shocks might
be behind the positive correlation and the aggregate implications of the connection
between the two.
In the first half of the paper, we provide three main pieces of empirical evidence
that suggests the positive correlation between inflation and the job-to-job transition
rate is driven by the positive effect of the former on the latter, rather than the other
way around. First, we run Granger Causality tests on the aggregate data as well
as panel regressions across U.S. regions and states. While inflation helps predict
future job-to-job transition rates, job-to-job transitions do not help predict future
inflation movements. Second, we use the previous estimates of structural monetary
policy shocks instead of inflation in our regressions. This analysis allows us to look
beyond the reverse causality argument, as these shocks are arguably exogenous to the
economic conditions. Our results suggest that an unexpected one percent decrease
in nominal interest rates can bring an increase in the job-to-job transition rates up
to 0.4% percent. Third, we provide some direct evidence on the mechanism using
individual-level survey data on on-the-job search behavior. We find that a cumulative
wage loss of 1% due to unexpectedly high inflation increases the likelihood of receiving
an offer by 7 percentage points and the expected number of offers by 0.17 in a sixmonth period.
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In the second half, we build a model of competitive on-the-job search with endogenous search effort where the contract space is restricted to nominal wage contracts.
The environment involves aggregate shocks to productivity where the agents form
rational expectations. In the model, the agents respond to an unexpected positive
inflation shock by increasing their search effort, as the option value of search increases4 . Simultaneously, the agents also respond by searching in markets with lower
posted wages as their current situation becomes more desperate. Hence, they trade
a higher wage for a higher probability of finding a new job. The increased search
effort leads to more frequent job-to-job transitions, which, by itself, would increase
average productivity. However, the reduced asking wage makes these transitions less
productivity-enhancing, therefore creates a force that decreases average productivity.
In short, inflationary shocks unambiguously increase job-to-job transitions while their
effect on productivity is undetermined. A preliminary calibration of the model to the
U.S. economy confirms the non-monotone response of the output. When the unexpected increase in inflation is bigger than a threshold value, the selectivity channel
starts to dominate, and the output decreases.
The proposed mechanism has important implications. First, it explains how output response may not be monotonic in the size of the inflation shock. Thus, it provides
a bridge between seemingly disparate estimates of the literature on the real effects of
monetary policy shocks5 . Second, it provides a novel mechanism on how monetary
policy can affect the real economy in the short run. Through monetary policy shocks,
the monetary authority can improve the allocation of labor in the economy, thus increase productivity. Third, it provides a novel channel that can explain why some
recessions are associated with a more pronounced ‘cleansing’ effect than the others.
4

See e.g., Christensen et al., 2005 and Mueller, 2010 for evidence on job search effort decreasing
as workers move up the job ladder.
5
See Wolf, 2019 for an overview of these findings.
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In our model, the sign and the magnitude of the unexpected price movement can
affect both the speed and the effectiveness of job reallocation during the recession.
This paper is closely related to the literature that analyzes the interaction between
inflation and the efficiency of labor markets. In particular, the idea that inflation helps
reduce labor market frictions and increase productivity was first proposed by Tobin,
1995 and tested by Card and Hyslop, 1997. In this channel, nominal downward wage
rigidity can be made non-binding with a positive inflation rate that ensures nominal
rigidity doesn’t translate to a real rigidity6 . Our model incorporates this benefit
of inflation, on top of our novel channel, that it incentivizes job switches. The most
closely related work to ours is by Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2019 (MPV henceforth),
who incorporate a random on-the-job search framework into a New Keynesian DSGE
model. When job-to-job transition rates are high, employees receive more offers,
some of which are matched by the incumbent firm. Matched offers are essentially
cost shocks to the firm and it responds by raising prices. Hence, a higher than
average job-to-job transition rate brings higher than average price inflation. The
mechanism in MPV and ours are complementary. MPV shows how a labor demand
shock brings wage inflation and therefore price inflation. We show how a shock to price
inflation increases job-to-job transitions. Thus, our contribution is three-fold. First,
our mechanism, in combination with theirs, explains how labor demand shocks can
be amplified through a combination of offer matching and changing search behavior.
Second, shocks to price inflation can also trigger this cycle. Third, the monetary policy
recommendations could change 7 . because the monetary authority needs to consider
6

Lunnemann and Wintr, 2010 find real wage rigidity is indeed more substantial in Luxembourg
where there is a state-imposed automatic wage indexation.
7
Tom Fairless of the Wall Street Journal, in his article based on the results by MPV, argues
“If workers are less willing to switch jobs, central banks could press harder on the gas pedal
to stimulate the economy without worrying about inflation. And there may be little policymakers can do to influence the job-switching rate except to watch it.” (2019, Nov 17 https:
//www.wsj.com/articles/one-explanation-for-weak-wage-growth-workers-reluctance-
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the job switching response to predict the response of the real economy. MPV assumes
on-the-job search effort is fixed, hence shuts down our channel by assumption8 . The
empirical evidence in Section 3.2 favors our channel if one or the other has to be
picked.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the efficiency of job reallocation.
This literature asks when reallocation is productivity-enhancing and when it is not. A
broad finding is that U.S. recessions were accompanied with productivity-enhancing
job reallocation until the great recession9 while the reallocation during the great
recession was both slower and less productivity-enhancing (Mukoyama, 2014 and
Foster, Grim, and J. Haltiwanger, 2016). J. C. Haltiwanger et al., 2018 asks whether
the decline is due to a decreased number of transitions or a smaller productivity gain
conditional on making a transition and find most of the decline comes from the latter.
Caballero and Hammour, 1994 discusses potential frictions that may create inefficient
job reallocation during recessions. Barlevy, 2003 emphasizes increased credit market
frictions while Ouyang, 2009 suggests early exits as mechanisms large enough to
reverse the ‘cleansing’ effect of the recessions10 . Gautier, Teulings, and Van Vuuren,
2010, in a model with on-the-job search, analyzes which wage-setting mechanisms
generate socially efficient job switches. They conclude, for social efficiency, the hiring
to-switch-jobs-11573999201?shareToken=st5a849d04f72440fca240048db4bad6d1).
Our
mechanism suggests there is a direct link from monetary policy shocks to job-to-job transition rates.
8
Incorporating the search effort channel in their model is not trivial. In MPV, only the distribution of productivities across jobs is a state variable while adding the search effort makes the joint
distribution of wages and productivities a state variable. The surplus function is not sufficient to
characterize the transitions either because the search effort choice is not efficient due to the restricted
contract space. Hence, the tricks in Lise and J.-M. Robin, 2017 cannot be used to simplify the problem. Our model avoids this issue by utilizing the block-recursivity of competitive search where the
distributions are no longer state variables. We present a version of our model under random search
in Appendix 3.E
9
See e.g. Davis and J. Haltiwanger, 1992, Caballero and Hammour, 1994, Davis, Faberman, and
J. Haltiwanger, 2006 and (Davis, Faberman, and J. Haltiwanger, 2012).
10
Foster, J. Haltiwanger, and Syverson, 2008 shows if pricing decisions are not taken into account, the effect of demand and productivity shocks on profitability can be confounded. Thus, the
reallocation that is only profitability enhancing can be mislabeled as productivity-enhancing.
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premium (to induce the worker to undertake search) should equal the no-quit premium
(to prevent the worker from making a job switch later) which happens in wage posting
with commitment but not in wage bargaining or the sequential auctions of Postel–
Vinay and J.-.-.-M. Robin, 2002. The competitive search framework we use also
satisfies the efficiency requirement posited here; the inefficient switches in our setting
are purely due to nominal frictions. The closest papers to ours in this literature are
by Moscarini, 2001 and Barlevy, 2002. Moscarini, 2001 considers a trade-off similar to
ours. In his model, similar to the competitive search models, workers decide between
a good match with a long queue and a mediocre match with a short queue. Thus,
in tight labor markets, the initial matches are of higher quality and the reallocation
is slow. Barlevy, 2002 shows decreasing job-to-job transitions during recessions can
generate an effect large enough to offset the ‘cleansing’ effect of recessions. In his
model, after a bad productivity shock, firms post fewer vacancies, which reduces
the rate of job-to-job transitions, thus the productive reallocation of workers in the
economy. In contrast, our model focuses on the effect of the inflationary shocks and
generates productivity drops even when the reallocation rate is higher.
Lastly, our mechanism is also related to the literature that analyzes how the extent
of wage flexibility affects the output response to monetary policy shocks. Olivei and
Tenreyro, 2007 shows that the effects of monetary policy shocks depend on their
timing during the year, and it is consistent with the fact that a significant fraction
of firms renegotiate wage contracts at the end of the year. Björklund, Carlsson, and
Nordström Skans, 2019 find that the output response to monetary policy is bigger
in periods where a larger fraction of wage contracts are nominally fixed, using a
micro-level dataset on details of collective wage agreements in Sweeden11 .
11

See also Benabou, 1992 and Diamond, 1993 for how inflation affects search effort in product
markets.
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We proceed with the description of the data used. Section 3.2 provides the empirical analysis. Section 3.3 lays down the model and provides the theoretical results.
Quantitative results of the model are presented in Section 3.4.

3.2

Empirical Analysis

This section presents three types of evidence to argue that the positive correlation
between inflation and job-to-job transitions stems from the causal effect of inflation
on job-to-job transitions. First, subsection 3.2.1 uses the time-series structure of the
data to show that a high inflation today predicts a high job-to-job transition rate in
the future. In contrast, a high job-to-job transition rate today does not predict high
inflation in the future. For this aim, both Vector Auto Regressions with aggregate
data and panel regressions with state level data are used. Second, subsection 3.2.2
uses popular estimates of structural Monetary Policy shocks to get a causal estimate
of the effect of inflation on job-to-job transitions and confirms that higher inflation
causes higher job-to-job transitions. Third, subsection 3.2.3 provides direct evidence
on how inflation increases the job search effort of the employed from survey data. We
later use the estimates from this subsection to discipline the macro model.

3.2.1

Predictive Regressions

This subsection presents findings from three datasets: (1) national monthly job-to-job
transition and inflation series between 1995-2018, (2) national yearly series between
1976-2018, and (3) quarterly state-level series between 2000-2018. All three analyses
use different periods due to data limitations but support the same argument: higher
inflation predicts higher job-to-job transitions in the future, while higher job-to-job
transitions do not predict higher inflation.
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Following Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2019, we will use a variable called ‘acceptance rate’ as introduced therein. This variable is the ratio of the job-to-job transition
rate to the unemployment-to-employment transition rate. The division is to ensure
that employees’ willingness to switch jobs is isolated from job availability, which moves
both rates simultaneously. The ‘acceptance rate’ is a natural candidate for what our
mechanism is about; higher inflation affects job-to-job transitions by changing the
employees’ willingness to switch12 .
The other primary variable we construct is called ‘inflation mistake’ and defined
as the discrepancy between the expected and the realized inflation for a one-year
period. At a time t, this measures the accumulated unexpected prices moves since
time t − 1.
Monthly Analysis, Nation Level
In this section, we use the series made available by Fujita, Moscarini, and PostelVinay, 201913 that covers the period from September 1995 to December 2018 for the
monthly job-to-job transition rates. Over-the-year log changes in the Consumer Price
Index (CPI) provide price inflation. Inflation expectations are taken from the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers. We take logs of all labor market variables,
and HP filter all variables with a smoothing parameter of 8.1 × 106 as in Moscarini
and Postel-Vinay, 2019.
The Granger Causality test rejects if the lags of variable x help predict variable y
above and beyond the lags of variable y. We find inflation Granger-causes job-to-job
transition rates with 5% significance, while the other direction shows no predictive
12

In MPV, the acceptance rate is primarily determined by the position of the workforce in the
job ladder. Since the search effort of the employed is not a choice, and the switches are exogenous,
no other model component can affect the acceptance rate once conditioned on the distribution of
workers across jobs.
13
See Appendix 3.A for details on the data sources used throughout the empirical analysis.
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Figure 3.2: National Predictive Regressions The left panel presents the coefficient estimates

and the associated 95% CI for β where price inflation is regressed on the ‘acceptance rate’ with the
specification in Equation 3.1. Each point corresponds to an estimate where the associated lag is in
the x-axis. The right panel provides the same plot where the ‘acceptance rate’ is regressed on the
price inflation. See Appendix 3.A for details of the data sources.
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relationship.
We continue by replicating the analysis inMoscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2019 that
questions and rejects a price Philips curve. Specifically, we run OLS regressions of
the form:

yt = βxt−L + γZt−L + t

(3.1)

Firstly, we set the price inflation as y and the acceptance rate as x and then switch
their places. The unemployment rate and unemployment-to-employment transition
rate constitute Z in both types of regressions. We vary L from 0 to 36 months and
analyze how β changes. Figure 3.2 presents the results of this analysis. The left panel
indicates no significant relationship between the lags of the acceptance rate and the
CPI inflation, where most of the estimates up to 2,5 years are negative. On the other
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hand, as shown in the right panel, a higher CPI inflation predicts a higher ‘acceptance
rate’ 15 to 36 months after14 .
Quarterly Analysis, State Level
Here we utilize the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) data set by
the U.S. Census. The LEHD provides publicly available job-to-job transition rates
in quarterly frequency at the state level starting from 2000. This structure allows
using the state-level variation in prices and job-to-job transitions15 . Unfortunately,
the state-level inflation data is only available in yearly frequency and starts from
200816 . Therefore, we use state-level wage inflation data from the Quarterly Census
of Employment and Wages (QCEW) as a proxy. We take logs and four-quarter
trailing moving averages of all labor market variables, and HP filter all variables
with a smoothing parameter of 105 as in Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2019. We then
combine all the data and run OLS regressions of the form:

yi t = βxit−L + γyit−L + υi + νt i t

(3.2)

where we analyze the lead-lag relationship between the wage inflation and the
‘acceptance rate’17 . υi and νt denote the state and time fixed effects. The results
are in Figure 3.3. Our mechanism would be able to explain both panels. The search
effort channel would suggest wage inflation be a positive predictor of the ‘acceptance
14

Potential causal channels in either direction would take some time to show up in the data. In our
mechanism, workers need to realize the real wage changes and manage to find a job after increasing
their search effort before a change in job-to-job transition numbers can be observed. Similarly, under
the classical menu cost assumptions, the mechanism argued by Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2019
requires firms to adjust their prices after their labor costs go up.
15
CPS, which is monthly, provides information regarding the location of the participant. However,
once the sample is divided into job switchers across states, the sample size becomes an issue.
16
See Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) by State in https://apps.bea.gov/regional/
downloadzip.cfm.
17
The results are robust to removing the fixed-effects or yit−L from the right-hand side of (3.2).
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Figure 3.3: State-Level Predictive Regressions The left panel presents the coefficient esti-

mates and the associated 95% CI for β where wage inflation is regressed on the ‘acceptance rate’
with the specification in Equation 3.2. Each point corresponds to an estimate where the associated
lag is in the x-axis. The right panel provides the same plot where the ‘acceptance rate’ is regressed
on the wage inflation. See Appendix 3.A for details of the data sources.
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rate’ through its effect on price inflation. On the other hand, the job ladder channel,
which is first proposed by MPV, would suggest the ‘acceptance rate’ be a negative
predictor of wage inflation. If the ‘acceptance rate’ is high, workers are at the bottom
of the ladder, and switches come with small wage improvements.

3.2.2

Structural Monetary Policy Shocks

Although the results in Section 3.2.1 are suggestive, they do not prove any causal
relationship between inflation and job-to-job transitions. Here, we use structural
estimates of monetary policy shocks as exogenous proxies for the inflation level. Our
mechanism would imply a negative relationship with nominal interest rate shocks and
job-to-job transitions.
We use several popular monetary policy shock estimates in the literature. The first
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measure is computed from narrative records of FOMC meetings and internal forecasts
of Federal Reserve by C. D. Romer and D. H. Romer, 2004, which is updated until 2007
by Wieland and Yang, 2016. The second measure is by Barakchian and Crowe, 2013
that uses Fed Funds futures to see exogenous changes in policy. The third measure
is by Sims and Zha, 2006, who use structural VAR estimates to identify shocks to
monetary policy. Fourth, fifth and sixth measures are by Gertler and Karadi, 2015 and
Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018 who use high-frequency movements in financial series
during FOMC announcements to identify monetary policy shocks18 . The periods that
match with the availability of job-to-job transitions data are all different across these
measures, but results from regressions with all measures are consistent.

yt = βxt−L + t

(3.3)

Here, the majority of the coefficients are negative as expected. Furthermore, all
but one of the significant coefficients are negative. These results further add to the
evidence in support of our theory, that is, higher price inflation leads to higher jobto-job transitions.

3.2.3

Survey Evidence on Search Effort

The analysis here utilizes the Job Search supplement of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE)19 . We use the publicly available
data from 2013 to 2016. The Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), which is
18

Readers should refer to Ramey, 2016 for an excellent review on these and other monetary policy
shock estimation methods.
19
The SCE is administered monthly as a rotating panel, and the Job Search supplement adds
detailed questions on job search behavior in the October survey. Since no respondent stays in the
SCE for more than a year, the supplement becomes a repeated cross-section.
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Figure 3.4: Monetary Policy Shocks and Acceptance Rate Each panel presents the coeffi-

cient estimates and the associated 95% CI for β where ‘acceptance rate’ is regressed on a structural
monetary policy shock estimate with the specification in Equation 3.3. Each point and the bar correspond to an estimate where the regressors are with the associated lag in the x-axis. See Appendix
3.A for details of the data sources.
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administered quarterly, provides one-year ahead inflation expectations20 .
To understand the effect of inflation on job search effort, the ideal measure would
be the accumulated real wage loss (or gain) the agent has due to unexpected price
movements. This object, unfortunately, is not available at the individual level. We
instead use another object denoted as ιi :

iotai =

τsi
Y
1 + it
1 + îτ0i
t=τ0i

(3.4)

where τ0i and τsi denote the dates individual i started her job and took the survey,
respectively. it denotes the realized CPI inflation rate and ît denotes the SPF inflation
expectations at date t. If the realized sequence of inflation rates is higher (lower)
than the inflation expectations in the beginning, then the agent’s real wage will be
less (more) than intended, and ιi will be larger. At the individual level, this measure
only requires the job-start date of the worker, which is available in SCE.
The measure also has two main drawbacks. First, if the contract is renegotiated
after the start date, the measure will break down. To alleviate this issue, we will
focus on individuals who started their current job recently21 . Second, SPF inflation
expectations are only available at 1-year and 10-year horizons. Thus, we assume
that inflation expectations n year ahead are the same as the 1-year ahead inflation
repeating itself n times.
In the regressions below, we will restrict attention to full-time employees with a
single job, who are (1) searching for another full-time job, (2) have been working for
at least a year and (3) the reason for the search is not a firing notice or a non-work
20

Although the SCE provides the inflation expectations of each respondent, we believe the relevant
inflation expectation that shapes a wage bargaining process is the one given by the firms and the
policymakers.
21
We will use workers with tenures for less than five years to have a compromise between guaranteeing that the start date is the last negotiation date and keeping a large sample.
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related reason.
The empirical design we will use is of the form:

yi = β0 + β1 ιi + β2 ln(tenure) + γτ0i + ατsi + βXi + i

(3.5)

where γτ0i and ατsi denote fixed effects for the job-start year and the survey year,
respectively. X includes demographic controls for age, gender, education, and marital
status. yi denotes outcome variables measuring the extent of the search effort. In our
exercise, we will use the number of offers received and a dummy variable for whether
any offers were received in the past six months22 .
The identification idea is built on the random sampling of the surveys. Conditional
on a job-start date, the survey dates of individuals are randomly assigned barring
survival bias. Once we control for the job start and survey years and the tenure of
the worker, we can treat ιi as randomly assigned23 . Figure 3.5 presents the histogram
of ιi values in the final sample.
Table 3.1 presents the results for an Ordinary Least Squares and a Linear Probability Model. The results indicate that unexpected inflation increases the likelihood
of receiving an offer as well as the number of offers received at a 5% level. The ‘Wage
Mistake’ variable is a ratio and is expected to be centered around 1. According to
our estimates, a 1% positive inflation shock translates to 7.9% higher probability of
receiving an offer and 0.17 more offers on average. Later in Section 3.4, we will use
these coefficients to validate our model’s ability to assess the relationship between
22

SCE has other potential outcome variables such as the number of employers applied and the
hours spent searching. However, any measure that quantifies effort through intermediate steps
requires caution. The time spent searching or employers contacted are highly related to whether
the specific type of effort translates into offers. For example, a high amount of time spent might
indicate employee’s inefficient search strategies. Similarly, a large number of employers contacted
might indicate a quantity/quality trade-off in the application strategy.
23
According to our identification argument, the demographic controls are also not strictly required.
We include them only to reduce the regression variance. Including them has minimal effect on our
quantitative results.
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Figure 3.5: Histogram of ιi Values

inflation and job-to-job transitions correctly.
Table 3.1: The Effect of Inflation on Search Effort Each column presents the coefficient
estimate for β1 and the associated standard error with the specification in Equation 3.5. The independent variable is ιi as constructed in Equation 3.4. The dependent variables are the number offers
received and whether an offer was received by the respondent in the past six months respectively.
The controls whose estimates are excluded from the table are job-start date, survey date, tenure,
age, gender, education, and marital status. See Appendix 3.A for details of the data sources.

Dependent variable:
Number of Offers Received

Received (0-1)

(1)

(2)

WageMistake

∗∗

17.395
(7.293)

7.920∗∗
(3.991)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 358)
F Statistic (df = 15; 358)

374
0.189
0.155
0.536
5.555∗∗∗

374
0.082
0.043
0.293
2.118∗∗∗

∗
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

3.3
3.3.1

The Model
Environment

The environment has two main frictions that are required to generate the monetary
non-neutrality. First, firms and employees are not allowed to sign state-contingent
contracts. Second, search frictions prevent perfect competition in the labor markets.
Therefore, shocks to inflation introduce shifts in real wages of existing employees.
Since employed also search on the job, the model exhibits monetary non-neutrality
even though the wages of new hires are completely flexible. If all labor contracts
were inflation-adjusted or labor markets were competitive, our model would exhibit
monetary neutrality.
Here, we describe an environment where all variables are real. We then introduce
shocks to the real wages of existing employees as inflation shocks and match these
shocks to the discrepancy between the inflation forecasts and the realized inflation
in the data. This will allows us to avoid nominal variables in our modeling which
can be conceptualized as a limit of the classical New Keynesian model where pricing
frictions go to zero24 .
Preferences
The economy consists of a continuum of individuals with measure one and a continuum of firms with positive measure. Both the workers and the firms are risk-neutral
and maximize the expected discounted income/profits. Time is discrete, and firms
and workers share the same discount factor, β ∈ (0, 1).
24

We choose to avoid a full New Keynesian structure with pricing frictions. First, this allows us
to isolate the effects of inflation through the labor market, without having to worry about other
moving parts. Second, once included, pricing frictions require dynamically optimizing firms that
break block-recursivity. Thus, we would be forced to use Taylor approximations to solve the model.
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Production Technology
There is a single homogeneous consumption good in the economy. When a worker
and a firm match, they produce y + z units of output. The first component, y, is the
aggregate productivity, and it is the same across firms. The second component, z,
is match specific. Upon meeting, z is drawn from a distribution G and remains the
same until separation.
Unemployed workers produce b units of output.
Meeting Technology
Workers and firms need to find each other to produce. Search is directed, and markets
are indexed by the value offered by a firm to a worker. We denote submarkets by
X ∈ R.
Both unemployed and employed workers can search for a job. After they choose
in which submarket to search for a job, workers choose the search effort, e. The cost
of exerting effort is denoted by c(e) and it is a strictly increasing and convex function
with the following properties: c(0) = 0, c0 (0) = 025 .
Firms also choose in which submarket to post their vacancies. The cost of opening
a vacancy for one period is κ > 0.
In a submarket, firms and workers meet each other via a constant returns to scale
matching function, M . Given v measure of vacancies and E unit of total search
effort, there are M (v, E) measure of matches. Constant returns to scale assumption
implies that market tightness θ, i.e. vacancy-to-total search effort ratio, is sufficient
to characterize the probability of matching. Specifically, a worker that exerts e unit
of search effort finds a job with probability ep(θ), where p : R → [0, 1] is a strictly
increasing and concave function with following properties: p(0) = 0, p(x) → 1 as
25

We consider the search cost as a utility cost, thus it doesn’t appear in the output calculations.
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x → ∞. On the other hand, a vacancy meets a worker with probability q(θ), where
q : R → [0, 1] is a strictly decreasing function with the following property: θq(θ) =
p(θ).
After a firm and a worker meets, they draw match productivity z and decide
whether to form a match or not.
Wage Setting
The contract space is limited to fixed-wage contracts. In other words, if a firm and a
worker meet in a submarket X and decide to form a match, then firm offers a wage rate
w that provides an expected lifetime utility of X to worker, taking into consideration
the search effort cost and the separation risk (either exogenous or through the worker
finding a better job). X and the aggregate state are sufficient to pin down the
wage, since it depends on future lifetime utility X, not past outcomes. Also, the
match productivity does not affect the lifetime value of the worker since it is constant
throughout the firm-worker match. Let ψ be the aggregate state of the economy,
which consists of aggregate productivity y and distribution of workers across jobs
and wages Γ(z, w)26 . We denote the entry wage of a worker in submarket X when
the aggregate state is ψ by h(X, ψ).
Timeline
Each period is divided into five sub-periods. In the first sub-period, aggregate productivity y is drawn. In the second sub-period, exogenous separations occur with
probability δ ∈ (0, 1). In the third sub-period, workers choose where to search and
how much effort to exert. In this stage, workers who were separated from their job in
the current period cannot search for a job; they remain unemployed with probability
26

Unlike Menzio and Shi, 2011, the wage distribution matters for determining future tightness
because it determines the aggregate search effort.
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one. In the fourth sub-period, workers and firms meet and decide whether to form a
match. In the last sub-period, production takes place, and wages are paid.
Discussion of the Model Elements
While setting the environment, we make five main simplifications. Four of them are
innocuous while the fifth is not.
First, we denote all the variables in real terms. Second, we avoid modeling an
inflation process with rational expectations over it. Third, we assume fixed-wage
contracts although all that is needed for the mechanism is that they are not statecontingent. In principle, we can focus on nominal wages, allow an inflation process
that follows an AR(∞) and contracts that are functions of time. In that scenario,
employees and firms could sign contracts that take the expected future inflation into
account and designate an associated increase in nominal wages over time. Therefore,
nominal wages would follow a path that leaves the real wages constant over time
absent shocks to inflation and aggregate productivity. Using the real wages as the
model element allows us to abstract from the expected paths of the nominal variables
and focus on the shocks to the inflation process. None of these three simplifications
have a bearing on the final results while they simplify the notation greatly.
Fourth, we don’t allow firms to make counter offers for their poached employees. In
theory, this might result in workers moving to jobs with lower productivity than their
current jobs, which wouldn’t happen if the incumbent firms could respond. We make
the assumption for computational simplicity. More importantly, in our quantitative
exercise, we don’t observe this behavior with the calibrated parameters. Therefore,
allowing the firms to respond should have no quantitative effect on our results.
The fourth simplification, namely, treating inflation as an exogenous process, is
not completely innocuous. In a fully-fledged New Keynesian model, output shocks and
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monetary shocks both contribute to determining the inflation. Therefore, treating the
inflation shocks as completely independent from output shocks would not be entirely
correct. On the other hand, introducing firms that price dynamically would break
the block-recursivity of the equilibrium. Thus, whenever we draw conclusions from
the past data, we will not only rely on the inflation series. Instead, we will focus on
the discrepancy between the inflation expectations and the realized inflation while
remaining agnostic on how these expectations are formed in the economy.

3.3.2

Equilibrium

Problem of a Firm
Since the production technology is constant returns to scale, the size of the firm is
indeterminate. Hence, we consider single vacancy firms. Let K(w, z, ψ) be the value
function of a filled vacancy with match productivity z, wage rate w and aggregate
state ψ. Observe that a firm is willing to form a match in submarket X if and only
if the match productivity z satisfies K(h(X, ψ), z, ψ) ≥ 0. Since the firm value is
increasing in z, define z such that K(h(X, ψ), z, ψ) = 0. If such z exists, the expected
value of finding a worker is:
Z
J(X, ψ) =

K(h(X, ψ), z, ψ)dG(z).
z≥z

The free entry condition implies that

k ≥ q(θ)J(X, ψ),

(3.6)

where left-hand side is the cost of vacancy, and the right-hand side is the expected
value of a vacancy, which is the product of the probability of finding a worker and
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the expected value of a filled vacancy. This condition holds with equality whenever
there is a positive mass of workers searching for a job in submarket X. Hence, there
is a one-to-one relationship between market tightness θ and (X, ψ). Hence, we can
write θ(X, ψ) as the market tightness in active submarkets.
Let p̄(H(w, ψ), ψ) be the probability that a worker leaves the job when his lifetime
value is H(w, ψ) and the aggregate state is ψ. Then,
K(w, z, ψ) = y + z − w + β(1 − δ)E [(1 − p̄(H(w, ψ 0 ), ψ 0 )K(w, z, ψ)]

(3.7)

The model has endogenous separations, which affect the wage-setting problem in a
non-trivial way. In a search model where job switches are efficient, a la Postel–Vinay
and J.-.-.-M. Robin, 2002, the probability of losing a worker is completely exogenous.
Thus, the sequential auctions protocol dictates firms to pay the minimum wage that
will allow them to keep/attract the worker. Once search effort is introduced, firms
may want to offer a wage that is more than absolutely needed to reduce the incentives
of the worker to exert search effort and attract more offers. This kills the simple
structure of the sequential auctions protocol. The additional complication is smaller
in a directed search framework, however, results in a firm value function K that is
not monotone in the wage (or value) offered.
Problem of an Unemployed Worker
Consider an unemployed worker. We write down the problem of the unemployed right
before the production sub-period. The value function of an unemployed worker is
h
i
U (ψ) = b + βE max eR(ψ 0 , U ) − c(e) + U (ψ 0 ) ,
e
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(3.8)

where R(ψ, V ) is return to searching in the optimal submarket for an agent with
lifetime value of V :

R(ψ, V ) = max p(θ(ψ, X))(X − V )(1 − G(z(ψ, X)))
x

e does not appear in R(ψ, X), because search effort is exerted after the choice of submarket27 . After the choice of submarket, worker chooses an effort level to maximize
the term inside the brackets in (3.9).
Problem of an Employed Worker
Similarly, we can define the value function of an employed worker as:
h
i
H(w, ψ) = w + βE δU (ψ 0 ) + (1 − δ) max(eR(ψ 0 , H(w, ψ 0 )) − c(e) + H(w, ψ 0 )) .
e

(3.9)
Equilibrium Definition
Following Menzio and Shi, 2011, we consider block recursive equilibria. In a blockrecursive equilibrium, policy functions do not depend on the distribution of workers
across jobs. Hence, the only relevant aggregate variable is aggregate productivity y,
i.e., ψ = y 28 .
A block-recursive equilibrium consists of a market tightness function θ : Y × R →
R+ , a value function for the unemployed U : Y → R, a value function for the employed
H : R+ × Y → R, a value function for the firm K : R+ × Z × Y → R, optimal choice
of submarket m : R × Y → R, optimal choice of search effort e : R × Y → R+ , entry
27

Since a worker is measure zero, his choice of e does not effect θ, hence it does not effect the
choice of submarket.
28
Since the search effort choice is an innocuous extension of the framework in Menzio and Shi,
2010, we do not prove existence and uniqueness of the block-recursive equilibrium here. Schaal, 2017
provides a discussion of the possible scenarios where block-recursivity may fail.
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wage h : R × Y → R and the cutoff for match productivity z : R × Y → R+ such
that:
1. z(X, ψ) satisfies K(h(X, ψ), z, ψ) = 0,
2. entry wage h(X, ψ) solves H(h, ψ) = X,
3. H(w, ψ) satisfies (3.9), U (ψ) satisfies (3.8), K(w, z, ψ) satisfies (3.7) where probability that a worker finds a job is
p̄(w, ψ) = e(m(H(w, ψ), ψ))p(θ(ψ, m(H(w, ψ), ψ)))(1 − G(z)),
4. e(V, ψ) and m(V, ψ) solve worker’s problem,
5. θ(ψ, X) satisfies the free entry condition (3.6).

3.3.3

Effect of a Decrease in Real Wage

What happens if a worker’s real wage decreases for some exogenous reason, for example, inflation? In this section, we show that there are two competing mechanisms:
a decrease in selectivity in on-the-job search and an increase in the search effort.
First, we prove that when a worker’s current lifetime utility decreases, she searches
in a lower-valued submarket, which has a lower cutoff for match-specific productivity.
Second, we prove that the worker increases the search effort.
Lemma 6. z(X, ψ) is increasing in promised lifetime utility X.
This lemma states that as the promised lifetime utility increases, to form a match,
a better match specific productivity draw is needed. The intuition is clear: if a firm
promises higher value, its lifetime value decreases. Hence, at the marginal match specific productivity, the firm starts making a loss. Therefore, the firm is more selective
in high indexed markets.
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Lemma 7. m(V, ψ) is increasing in current lifetime utility V .
This lemma states that workers with low current lifetime utility searches in a
market that promises lower lifetime utility compared to a worker with higher current
lifetime utility. This mechanism implies a job ladder, workers start from the bottom
and gets better lifetime utilities as they find new jobs and climb the job ladder.
Lemma 8. R(ψ, V ) is decreasing in current lifetime utility V .
As a worker’s current lifetime utility increases, there is a lower gain from finding
a better job. Hence, return to searching for a job increases. This mechanism also
implies that search effort is decreasing with lifetime value.
Lemma 9. e(V, ψ) is decreasing in current lifetime utility V .
Lemmas 6 and 7 show that a worker with a lower current lifetime utility search
in a lower indexed submarket, in which cutoff for the match-specific productivity is
lower. Hence, if a worker’s wage decreases, the expected productivity of her next job
is lower than the expected productivity in the market she previously searched in29 .
On the other hand, Lemma 9 shows that the worker increases his search effort. Hence,
the probability of moving to a better job increases.
At the micro-level, inflation has a direct impact on individual’s lifetime utility.
However, at the macro level, inflation does not have a direct effect, i.e., if workers
do not change their behavior, there would be no change in the aggregate output.
However, due to these two competing channels, the aggregate output might decrease
or increase in the short-run due to inflation. One time inflation shock does not have
an impact on the steady-state, thus, there are no long-run implications.
29

There might even be a probability that she ends up at a worse job than the current one she has.
In the calibrated model, we don’t observe this possibility.
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If the first channel dominates, workers end up with lower match specific productivities, which leads to lower aggregate output. If the second channel dominates,
workers increase their search effort and form new matches with higher match productivity. This mechanism leads to a higher aggregate output. Therefore, impact of an
inflation shock is ambiguous. We proceed to quantify the importance of each channel
in Section 3.4.

3.4

Quantitative Analysis

This section presents the preliminary calibration strategy and the quantitative results.

3.4.1

Calibration Strategy

For the output predictions to have a quantitative interpretation, two implied elasticities should be plausible: (1) the response of job-to-job transitions to an inflationary
shock and (2) the response of aggregate output to job-to-job transitions. We measure
the former elasticity from micro-data that documents how workers adjust their search
behavior with inflationary shocks (see Section 3.A). The latter can be inferred from
wage increases following job switches and a measure of how surplus is shared between
firms and workers. Although matching these two elasticities is necessary for pinning
down the output response, it is not sufficient. The response of the aggregate output
to job-to-job transitions depends on the underlying reasons for these transitions. The
output response following increased transitions due to a labor demand shock does
not necessarily equal the response due to an inflationary shock. Thus, it is crucial
to model these two together instead of stitching two elasticities that are computed
separately.
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We use a telephone-line matching function: p(θ) = θ (1 + θγ )−1/γ 30 and assume the
match specific productivity distribution G follows a Pareto distribution with location
parameter zmin and shape parameter zshape . Lastly, we assume a quadratic search
cost function c(e) = Ae2 where the level potentially differs for the employed Ae and
the unemployed Au .
The full set of parameters necessary to compute the model is the vector:

Ω = {β, δ, γ, κ, Ae , Au , b, zm in, zs hape, ρy , σy }

(3.10)

The model period is taken to be a month. We normalize zm in to equal the
unemployment benefit replacement rate, calibrate β and δ externally, and calibrate
the remaining parameters internally. We calibrate the parameters to match the steady
state moments, except for the parameters that determine the process of aggregate
productivity process. Then, we calibrate the aggregate productivity process to match
the business cycle statistics.
We set the monthly discount factor β = 0.951/12 and exogenous separation rate
δ = 0.011 consistent with the average EU rate in 2005 (Fallick and Fleischman, 2004).
Calibration Idea
The model doesn’t admit an analytic expression for the steady state distribution
of workers across jobs, hence we stick to discussing the broad intuition of how the
moments inform the parameter values. The calibration uses all moments to discipline
all parameters, since general equilibrium effects through market tightness prevents
isolating the response of different moments.
The residual wage distribution informs the match productivity distribution zshape ,
30

The telephone-line matching function, proposed by Stevens, 2007, is a flexible matching function
that has the Cobb-Douglas as a special case.

178

Table 3.2: Calibrated Parameters All parameters in the table are jointly calibrated to match
all the moments. The last column provides an intuitive mapping between the parameters and the
moments that are most related. Avg. labor prod. is constructed by HP filtering the logged series with
smoothing parameter 105 . In order to construct the residual wage distribution, we first construct
an hourly wage measure through dividing the weekly wage by the usual hours worked. Then, we
regress the hourly wage on age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, and education level in
the cross-section for each month of 2005 in CPS. Lastly, we take the average of the quantiles of the
distributions of residuals from each regression.
Parameter
γ Match. Funct. Elasticity
Ae for employed
Au for unemployed
b Unemployment Flow
zshape
κ Vacancy Cost

Value
3
0.066
4.5
5.50
1.95
0.066

Moment
UE
EE
labor share
residual log wage q75
residual log wage q25
median tenure

Data
0.30
0.024
0.60
0.54
-0.32
48

Model
0.30
0.016
0.60
0.32
-0.2679
31

Source
Shimer ’05
Shimer ’05
CPS
CPS
CPS

and the flow benefit of unemployment b. The flow benefit disciplines the left tail
because the wage bargaining between the firm and an unemployed worker depends
on the outside option of the worker. The right tail depends on how large the match
productivity can be, hence on zshape .
The employment-to-employment (EE) and unemployment-to-employment (UE)
transition rates inform the search effort cost level parameters for the employed Ae
and the unemployed Au respectively. A higher transition rate implies a lower cost.
The labor share disciplines the vacancy cost κ, hence the surplus sharing between
the firm and the worker in the model. A higher labor share implies a low κ. Lastly, the
median tenure helps discipline the matching function elasticity γ. As the elasticity
gets larger, firms become more aggressive with the wage postings and the median
tenure goes down.
Calibration Results
The calibrated parameters together with the matched moments are given in Table
3.2.
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3.4.2

Unexpected Inflation Shock

This section presents how the economy responds to unexpected shocks to inflation of
different sizes. In particular, the quantitative findings confirm the analytic results in
Section 3.3.3. While small positive inflation shocks increase the output in the short
run, large positive inflation shocks decrease it. Negative shocks to inflation uniformly
decrease the output.
Figure 3.6: Impulse Responses to Inflation Shocks Each panel presents the impulse response
functions with respect to an unexpected inflation shock of different sizes.
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Figure 3.6 displays the impulse-responses for shocks to inflation of sizes 1 pp and
0.5 pp. The instantaneous change in average wages reflects the size of the inflation
shock. The job-to-job transition rate increases following both shocks together with
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the average on-the-job search effort. However, while the smaller shock brings a shortrun boost to output, the larger shock causes a short-run decline. Here, one important
implication of the counter-acting mechanisms manifests itself. The drop in real wages
brings the search effort up, which results in an increase in output. On the other
hand, the same drop causes the employed to be more nervous about finding a new
job more quickly. Hence, they look for jobs in markets where it is easier to find a job,
where wages and productivity are lower as well. When the shock is small enough, the
increased number of switches dominates the fact that each switch is less productivityenhancing. When the shock gets larger, the latter channel starts to dominate and we
see a drop in output.
Since the wages of new hires are perfectly flexible, job switches undo the effects
of the one-time inflation shocks. Therefore, the model exhibits money neutrality in
the long run.

3.5

Conclusion

In this paper, we try to understand the positive correlation with inflation and jobto-job transitions in the economy. We first show reduced form and causal evidence
suggesting higher inflation causes more job-to-job transitions. In time-series and panel
structures, we find that shocks to inflation precede shocks to job-to-job transition
rates: lags of inflation are consistently good predictors of job-to-job transitions. In
addition, using several monetary policy shock estimates, we argue the relationship
seems to be causal and economically significant: 1% increase in the nominal interest
rate corresponds up to 6.5% decrease in job-to-job transition rates in the U.S. We
proceed by constructing a model that can explain these observations. In settings with
wage rigidities, higher than expected inflation rates increase the benefit of searching
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on the job. As employees increase their search effort, more job-to-job transitions
occur and allocation of labor across firms improves in the short run. The mechanism
carries important implications for monetary policy: an expansionary monetary policy
can improve the allocation of resources in the economy and increase productivity in
the short run.
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3.A

Data Sources

Monthly Data
For the job-to-job flows, we use the series made available by Fujita, Moscarini, and
Postel-Vinay, 201931 that is computed from the Current Population Survey (CPS).
The unemployment-to-employment transition (UE) rates are from Fallick and Fleischman, 2004, similarly computed from the CPS32 . The Consumer Price Index (CPI)
inflation and the unemployment rate (U) series are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics33 . The wage inflation series is computed the same way using the ‘Average hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory employees, total private, not
seasonally adjusted’, from the Current Employment Series (CES)34 .
Yearly Data
CPS provides an approximate measure for yearly job-to-job transition rates starting
at 1976. We use the methodology proposed by Mukoyama, 2014 to deal with the time
aggregation bias introduced by low frequency of data35 .
31

This series is based on the method introduced by Fallick and Fleischman, 2004 while
corrects for an attrition bias that starts with the changes in the survey questions in
2007 (https://sites.google.com/site/fabienpostelvinay/working-papers/EEProbability.
xlsx?attredirects=0&d=1). We repeat our empirical exercises using the original series by Fallick and Fleischman, 2004 as a robustness check. The results are BLANK and are presented in
Appendix BLANK.
32
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2004/200434/200434abs.html.
33
The analyses where CPI is replaced with Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE, https:
//fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCEPI#0) provide quantitatively and qualitatively similar results.
34
https://beta.bls.gov/dataViewer/view/timeseries/CEU0500000008
35
The monthly series is based on the question introduced to CPS at 1994, that asks whether there
were any changes in the employment status of the worker since last month (”SAMEMP”). The
yearly data asks whether the employee works for the same employer as last year. If the answer is no
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Quarterly Data
For the job-to-job flows, we use the series J2JHireR and J2JSepR which are computed
by dividing the number of hires (or separations) with no unemployment period in
between to the total labor force. The two series closely follow each other and give
very similar qualitative and quantitative results. In the main text, we focus on the
analysis with J2JSepR. LEHD does not have information on unemployed-to-employed
transition rates, therefore we use the variable NEHireR instead. This variable is
computed by dividing the number of hires (or separations) from non-employment to
the total labor force. We get state-level wage inflation data from the Quarterly Census
of Employment and Wages (QCEW). Specifically, we use the percentage change in
state-level average weekly wages between quarters t and t-4 in privately owned firms36 .
We use Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) from the BLS for state-level
unemployment and labor-force data37 .

3.B

Evidence on the Extent of Wage Indexation

Explicit measures of what fraction of wage contracts are indexed to inflation are
unavailable for the U.S. economy. The measures that are based on the actual contract
terms are restricted to collective agreements in the U.S., which varies in coverage over
the years and does not apply to a random sample of the workers. Measures based
and there hasn’t been a long unemployment spell, there needs to be at least one switch. However,
there is no way to confirm multiple switches within a year. Furthermore, recall becomes a bigger
problem when the time period the respondent is expected to remember is further back. Although
the data quality is potentially lower due to these issues, the yearly series goes back to high inflation
periods in the U.S., thus provides important variation in inflation levels that is not present in recent
years.
36
We exclude the public sector to isolate the market forces in the wage changes. Using data from
all the firms has little impact on qualitative and quantitative outcomes.
37
See
https://www.j2jexplorer.ces.census.gov,
https://www.bls.gov/cew/
downloadable-data-files.htm , and https://www.bls.gov/lau/.
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on changes in the nominal wages are imperfect due to several other factors affecting
the wage process. However, even the most conservative estimates imply a very low
level of wage indexation (less than 25%) in developed countries. Here, we discuss the
implications of prior research on the extent of wage indexation.
Evidence Based on Contract Terms
The main papers on the prevalence of ‘cost-of-living adjustment’ (COLA) terms in
contracts are Card, 1990 for Canada and Ragan Jr and Bratsberg, 2000 for the
U.S. Card, 1990 looks at the universe of manufacturing union contracts (with more
than 500 employees) signed between 1968 and 1983. He finds that 26% of them
have an ‘escalation clause’ on average while the explicit indexation is very rare. The
fraction with ‘escalation clause’ peaks at 65% in a period where the inflation is over
10%. Ragan Jr and Bratsberg, 2000 use the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data
on collective bargaining settlements to see the prevalence of COLA provisions. They
document that even though 61% of the settlements had COLA provisions back in
1976, it has fallen all the way to 22% in 1996 when the data is no longer available.
The COLA provisions are known to be much less prevalent among non-union workers.
With the decline in unionization, collective agreements cover a smaller fraction of the
labor force in either country today. We consider these measures as an upper bound
on the extent of wage indexation. Druant et al., 2012 utilize a firm-level survey
conducted in 17 European countries regarding wage adjustment practices. Across
15,000 firms from all industries, they document that only 11.5 % of the firms employ
any formal indexation clause in employment contracts while only 10.9% have any
informal inflation considerations in wage setting38 . More importantly, the survey also
asks about the frequency of wage adjustments. This gives us a back-of-the-envelope
38

There is still large variation across countries. In Belgium, 98.2% of the firms have automatic
wage indexation while in Italy, only 5.8% of the firms have any form of wage indexation.
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mapping between the degree of indexation and the frequency of wage adjustments.
Wage adjustments happen either yearly or more frequently for 74.4% of the firms.
Thus, even when firms adjust wages frequently, this does not imply an implicit wage
indexation.
Evidence Based on Wage Movements
McLaughlin, 1994, using PSID data, finds that the effect of unanticipated inflation
on nominal wage growth is consistent with 42% indexation between 1970 and 1986.
Hofmann, Peersman, and Straub, 2012, using a DSGE model, infers the extent of
wage indexation in the economy from the time variation in U.S. wage dynamics.
They estimate the degree of wage indexation to be 0.17 in 2000, compared to 0.91
in 1974, which is roughly in line with the time path of COLA coverage in collective
bargaining agreements39 . More recently, Grigsby, Hurst, and Yildirmaz, 2019, using
data from a payroll processing company in the U.S., found that approximately 36% of
job stayers experience no nominal wage changes in a one-year period. Once contrasted
with the evidence in Druant et al., 2012, the implied wage indexation should be less
than 11.5%.

3.C

Proofs

Lemma 6. z(X, ψ) is increasing in promised lifetime utility X.
Proof. Recall that z solves
K(h(X, ψ), z, ψ) = 0.
39

A major implication from the paper is that wage indexation is a response to increasing monetary
policy uncertainty. Thus, the level of indexation should be endogenous to run counter-factual exercises that change monetary policy. Since we focus on one-time shocks, we abstract from endogenous
indexation.
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Clearly, as promised lifetime utility X increases, value of the firm decreases. In order
to satisfy equality, z must be increased.

Lemma 7. m(V, ψ) is increasing in current lifetime utility V .
Proof. LetVh > V` . We want to show that m(Vh , ψ) ≥ m(V` , ψ). For simplicity, we
drop the aggregate state variable, since we are only considering the change in current
lifetime utility V and denote the associated choices as mh and m` and associated
market tightness as θh and θ` . Suppose the contrary: mh < m` . This implies that
m` − Vh > mh − Vh . Since mh is the optimal choice for Vh

p(θh )(mh − Vh ) ≥ p(θ` )(m` − Vh )
=⇒ p(θh ) > p(θ` ).
Rearranging the first line also gives us:

p(θh )mh − p(θ` )m` ≥ [p(θh ) − p(θ` )]Vh .
Similarly, since m` is the optimal choice for V`

p(θ` )(m` − V` ) ≥ p(θh )(mh − V` )
[p(θh ) − p(θ` )]V` ≥ p(θh )mh − p(θ` )m` .
Using combining these two conditions:

[p(θh ) − p(θ` )]V` ≥ [p(θh ) − p(θ` )]Vh =⇒ V` ≥ Vh .
Which contradicts the assumption that Vh > V` .
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Lemma 8. R(ψ, V ) is decreasing in current lifetime utility V .
Proof. By envelope theorem:

RV (ψ, V ) = −p(θ(m(V, ψ))) < 0.
Hence, R is decreasing in V .

3.D



Solution Method

We use Value Function Iteration with 20 grid points for the distribution of z, 5 points
for the distribution of y, 200 points for the grid for V , and 600 points for the grid for
w. We define K̃(V, y, z) = K(h(V, y), y, z) for convenience and start with an initial
guess K̃ 0 (V, y, z). The algorithm works sequentially. At step i, we compute
1. J i (V, y) given K̃ i−1 (V, y, z)
2. z i (V, y) and θi (V, y) given J i (V, y)
3. U i (y), ei (V, y), Ri (V, y), and mi (V, y) given z i (V, y) and θi (V, y)
4. H i (w, y) given ei (V, y), Ri (V, y), mi (V, y), z i (V, y), θi (V, y), and U i (y)
5. K i (w, y, z) given ei (V, y), mi (V, y), z i (V, y), and θi (V, y)
6. hi (V, y) given H i (w, y)
7. K̃ i (V, y, z) given K i (w, y, z) and hi (V, y)
We stop when dmax (K̃ i (V, y, z), K̃ i−1 (V, y, z)) <  where dmax gives the maximum
distance between the two vectors.
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3.E

A Random Search Model with Effort

In this section, we present a random-search version of our model in Section 3.3. The
random-search version here doesn’t have the selectivity channel, since workers do not
direct their search to particular types of firms.

3.E.1

Preferences

The discrete-time economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived workers
and firms. The total measures of workers and firms are fixed and normalized to one.
Each worker has ability x, which is distributed with cumulative distribution function
G, and each firm has productivity y, which is distributed by cumulative distribution
function Γ. Time is discrete.
Both firms and workers are risk neutral and have the same discount factor, β ∈
(0, 1).

3.E.2

Production Technology

There is only one consumption good in the economy. A worker-firm pair (x, y) can
produce f (x, y) output, where f is strictly increasing in both arguments and supermodular, i.e. fi (x, y) > 0 for i ∈ {x, y} and fxy (x, y) > 0, where fi is the derivative
with respect to i.
Super-modularity of f implies that output maximizing allocation is to match high
productivity workers with high productivity firms.
Each unemployed worker produces b(x) unit of output by herself. Lastly, each
worker-firm pair dissolves with probability δ in a given period.
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3.E.3

Meeting Technology

In order to produce workers and firms need to find each other through random search.
Both unemployed and employed worker can search for a job. In order to find a
vacancy, workers need to exert search effort. c(e) denotes the utility cost of exerting
e units of effort for the employed. For simplicity, we assume that search effort of
unemployed worker is fixed to 1 and there is no cost attached to this effort. However, employed person chooses e optimally40 . We assume c(e) is convex and strictly
increasing in e, with lime→1 c(e) → ∞ to simplify matching probabilities.
Firms, on the other hand, choose how many vacancies to open. In order to open
v units of vacancies, a firm needs to pay κ(v), where κ(v) is convex and strictly
increasing.
Let E and V be the total measure of search effort and vacancies, respectively.
Total measure of matches to be formed is denoted with M (E, V ), for a given E
and V . We assume that M (E, V ) is homogeneous of degree one. Then, measure of
matches per unit of search effort is given by M (1, E/V ). Let λ denote the probability
that one unit of search effort matches a vacancy: λ = M (E, V )/E. The probability
that a vacancy meets with a worker is given by λf = M (E, V )/V .
We define market tightness to be the measure of vacancies available per unit search
effort and denote it with θ = V /E. Homogeneity of degree one implies that match
probabilities of workers and vacancies only depend on aggregate quantities through
tightness: λ(θ) = M (θ, 1), λf (θ) = M (1, 1/θ). This implies that λf (θ) = θλ(θ).
40

It is assumed that production level does not depend on search behavior of the worker.
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3.E.4

Wage Setting

Upon meeting, firm makes a take or leave it offer to worker. Firms can only propose
constant nominal wage contracts to workers from which workers can walk away from
anytime. Contracts can be re-negotiated without cost.
Contract space is not complete. Firms cannot make wage rate contingent on the
state of the economy. Moreover, search effort of worker is not contractible. Hence,
when a firm makes an offer, it needs to take into account the search effort of the
worker.
When an employed worker meets with another vacancy, incumbent firm can make
a counter-offer. As in Postel–Vinay and J.-.-.-M. Robin, 2002, this triggers Bertrand
competition between incumbent firm and poaching firm.
Let Vt (w, x, y) be the lifetime utility of a worker type x who is employed at firm y
with a wage w and let Jt (w, x, y) be the present discounted profits of a firm with productivity y that employs worker x at wage w41 . Consider two firms with productivity
y 0 > y that are bargaining over a worker with type x. In Bertrand competition, the
maximum that a firm can offer as wage is the entire output. In such a situation, the
lifetime utility of a worker type x would be Vt (f (x, y), x, y) with firm y. Therefore,
firm y 0 should solve the following problem:
max Jt (w, x, y 0 )
w

s.t. Vt (w, x, y 0 ) ≥ Vt (f (x, y), x, y).
where constraint ensures that firm y cannot outbid the offer.
When a firm makes an offer, it needs to take into account the search effort of
41
For brevity, instead of writing aggregate states in the value function, we index value functions
with the time subscript.
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the worker. Even though an increase in w decreases the output share of firm, it
discourages the worker from searching for a job and getting new offers, which is
good for the firm. Depending on which effect dominates, value function Jt might be
increasing or decreasing with w. To simplify the model, as in Postel-Vinay and J.-M.
Robin, 2004, we assume that Jt (w, x, y) is a decreasing function of w.
Assumption 3. Jt (w, x, y) is a decreasing function of w.
This assumption implies that constraint must hold with equality, since Vt (w, x, y)
is increasing in w.
There are three possibilities for a worker employed at a firm with productivity
y. First, she might match with a firm that has higher productivity, y 0 > y. In
this case high productive firm wins the bargaining and worker changes his job. The
worker’s lifetime utility becomes V (f (x, y), x, y)42 . Let φ(x, y, y 0 ) be the wage that
solves V (φ(x, y, y 0 ), x, y 0 ) = V (f (x, y), x, y). In other words, π(x, y, y 0 ) is the wage
rate of worker type x when she moves from y to y 0 .
In the second case, the worker matches with a firm that has lower productivity,
y > y 00 , however poaching firm can offer higher lifetime utility to worker than she
currently has. In this case, poacher cannot win the bargaining, though bargaining
increases the wage of the worker in the current firm. In this case, the worker’s lifetime
utility increases to V (f (x, y 00 ), x, y 00 ) and her wage increases to π(x, y 00 , y).
The second case can only happen if the current lifetime utility of the worker is
lower than the maximum utility she could get from the poaching firm, i.e. V (w, x, y) <
V (f (x, y 00 ), x, y 00 ). In this situation, there is a room for firm y 00 to make an offer.
In the third case, the poaching firm’s productivity is so low that it cannot make
any offer that triggers Bertrand competition. In this case there is no change in the
42

Here, since all comparisons happen at the same aggregate state, we suppress the time subscripts
to reduce notation.
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Figure 3.7: Worker x in Firm y Matches with Firm y 0 > y.
V (f (x, y 0 ), x, y 0 )

V (f (x, y 0 ), x, y 0 )

V (f (x, y), x, y)

V (f (x, y), x, y)

Firm y

V (φ(x, y, y 0 ), x, y 0 )

V (w, x, y)

worker moves
to y 0
Firm y

Firm y 0

Firm y 0

worker’s wage and lifetime utility.
Let ỹ(w, x, y) be the minimum productivity level that a firm can trigger a bargaining. The following table summarizes the bargaining outcome between incumbent
firm with productivity y and poaching firm with productivity y 0 :
• y 0 > y: Poaching firm offers φ(x, y, y 0 ), worker moves to firm y 0 and her lifetime
utility becomes V (f (x, y), x, y). See Figure 3.7.
• ỹ(w, x, y) ≤ y 0 ≤ y: Incumbent firm offers π(x, y 0 , y), worker stays with the
incumbent firm and her lifetime utility becomes V (f (x, y 0 ), x, y 0 ). See Figure
3.8.
• y 0 < ỹ(w, x, y): The worker ignores the poaching firm, stays with the incumbent
firm and her lifetime utility remains V (w, x, y). See Figure 3.9.
Now consider an unemployed worker. If she meets a vacancy, the firm has the all
the bargaining power, since there is no other firm to make a counter offer. Hence,
the firm offers the wage rate that makes the unemployed worker indifferent. Let
197

Figure 3.8: Worker x in Firm y Matches with Firm y 0 ∈ [ỹ, y].
V (f (x, y), x, y)

V (f (x, y), x, y)
V (f (x, y 0 ), x, y 0 )

Firm y

Firm y 0

V (φ(x, y 0 , y), x, y)

worker stays
at y

V (w, x, y)
Firm y

V (f (x, y 0 ), x, y 0 )

Firm y 0

Figure 3.9: Worker x in Firm y Matches with Firm y 0 < ỹ.
V (f (x, y), x, y)

V (f (x, y), x, y)
nothing
happens
V (w, x, y)

V (w, x, y)
Firm y

V (f (x, y 0 ), x, y 0 )

Firm y

Firm y 0
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V (f (x, y 0 ), x, y 0 )

Firm y 0

φt (x, 0, y 0 ) be the wage rate that firm y 0 offers to unemployed worker. φt (x, 0, y 0 )
solves Vt (φt (x, 0, y 0 ), x, y 0 ) = Ut (x).

3.E.5

Market Tightness

Let h(w, x, y) be the measure of workers with skill x employed at firm y earning
wage w and let e? (w, x, y) be the optimal search effort. Let u(x) be the measure of
unemployed workers with skill x. Lastly, let v(y) be the measure of vacancies posted
by firms of type y.
Total search effort in the economy is given by
Z
Et =

Z Z Z

e?t (w, x, y)ht (w, x, y)dwdydx.

ut (x)dx +

Total measure of vacancies in the economy is given by
Z
Vt =

vt? (y)dG(y).

Then, market tightness is given by

θt = Vt /Et .
We define the distribution of vacancies as Γ:
Z
Γt (y) ≡

y

vt (y 0 ) 0
dy .
Vt

with γt (y) is the associated density function.
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(3.11)

3.E.6

Problem of the Firm

The present value of a filled vacancy by firm of productivity y that employs worker
with skill x at wage w is
Jt (w, x, y) = f (x, y) − w
"
+ β (1 − δ)(1 − e?t+1 (w, x, y)λ(θt+1 )Jt+1 (w, x, y)
+ (1 −
Zy
+

δ)e?t+1 (w, x, y)λ(θt+1 )


Γt+1 (ỹt+1 (w, x, y))Jt+1 (w, x, y)

#
Jt+1 (φt+1 (x, y 0 , y), x, y)γt+1 (y 0 )dy 0 .

ỹt+1

Using integration by parts we get
"
Jt (w, x, y) = f (x, y) − w + β(1 − δ) Jt+1 (w, x, y)
(3.12)

#
+

0
e?t+1 (w, x, y)λ(θt+1 )Jt+1
(φt+1 (x, y 0 , y), x, y)γ(y 0 )dy 0

,

0
where Jt+1
is the derivative of Jt+1 (φt+1 (x, y 0 , y), x, y) with respect to y 0 .

The main decision the firm gives is how many vacancies to post each period:

max vλf (θt )

"Z

v

Z
+

y

ut (x)Jt (φt (x, 0, y), x, y)dx
Z Z

#
Jt (φt (x, y 0 , y), x, y)ht (w, x, y 0 )dwdxdy 0 − κ(v)

A vacancy can be filled by an unemployed worker or an employed worker. The
first term inside the bracket is the expected return to vacancy that is filled by an
unemployed worker while the second term is the expected return to vacancy filled by
an employed worker. A firm with productivity y can hire any worker employed at a
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firm with lower productivity y 0 < y and pays the worker φt (x, y 0 , y).
First order condition with respect to v is
"Z

λf (θt )

ut (x)Jt (φt (x, 0, y), x, y)dx
Z
+

y

Z Z

#

(3.13)

Jt (φt (x, y 0 , y), x, y)ht (w, x, y 0 )dwdxdy 0 = κ0 (v).

At an interior optimum, firm equates the marginal cost of opening an extra vacancy to return to vacancy.

3.E.7

Problem of the Worker

Now, we are in a position to define the value function for a worker.
First consider a worker with skill level x employed at firm y and earning w.
Suppose she searches for a job with effort level e. The worker gets flow utility of
w − c(e) this period. Next period, with probability δ she becomes unemployed and
earns lifetime utility of an unemployed worker, Ut+1 (x). With probability (1 − δ)
she remains employed and searches for a job. For a given effort level e, she does
not meet with a firm with probability 1 − λ(θt+1 )e and her lifetime utility becomes
Wt+1 (w, x, y). With probability λ(θt+1 )e she meets with a firm. With probability
1 − Γt+1 (y) the poaching firm has productivity y 0 > y. In this case the lifetime utility
of the worker becomes Wt+1 (f (x, y), x, y). With probability Γ(ỹt+1 ), the poaching
firm has productivity y 0 < ỹ. In this case, the lifetime utility of the worker remains
as Wt+1 (w, x, y). If the poaching firm has productivity y 0 ∈ [ỹt+1 , y], then his lifetime
utility becomes Wt+1 (f (x, y 0 ), x, y 0 ).
Hence, the lifetime utility of a worker with skill level x employed at firm y at wage
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w is
"
Wt (w, x, y) = max w − c(e) + β δUt+1 (x)
e

+ (1 − δ)[1 − λ(θt+1 )e]Wt+1 (w, x, y)
h
+ (1 − δ)λ(θt+1 )e (1 − Γt+1 (y))Wt+1 (f (x, y), x, y)
Zy
+

i
Wt+1 (f (x, y 0 ), x, y 0 )dΓt+1 (y 0 ) + Γt+1 (ỹt+1 )Wt+1 (w, x, y)

(3.14)
#

ỹt+1

Consider a worker employed at a firm y with wage rate f (x, y). Clearly, she has no
gain from matching an outside firm, since no firm offers more than Wt+1 (f (x, y), x, y).
In other words, optimal search effort for such worker is 0. This implies that the lifetime
utility for her is

Wt (f (x, y), x, y) = f (x, y) + βδUt+1 (x) + β(1 − δ)Wt+1 (f (x, y), x, y)

(3.15)

Observe that state variables affect it through the value of unemployment. Since
she does not search on the job, market tightness is irrelevant for on the job value. This
implies that y only effects it through the production function. Hence, the derivative
of Wt (f (x, y), x, y) with respect to y is fy (x, y)/[1 − β(1 − δ)].
Using integration by part and derivative of Wt+1 (f (x, y), x, y), the lifetime utility
of an employed worker becomes
"

h
Wt (w, x, y) = maxw − c(e) + β δUt+1 (x) + (1 − δ) Wt+1 (w, x, y)
e

Zy
+ λ(θt+1 )e

#
i
fy (x, y)
[1 − Γt+1 (y 0 )]dy 0
1 − β(1 − δ)

ỹt+1
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(3.16)

Taking derivative with respect to e gives us

c0 (e) = β(1 − δ)λ(θt+1 )

Zy

fy (x, y)
[1 − Γt+1 (y 0 )]dy 0 .
1 − β(1 − δ)

(3.17)

ỹt+1

where he left hand side is the marginal cost of effort. The right hand side is the
marginal return to search effort. (1 − δ)λ(θ) is the increase in the probability of
meeting with a firm. The integral is the return to finding a match. β is the discount
factor. At the optimal solution, the cost of increasing the search effort should be
equal to benefit of increasing the search effort.
Now consider unemployed worker. Unemployed worker has no choice, she searches
for a job with effort level 1. In the current period she gets flow utility of unemployment
b(x). In the next period, with probability λ(θ) she finds a job. Given the assumption
that firms can make take-it-or-leave-it offers to unemployed, finding a job does not
increase lifetime utility. Hence, the lifetime utility of an unemployed worker with skill
x can be written as:
Ut (x) = b(x) + βUt+1 (x).

3.E.8

(3.18)

Distribution Accounting

In this section, we derive how the distribution of workers over employment status
changes over time.
First, consider distribution of unemployed: ut (x). λ(θt ) fraction find a job and
leave unemployment. δ fraction of employed workers with skill level x separate from
their job and become unemployed. Hence, unemployment distribution evolves ac-

203

cording to
Z Z
ut+1 (x) = ut (x) − λ(θt )ut (x) + δ

h(w, x, y)dwdy.

(3.19)

Similarly, employed distribution evolves according to

ht+1 (w, x, y) =ht (w, x, y) − δht (w, x, y)λ(θt )[1 − Γt (ỹ)]
Z
+ et (w0 , x, ŷ(x, w))λ(θt )γt (y)ht (w0 , x, ŷt (x, w))dw0
Z w
+
et (w0 , x, y)λ(θt )γt (ŷt (x, w))ht (w0 , x, y)dw0

(3.20)

+ 1{w = φt (x, 0, y)}ut (x)γt (y),
where ŷt (x, w) satisfies φt (x, ŷt (x, w), y) = w.

3.E.9

Equilibrium

Definition 4. For given initial distributions u0 (x) and h0 (w, x, y), a competitive
equilibrium is a set of value functions {Ut (x), Wt (w, x, y), Jt (w, x, y)}t , policy functions {e?t (w, x, y), vt? (y)}t prices {φ(x, y, y 0 )t }, market tightness {θt }t and distributions
{ut (x), ht (w, x, y)}t such that
• Value functions solve (3.18), (3.16), (3.12),
• policy functions solve (3.13), (3.17),
• φ(x, y, y 0 ) is the wage rate that solves W (f (x, y), x, y) = W (w, x, y 0 ), and
φ(x, 0, y) is the wage rate that solves U (x) = W (w, x, y),
• market tightness is given by (3.11),
• distributions evolve according to (3.19) and (3.20).
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Figure 3.10: The Discrepancy Between the MCS Forecast and Realized Inflation The

x axis refers to the calendar year. The black line represents the difference between the 1-year ahead
MCS forecast and the realized inflation. The values above 1 indicate inflation exceeded forecasts.
The red line represents the cumulative real wage loss for a worker who signed his contract two years
ago, based on MCS forecasts. The green line represents the cumulative real wage loss for a worker
who signed his contract five years ago, based on MCS forecasts.
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Figure 3.11: Predictive regressions for inflation mistake and acceptance rate The left

panel presents the coefficient estimates and the associated 95% CI for β where ‘inflation mistake’ is
regressed on the ‘acceptance rate’ with the specification in Equation 3.1. Each point and the bar
correspond to an estimate where the regressors are with the associated lag in the x-axis. The right
panel provides the same plot where the ‘acceptance rate’ is regressed on the ‘inflation mistake’. See
Appendix 3.A for details of the data sources.
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